Summary of the Opinion — Judge Edis

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence by the Applicant following refusal by a single judge. The Applicant was convicted after a Crown Court trial before Judge Murray and a jury on 4 July 2024 of three offences on an indictment: (1) soliciting the murder of the Victim contrary to section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861; (2) encouraging or assisting others to kidnap the Victim, contrary to section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007; and (3) encouraging or assisting the commission of the rape of the Victim under the same provision. The offending conduct underlying counts 2 and 3 took place over a long period during which the Applicant attempted to persuade several people (referred to in the record as "Marc", "Ryan" and others) to participate in abduction, kidnap and subsequent rapes. Count 1 concerned conduct at the end of that period in which the Victim's death was specifically contemplated and intended.

At first instance the sentencing judge imposed three concurrent life sentences, fixing a minimum term which he reached by assessing a notional determinate term of 24 years and then applying the appropriate reductions; after taking account of time on remand the specified minimum term under section 232 of the Sentencing Act 2020 was 15 years and 85 days. The Applicant sought renewed leave to appeal against sentence; this court heard submissions from Attorney Wass (appearing pro bono) and reserved its decision on leave and the substantive appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the notional determinate period adopted by the sentencing judge (24 years, from which the minimum term was calculated) was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
2. Whether a discretionary life sentence was required in this case given the possibility of an extended determinate sentence and, specifically, whether the judge should have considered and explained why an extended determinate sentence would have been inadequate before imposing life imprisonment.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Wass)

• The notional determinate period of 24 years (and the resulting minimum term) was manifestly excessive: the offending was preparatory in nature, no completed offences occurred, and there was no actual physical assault or harm to the Victim.
• There are three distinguishable levels of seriousness—(a) completed offences such as rape, kidnap and murder; (b) attempted offending that goes beyond mere preparation; and (c) soliciting/encouraging others to offend—and the Applicant's conduct should properly be assessed at a lower level of seriousness than the judge did.
• The court should have treated a life sentence as a measure of last resort. The sentencing judge should have considered imposing an extended determinate sentence (with an extended licence period) and explained why that regime would be insufficient to protect the public before imposing life imprisonment.
• Reliance was placed on the court's decision in R v Case B [2023] EWCA Crim 319 (referred to in the judgment as R v Franks) as an authority illustrating that soliciting murder cannot always be equated with attempted murder for sentencing purposes and that a lower sentence may be appropriate where there has been no attempt and no feasible attempt.

Prosecution's Sentencing Submissions (as recorded in the sentencing material)

• The prosecution conveyed that the Victim had provided a victim personal statement (treated confidentially) and submitted that the offences had life-changing consequences for the Victim's private and professional life.
• The prosecution submitted that the extent of fear and shock caused to the Victim by learning of the planning was extreme and had created additional trauma, and that offending of this type also has a broader adverse impact on women and public confidence in safety.
• The sentencing record shows that the court accepted the prosecution's account of harm and treated the offending as involving the highest category of intended harm.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court took a stepped approach in its analysis.

First, the court acknowledged the nature of the offending: prolonged and obsessive planning directed at the Victim involving research into her private life, assembly of equipment, attempts to procure incapacitating substances, encouragement of multiple other individuals to participate in kidnap, rape and murder, and explicit contemplation of the Victim's death. The judge's sentencing findings included that the Applicant had relevant and serious previous convictions involving the threat of sexual violence, and that the Applicant was dangerous.

Second, on the contention that the notional determinate term of 24 years was manifestly excessive, the court analysed the decision in R v Case B (Franks) on which the Applicant relied. The court emphasised that Franks should not be read as a categorical rule making all soliciting-to-murder offences less serious than all attempted murders. The court explained that soliciting murder often involves planning and premeditation which may heighten seriousness compared with some attempted murders. The court therefore concluded that it was appropriate for the sentencing judge to have regard to the attempted murder guideline and to place the case in category B2 of that guideline (a starting point of 25 years with a range of 20–30 years).

Third, the sentencing judge had accounted for the "viability" or "feasibility" of the plans (the Applicant's physical limitations, lack of transport, lack of premises suitable for holding a victim and other realistic obstacles) and accordingly adjusted the notional determinate period to 24 years rather than 25. The appellate court found that assessment and adjustment to be within permissible judicial evaluation and not open to successful challenge given the totality of the offending, the number of attempts to recruit accomplices and the applicant's previous convictions.

Fourth, on the challenge to the imposition of life sentences, the court analysed the statutory scheme for dangerous offenders. The statutory process requires the sentencing judge to determine dangerousness and then to determine whether the level of seriousness justifies life imprisonment. The sentencing judge had made those assessments, properly taking into account the offences together and the Applicant's previous convictions, and had concluded that life sentences were justified. The appellate court held that there was no requirement for the sentencing judge to demonstrate that he had considered, and rejected as inadequate, an extended determinate sentence in order to justify life imprisonment so long as he had followed the required statutory stages and reached sound conclusions on them.

Finally, the court addressed public protection considerations. It observed that an extended determinate sentence carries a point at which the offender would become entitled to release even if still dangerous, and that in a case where the offender was clearly dangerous with no prospect of certainty as to when that would cease, the risk to public safety could render an extended determinate sentence inadequate. On that basis the court found the sentencing judge's conclusion that life sentences were required to be unimpeachable.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding:

• The court granted renewed leave to appeal (finding the grounds arguable) and made a representation order for leading counsel to present them, but after full consideration dismissed the appeal on its merits.
• The sentencing judge's approach to using the attempted murder guideline as a yardstick, placing the case in category B2 and arriving at a notional determinate term of 24 years (leading to a specified minimum term of 15 years and 85 days after remand credit and statutory calculation), was appropriate and not manifestly excessive.
• The sentencing judge was entitled to impose discretionary life sentences on the basis that the Applicant was a dangerous offender; it was not necessary for him to set out explicit reasons for not choosing an extended determinate sentence once he had properly applied the statutory dangerousness framework and concluded that life sentences were justified.

Implications:

• The direct effect is that the life sentences and the minimum term fixed by the sentencing judge remain in place and the Applicant's appeal against sentence is dismissed.
• The court recorded that leave to appeal had been granted and that a representation order was made for leading counsel, but the substantive appeal failed.
• The opinion emphasises the need for close factual analysis when comparing soliciting-type offences with attempted offences and confirms that a court may, in appropriate cases, sensibly use attempted-murder guidelines as a comparative yardstick while tailoring the assessment to the particular facts. The court declined to lay down a categorical rule that soliciting-to-murder is always less serious than attempted murder.
• The judgment does not purport to establish a new, general precedent beyond its application to the facts; it affirms application of the statutory dangerousness framework and the established approach to sentencing analysis in similar complex cases.

Document prepared on the basis of the opinion delivered by Judge Edis. All personal names and identifying details have been replaced with neutral placeholders to preserve anonymity in accordance with the summary instructions.