| Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA v College van gedeputeerde staten van Limburg (“Dutch Nitrogen”) (Joined Cases C-293/17, C-294/17) [2019] Env LR 27 |
Precautionary approach; stringent authorization criterion under Article 6(3) to prevent adverse effects; nutrient loading scrutiny. |
Part of the scientific/policy backdrop to Company A’s advice; underscores strict prevention of adverse effects on protected sites. |
| UBS AG v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2016] UKSC 13; [2016] 1 WLR 1005 |
Purposive statutory interpretation in domestic law. |
Relied on to confirm ordinary domestic purposive construction for regulation 63. |
| Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5; [2021] ICR 657 |
Context- and purpose-led statutory construction. |
Supports purposive reading of regulation 63’s broad language. |
| R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28; [2023] 1 WLR 2594 |
Statutes construed in light of their purpose and scheme. |
Employed to orient interpretation of the Habitats Regulations. |
| R (Wyatt) v Fareham Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 983; [2023] PTSR 1952; [2023] Env LR 14 |
Summary of the precautionary principle and Article 6(3) requirements. |
Confirms high standard of investigation and the “no reasonable doubt” threshold. |
| Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (“Waddenzee”) (Case C-127/02) [2005] All ER (EC) 353 |
Precautionary principle; appropriate assessment must remove reasonable scientific doubt. |
Grounds the stringent standard for appropriate assessments. |
| Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála (Case C-258/11) [2014] PTSR 1092 |
Appropriate assessment must contain complete, precise, and definitive findings. |
Reinforces rigour required for Article 6(3) assessments. |
| People Over Wind v Coillte Teoranta (Case C-323/17) [2018] PTSR 1668 |
Appropriate assessment must remove reasonable scientific doubt; rigour of assessment. |
Cited for the standard of certainty in assessments. |
| Holohan v An Bord Pleanála (Case C-461/17) [2019] PTSR 1054 |
Assess all aspects affecting conservation objectives using best scientific knowledge; no reasonable scientific doubt standard. |
Confirms depth and scope of appropriate assessments. |
| Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Conseil des Ministres (Case C-411/17) [2020] Env LR 9 |
“Agree to” in Article 6(3) means assessment must precede authorization; timing in multi-stage consent. |
Supports assessment when project effects are sufficiently identifiable within staged consent. |
| Friends of the Irish Environment Ltd v An Bord Pleanála (Case C-254/19) [2021] Env LR 16 |
“Development consent” is the decision entitling the developer to proceed. |
Used to identify the relevant implementing decision in staged processes. |
| Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom (Case C-508/03) [2006] QB 764 |
Under the EIA Directive, EIA may be required at reserved matters if not assessed earlier and effects emerge. |
Provides analogy for staged assessments; informs timing analysis. |
| R (Barker) v Bromley London Borough Council (Case C-290/03) [2006] QB 764; and R (Barker) v Bromley LBC [2007] 1 AC 470 |
EIA in staged consents; possible need for later-stage assessment where effects identified later or overlooked. |
Quoted to illustrate that later-stage assessment can be required in multi-stage processes. |
| Preston New Road Action Group v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 9; [2018] Env LR 18 |
EIA Directive may require earliest-possible-stage assessment (contrasted with Habitats Directive). |
Used to distinguish timing requirements under different regimes. |
| R (Wingfield) v Canterbury City Council [2019] EWHC 1974 (Admin) |
Habitats assessment may be done at reserved matters where earlier stage was overlooked; “agree” occurs at implementing decision. |
Endorsed for the interpretation that regulation 63 can apply at later stages. |
| R (Swire) v Canterbury City Council [2022] EWHC 390 (Admin); [2022] JPL 1026 |
Later-stage appropriate assessment under Habitats Regulations before implementing decision; no requirement for earliest stage. |
Affirms Wingfield approach; applied by analogy. |
| European Commission v Germany (Case C-142/16) EU:C:2017:301 |
Date of “agreement” is the date of the implementing decision authorizing the project. |
Supports identifying the operative decision in multi-stage processes. |
| R (Wells) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (Case C-201/02) [2004] ECR I-723 |
Reserved matters approval characterized as the implementing decision. |
Used to locate the operative authorization stage. |
| Cooper v Attorney General [2011] QB 976 (CA) |
Support for the possibility of later-stage assessment where earlier stage was overlooked. |
Cited in Wingfield to justify reserved-matters-stage assessment. |
| No Adastral New Town Ltd v Suffolk Coastal District Council [2015] EWCA Civ 88; [2015] Env LR 28 |
Habitats Directive focuses on end-result protection; assessment need not be at the earliest stage. |
Relied on to justify later-stage Habitats assessments. |
| R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13; [2003] 2 AC 687 |
Courts give effect to legislative purpose, read in context and history. |
Supports purposive reading of the Habitats Regulations. |
| R (Wright) v Forest of Dean District Council [2019] UKSC 53; [2019] 1 WLR 6562 |
Rights conferred by planning permission cannot be overridden or diluted by policy. |
Central to Issue 2: policy cannot curtail rights granted by outline permission. |
| Elsick Development Co Ltd v Aberdeen City and Shire Strategic Development Planning Authority [2017] UKSC 66; [2017] PTSR 1413 |
National policy can be a material consideration at the permission-grant stage. |
Used to distinguish when policy properly affects decision-making (pre-permission vs post-permission). |
| DB Symmetry Ltd v Swindon Borough Council [2022] UKSC 33; [2023] 1 WLR 198 |
Construction of planning conditions by a reasonable reader in context. |
Applied to confine discharge decisions to the scope of the conditions actually imposed. |
| Kingsway Investments (Kent) Ltd v Kent County Council [1971] AC 72 |
Authorities must not misuse functions to achieve a de facto revocation/modification without compensation. |
Supports that discharge decisions cannot be used to revisit or undermine granted permission. |
| Camden London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1993] JPL 466 |
Approval of reserved matters must be determined within the terms of the condition. |
Limits the scope of considerations when discharging/approving under conditions. |
| Redrow Homes Ltd v First Secretary of State [2004] EWCA Civ 1375; [2005] JPL 502 |
Reserved matters approval turns on the construction of the condition; changes in general policy may require revocation procedures (with compensation) rather than re-interpretation. |
Applied to confine the discharge decision to the condition’s ambit. |
| Paul Newman New Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2021] EWCA Civ 15; [2021] PTSR 1054 |
After outline permission, matters approved in principle cannot be revisited; some development must be acceptable within the permission’s ambit. |
Supports that discharge cannot be used to negate the permitted development. |
| Shemara Ltd v Luton Corpn (1967) 18 P & CR 520 |
Authority cannot go back on points of principle accepted by granting outline permission. |
Endorses limits on withholding approval to the matters expressly reserved. |
| Lewis Thirkwell v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) JPL 844 |
Limits on revisiting agreed principles at reserved matters stage. |
As above. |
| Proberun Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1990) 61 P & CR 77 |
Confines refusal to the scope of reserved matters. |
As above. |
| R v Newbury District Council, Ex p Chieveley Parish Council [1999] PLCR 51 (CA) |
Confirms limits on re-opening principle issues at reserved matters stage. |
As above. |
| R (Whiteside) v London Borough of Croydon [2023] EWHC 3289 (Admin) |
When discharging a condition, the authority may consider coherence with other conditions of the same permission. |
Distinguished; does not permit use of discharge to import unrelated new policy objectives. |