Summary of Opinion (Anonymized)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an Order made on 4 July 2025 (effective 5 July 2025) by the Appellant adding an organisation referred to in the opinion as Organisation A to the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 ("the Act"). As a consequence of the Order, specified acts of membership, support, or assistance in relation to Organisation A became criminal offences under the Act.

The Claimant, identified in the opinion as a founder of Organisation A, issued a claim for judicial review challenging the decision to add Organisation A to Schedule 2 and sought permission to raise eight grounds. A permission hearing before Judge Chamberlain took place on 25 July 2025. In a written judgment handed down on 30 July 2025, Judge Chamberlain determined, as a preliminary issue, that an application to the Secretary of State to remove Organisation A from Schedule 2 (a "deproscription" application), together with a right of appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (referred to below as Tribunal A) against refusal of such an application, was not an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review of the initial proscription decision. The Judge therefore allowed the claim to proceed by way of judicial review. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on two grounds and refused on six others (four of which were described as material in the opinion).

The Appellant obtained permission to appeal the preliminary ruling (on whether deproscription + appeal to Tribunal A was an adequate alternative remedy). Separately, the Claimant filed a respondent's notice seeking permission to appeal the Judge's refusal of permission on certain grounds; that respondent's notice raised issues about compliance with the seven-day time limit in CPR 52.8 and led to an application for an extension of time, which was made and supported by witness evidence. The Court considered closed material submissions from a representative group (referred to in the opinion as Representative Group A) and determined they could be disclosed as open material with minor amendments.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether an application under section 4 of the Act to remove Organisation A from Schedule 2, coupled with an appeal to Tribunal A under section 5 if the application is refused, is an adequate alternative remedy to a claim for judicial review of the initial decision to proscribe Organisation A.
2. Whether the Claimant was required to apply for permission to appeal the Judge's refusal of permission to apply for judicial review on certain grounds within seven days of the decision in accordance with CPR 52.8.
3. If the seven-day rule applied, whether it was appropriate to extend time for the Claimant to apply for permission.
4. If time could be extended, whether permission should be granted in relation to any or all of the specified grounds refused by the Judge.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as summarized from the opinion)

• Judicial review is a remedy of last resort; where Parliament has provided a statutory appeal route for a category of decisions, that route is ordinarily the suitable alternative and should be used rather than judicial review.
• Parliament intended the deproscription procedure and appeal to Tribunal A to be the mechanism to challenge continued proscription; the court should be slow to displace a scheme that Parliament has constructed for dealing with such matters.
• The Judge erred in a number of respects, including reliance on speed (judicial review being more expeditious), the Judge's assessment of detriment to the Claimant and others if forced to use deproscription, the Judge's analysis of implications for those charged with offences under the Act, the Judge's comparison of Tribunal A and the Administrative Court, and rejecting the argument that allowing judicial review would render the statutory deproscription route otiose.
• The Judge failed to follow the earlier decision by Judge Richards in a case before Tribunal A (referred to in the opinion) that had treated Tribunal A as a suitable alternative remedy.

Claimant's Arguments (as summarized from the opinion)

• The Judge was correct to conclude deproscription plus appeal to Tribunal A was not a convenient and effective alternative to judicial review for challenging the initial proscription decision in the circumstances of this case.
• The statutory deproscription procedure does not adequately respect the rule of law in the specific circumstances of this case, particularly given the pressing public-law and criminal consequences that followed the Order.
• There are exceptional features in this case (including a significant number of arrests and charges said to have arisen after the Order) that justify immediate judicial review rather than requiring the Claimant to use the deproscription/appeal process first.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the case in two stages: (1) whether sections 4 and 5 of the Act (the deproscription application process and appeal to Tribunal A) were intended by Parliament to be the primary means of challenging the initial decision to add an organisation to Schedule 2; and (2) if those statutory remedies were available, whether they were an adequate alternative remedy in the circumstances of this case.

Statutory interpretation and primary conclusion:

• The court examined the wording of the Act and observed that the Act distinguishes legally between the decision to proscribe (section 3(3)(a)) and the decision to remove an organisation from the list (section 3(3)(b)). Section 4 provides for applications to remove an organisation from Schedule 2; section 5 creates Tribunal A and confers an appeal right against refusal of such an application.
• Crucially, the court emphasised that section 7 expressly limits the effect of a successful deproscription appeal on criminal convictions: it permits appeal only in respect of activity occurring on or after the date of the refusal to deproscribe, leaving in place convictions (if any) for activity occurring between the making of the proscription Order and the date of the refusal. The court treated this as a strong indicator that the deproscription procedure is intended to address whether proscription should continue (for example because circumstances have changed), not to vindicate the lawfulness of the initial decision and to eradicate all consequences of an unlawful initial Order.
• On this textual and purposive reading, the court concluded that sections 4 and 5 are aimed at assessing continued proscription and bringing proscription to an end where circumstances warrant; they are not, by their terms, a mechanism intended to substitute for judicial review of the initial decision to proscribe and do not provide a remedy that removes consequences of an initial unlawful Order.

If deproscription/appeal were an available alternative: adequacy on the facts

• The court accepted the established legal framework that judicial review is ordinarily a remedy of last resort and that the court should normally expect claimants to use suitable statutory appeal routes unless exceptional circumstances exist (drawing on the authorities summarized in the Table of Precedents).
• Even if the deproscription/appeal route were to be treated as an available alternative remedy, the court concluded the Judge was entitled to find that it was not adequate in the circumstances of the present case. The court summarised the relevant factual considerations relied upon by the Judge and endorsed them, notably:
  • Timing: a judicial review hearing could be arranged relatively promptly, whereas the statutory deproscription process (including the Secretary of State's 90-day determination period and any subsequent appeal timetable) would take significantly longer and likely postpone a final determination until mid-2026 in the absence of expedition;
  • Detriment to rights: the period during which the Order remained in force would inhibit freedom of expression and assembly for those associated with Organisation A, producing real detriment if the Order were ultimately found unlawful;
  • Criminal consequences: the statutory scheme in section 7 provides only prospective relief for convictions (from the date of refusal onward). Many persons had been arrested and charged after the Order's entry into force; the court regarded the risk of multiple, conflicting defences being raised across criminal courts as a significant factor in favour of an early authoritative determination via judicial review;
  • Institutional considerations: although Tribunal A is a specialist body with a particular constitution and some capacity for closed material, the court found that those institutional differences did not outweigh the public interest in an expeditious and authoritative judicial review in this case;
  • Effect on statutory routes: the court did not accept that allowing judicial review in this case would render the deproscription procedure otiose; many deproscription applications would remain appropriate where the issue is whether an organisation has ceased to be involved in terrorism.
• The court also engaged with the potential application of the rule in Boddington (that the validity of subordinate legislation can, in principle, be raised as a defence in criminal proceedings). The court did not finally determine the scope of that rule in the precise circumstances here but accepted the Judge's point that, whether or not Boddington applies, criminal defendants were likely to seek to raise the lawfulness of the Order as a defence and that would tend to produce inconsistent outcomes unless an early authoritative ruling were obtained.

Procedural and CPR analysis:

• On the CPR timing issue, the court analysed CPR Part 52 and concluded that where permission to apply for judicial review has been refused by the High Court, CPR 52.8(3) requires any application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal to be made within seven days of that refusal. The court held that this time limit cannot be circumvented by filing a respondent's notice under CPR 52.13; the drafting and structure of CPR 52 indicate that CPR 52.8 was intended to govern such applications and that allowing otherwise would produce arbitrary and unworkable procedural results.
• The court therefore concluded that the Claimant's initial application for permission to appeal the refusal of permission on certain grounds was out of time (not made within seven days of the High Court decision). Nevertheless, applying the established rigorous approach to applications for extension of time, and having regard to the particular public-interest circumstances (including the number of arrests and the desirability of an authoritative High Court determination), the court granted an extension of time for the Claimant to seek permission in relation to certain grounds.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The court (i) held that an application to remove an organisation from Schedule 2 under section 4 of the Act, coupled with a right of appeal to Tribunal A under section 5 against a refusal, is not an available, and in any event is not an adequate, alternative remedy to a claim for judicial review of the initial decision to add an organisation to Schedule 2 in the circumstances of this case; (ii) dismissed the Appellant's appeal against the Judge's preliminary ruling on that point; and (iii) resolved the CPR timing issue by holding that applications for permission to appeal against refusal of permission to apply for judicial review must be filed within seven days in accordance with CPR 52.8.

Direct consequences on the parties (as recorded in the opinion):

• The Claimant's application for an extension of time to seek permission to appeal against the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review on certain grounds was granted.
• The court granted permission to apply for judicial review (rather than permission to appeal) in respect of ground 5 (limited to the matters raised in paragraph 82 of the amended statement of facts and grounds) and ground 6.
• The court refused permission to appeal in respect of grounds 1 and 7.

Broader implications: the opinion contains a textual and purposive interpretation of sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Act, concluding those provisions address continuation or cessation of proscription rather than serving as a substitute for judicial review of the initial decision. The opinion also clarifies the procedural point that CPR 52.8 governs the seven-day time limit for applications for permission to appeal where permission to apply for judicial review has been refused by the High Court. The court engaged with, but did not decide, certain questions about the reach of Boddington in criminal proceedings; it treated that potential for multiple criminal-defence arguments as a relevant reason supporting an early judicial review in this case.

The court's decision resolves the particular questions in this litigation and clarifies the application of the alternative-remedy principle and relevant CPR time limits in this context. The court did not attempt to resolve the substantive merits of the Claimant's remaining grounds on the merits of the proscription decision; those matters remain for the judicial review hearing listed in the Administrative Court.