Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant pleaded guilty to two offences: intentionally encouraging or assisting the commission of offences contrary to section 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (count 2), and having an article with a blade or point contrary to section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (count 3). On 6 January 2025, in The Crown Court at The City, the Appellant was sentenced by Judge [Last Name] to seven years and six months' imprisonment on count 2 and to a concurrent term of six months' imprisonment on count 3. The Appellant's application for leave to appeal against the total sentence was referred by the Registrar to the full court.

The Appellant was 39 when sentenced and had no previous convictions. In August 2024 he was working as a taxi driver. Count 2 related to his online communications in the immediate aftermath of stabbings of young girls at a dance class in The City on 29 July 2024. Count 3 related to a knife found in the spare wheel of his car when he was arrested on 8 August 2024.

The judgment records that the stabbings and the arrest of the lone perpetrator were very widely reported. The sentencing judge summarised the Appellant's online activity and presence at multiple protests and incidents of disorder that followed the stabbings.

Key factual elements relied on at sentence included:

• The Appellant administered an online channel ("Online Channel A") on an internet platform established shortly after the stabbings and posted under pseudonymous handles. He posted material organising and promoting protests, warned police with the words "Stand in our way, even if you are just doing your job, prepare to fall", urged the wearing of masks to avoid identification, and used incendiary imagery (fire emojis) in posts he shared with other extremist sites.
• He posted messages inviting further protests (for example: "Well done last night, lads. To all you heavy hitters, are you ready for round 2? The City Mosque, [Number] Main Street, Friday 8 pm." and "Death to traitors").
• He shared posts praising violent protests in other locations and encouraged further protests against organisations assisting asylum seekers. One shared post named the offices of Company B and contained the instruction: "Burn it fucking down Friday, 8 pm" (as reported in the sentencing material).
• At arrest, a concealed knife was found in the Appellant's vehicle. Additional weapons and a copy of Mein Kampf were found at his home.
• The Appellant refused to provide the PIN for his mobile phone; the sentencing judge treated that refusal as permitting an inference that further incriminating material would be on the device.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the total sentence of seven years and six months' imprisonment (with a concurrent six months on the lesser count) was manifestly excessive.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in the stage at which he reached a near-maximum sentence before applying a reduction for the guilty plea.
3. Whether the sentencing judge gave insufficient credit for the Appellant's guilty plea (the Appellant contending that a reduction of one fifth would have been appropriate rather than the one sixth allowed by the judge).

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney for the Appellant

• The total sentence was manifestly excessive. In particular: (a) the judge reached too high a sentence before taking into account the guilty plea; and (b) the judge gave insufficient credit for the guilty plea (the Appellant submitted that a reduction of one fifth would have been appropriate).
• The Appellant did not challenge the judge's factual findings or the applicability of the analogous sentencing guidelines, but submitted that no direct connection had been shown between his online communications and any specific act of serious damage and that the sentence before plea should therefore not have been so close to the statutory maximum.
• The Appellant's plea history: he initially pleaded not guilty while also facing a further count (encouraging or assisting murder) and changed his pleas after the prosecution indicated a willingness not to pursue that further count; the Appellant relied on that context when arguing for greater credit for a plea.

Attorney for the Respondent

• The Appellant's racially motivated conduct must be seen in the national context of the disturbances that followed the stabbings; the Appellant incited violent disorder and criminal damage across multiple locations and was aware that more serious offences could be committed.
• On the issue of plea credit, the fact that the Appellant was charged with the additional count did not prevent him from entering earlier guilty pleas to counts 2 and 3. The Appellant served a defence statement and persisted in denials of aspects of the prosecution case, which meant that trial preparation had to continue and that greater credit was not appropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out and endorsed a step-by-step application of the relevant sentencing principles and materials that the sentencing judge had employed.

First, the court accepted the narrow point advanced by the Appellant's counsel that no direct link had been shown between the Appellant's online postings and any single specific act of criminal damage. The court explained, however, that that point did not assist the Appellant; the Appellant's conduct was in some respects more serious than conduct that could be tied to a single act of damage because he incited multiple people to offend at different places on multiple occasions.

The court emphasised the following factual and legal conclusions, all founded on the sentencing judge's findings:

• The Appellant was prominent and active in deliberately instigating and promoting spreading and escalation of disorder following the stabbings. He urged others to "spread his message 'as far and wide as you can'".
• His actions threatened public safety, promoted widespread damage to property and placed police officers at risk of serious injury; he boasted about the scale of disorder and his actions were racially motivated.
• These features meant that, applying analogous guidelines for violent disorder and criminal damage and the statutory purposes of sentencing, the case fell at the top of the range of offending of this kind. The sentencing judge therefore legitimately considered a sentence near the statutory maximum appropriate before any reduction for plea.

The court next considered mitigation. The Appellant's lack of previous convictions and personal references indicated another side to his character, but the judge had correctly treated such personal mitigation as carrying limited weight in the context of the serious offending.

The court also took into account the possession of a concealed knife found at arrest and the presence of other weapons at the Appellant's residence. Although the knife had not been shown to have been used to threaten or inflict violence, its concealment undermined any innocent explanation for carrying it. The offence in count 3, properly dealt with by a concurrent sentence, nevertheless added materially to the Appellant's overall criminality and warranted reflection in the sentence on the lead offence.

On the issue of credit for guilty plea, the court applied the Sentencing Council's guideline on reduction in sentence for a guilty plea. The court noted the guideline provides a sliding scale between the usual 25% reduction for a plea entered at a plea and trial preparation hearing and the usual 10% reduction on the day of trial. It was a matter for the sentencing judge to determine the appropriate discount within that range.

The court accepted the sentencing judge's assessment that the Appellant delayed entering his guilty pleas until it suited him. The Appellant had initially pleaded not guilty, been re-arraigned and only later entered guilty pleas without limiting the basis of those pleas; he then continued to contest aspects of the case (including initially denying his administrative role and a racist motive) until shortly before sentencing. In light of that conduct the sentencing judge was entitled to award a reduction of one sixth rather than the greater credit sought by the Appellant.

Having reviewed these matters, the court concluded that the sentencing judge's approach — reaching a near-maximum starting point before reduction for plea and allowing one sixth credit — was within the judge's discretion and could not be criticised. The court therefore found no arguable ground that the total sentence was excessive or manifestly excessive.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED.

Direct effect: the sentence imposed by the Crown Court at The City stands — seven years and six months' imprisonment on count 2 with a concurrent six months on count 3. The court refused the Appellant's application for leave to appeal against sentence.

Broader implications: the decision affirms the application of established sentencing principles in cases of serious public disorder, including (1) the relevance of the national context of disturbances when assessing culpability and harm, (2) the use of analogous violent disorder and criminal damage guidelines where no offence-specific guideline exists, and (3) the exercise of judicial discretion under the Sentencing Council's guideline on reduction in sentence for a guilty plea when assessing the appropriate credit for late pleas. The opinion does not purport to establish new legal principle beyond those applications.

Note on anonymization: All personal names, institutional names and locations in the original opinion have been replaced with consistent, neutral placeholders in this summary (for example: "Appellant", "Judge [Last Name]", "Attorney for the Appellant", "Company A", "Company B", "Online Channel A", and "The City"). Quotations and factual descriptions have otherwise been preserved as appeared in the judgment.