Icg, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

Reporting restrictions under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applied to this matter; the victim is referred to throughout as the Complainant.

Procedural history (as stated in the opinion): On 22 September 2023, after a trial before Judge Rankin and a jury at the Crown Court at The City, the Appellant (then aged 65) was convicted of counts 9 (sexual assault) and 12 (possession of indecent photographs). He was acquitted on counts 1, 8, 10 and 11. On 28 November 2024, following a retrial before Judge Thompson and a jury, the Appellant (then aged 66) was convicted of counts 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (sexual activity with a child) and count 7 (attempted rape). The Appellant was sentenced to a total of 16 years' imprisonment, and he appealed with the leave of the single judge. The written judgment in this appeal was delivered by Judge Freedman.

Summary of primary factual material (as set out in the opinion): The Complainant was born in 2003. From about age 2 or 3 the Appellant had a relationship with the Complainant's mother and was often present in the household; the Complainant called the Appellant "dad." The Appellant sexually abused the Complainant over a three-year period between 2016 and 2019, when she was aged between 13 and 16. The abuse involved a course of conduct in which the Appellant used his position as a trusted step-parent to be alone with and to groom and sexually abuse the Complainant. The Complainant gave a victim impact statement describing significant and lasting psychological harm, including depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder; she reported a suicide note written at 16 and ongoing difficulties trusting men. The Complainant also reported that her mother stood by the Appellant.

The opinion summarised the offences by count (as contained in the trial material):

• Count 2: When the Complainant was 13 and unwell with tonsillitis, the Appellant assisted with bathing, the Complainant passed out after the bath and, on regaining consciousness, found the Appellant penetrating her vagina with his finger.
• Count 3: On the Complainant's 15th birthday after a party she was very drunk; the Appellant entered her bedroom, got into bed beside her wearing only boxer shorts, kissed her neck, touched her breasts and told her he loved her; the Complainant protested and the Appellant told the Complainant's mother that the Complainant had had a nightmare.
• Counts 4–7: On New Year's Eve when the Complainant was 15 and drunk, the Appellant removed her from the bath; while she was unconscious or semi-conscious he penetrated her with a vibrator (count 4), penetrated her with his fingers (count 5), and licked her vagina (count 6). He then exposed himself and began to pull down his trousers and underpants; the attempt to proceed further was interrupted when the Complainant's brother entered a nearby room (count 7: attempted rape).
• Count 9: When the Complainant was 16 she returned from her school prom, went to sleep and later woke to find the Appellant kissing her and attempting to remove her underwear; she resisted physically (punching and scratching).
• Count 12: Items of technology were seized and analysed. The Appellant had a folder on his laptop labelled with a nickname for the Complainant; in that folder were multiple recordings from a camera placed in the Complainant's bedroom and six videos showing the Complainant undressing. The Appellant asserted the recordings were legitimately related to helping with the Complainant's night terrors.

The opinion also referred to text-message evidence showing sexually suggestive exchanges and to a pre-sentence report indicating the Appellant did not accept responsibility and demonstrated no victim awareness. The Appellant had previous good character and was diagnosed, at sentencing, with "mild cognitive impairment as a result of cerebrovascular disease or early Lewy body disease," which the sentencing judge treated as limited mitigation.

Sentence imposed (as recorded in the opinion): total 16 years' imprisonment made up as follows — nine years on count 7; concurrent sentences of five years on each of counts 4 and 5, and three years on count 6; count 2 six years to run consecutively to the other sentences; counts 3 and 9 each six months to run consecutively; count 12 three months concurrent.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the nine-year sentence imposed on count 7 (attempted rape) was manifestly excessive in light of the fact that the full offence of rape did not occur and the acts were, it was submitted, brief and largely preparatory.
2. Whether the six-year sentence imposed on count 2 (penetration by finger when the Complainant was aged 13) was manifestly excessive, specifically whether there had been double counting of the abuse of trust and whether the absence of overt violence/threat required a lower sentence.
3. Whether the overall sentence of 16 years' imprisonment failed adequately to reflect the principle of totality and was therefore excessive.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (summary)

• Ground 1: The nine-year sentence for attempted rape (count 7) was manifestly excessive because no completed rape occurred, the acts were brief, and the conduct went only a small way beyond mere preparation.
• Ground 2: The six-year sentence for count 2 was manifestly excessive because there was no violence or threat and the abuse of trust should not be double-counted; the appropriate sentence should not exceed the starting point for that offence.
• Ground 3: The total sentence of 16 years was excessive and did not properly reflect the totality principle.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's (Crown's) written submissions in opposition to these grounds within the text provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court (Judge Freedman) addressed each ground in turn, applying sentencing principles and the factual findings from the two trials. The analysis proceeded along these lines (restricted to matters expressly in the opinion):

1. Ground 1 — Attempted rape (count 7):
   • The court acknowledged that an attempted rape can attract a lesser sentence than a completed rape, but emphasised several factors that supported the sentence imposed. The attempted rape occurred in the context of related penetrative acts (counts 4–6) that occurred at the same time and had concurrent sentences; these accompanying acts meant the lead offence sentence could properly be higher than it would have been if considered in isolation.
   • The factual findings (as summarised in the opinion) included that the Complainant tried to move but the Appellant pulled her back into position, and that the reason the rape did not occur was not remorse or voluntary cessation but because the Appellant heard the Complainant's brother and was concerned about being overheard. On that basis the court concluded that but for that interruption the rape would have occurred.
   • The attempted rape was aggravated by being committed in the Complainant's home and being part of a course of conduct with very serious and lasting effects on the Complainant. The court therefore found that the sentencing judge's choice of nine years (the bottom of the stated range for the full offence of rape) was within proper bounds and not manifestly excessive when the relevant aggravating factors and concurrent sentences for related offending were taken into account.
   • The opinion recorded the sentencing framework applied to a full offence of rape here: a starting point of ten years with a range of nine to 13 years in category 2 because of severe psychological harm and abuse of trust (culpability A). The court accepted that some reduction for attempt was appropriate, but that reduction was limited for the reasons given above.
2. Ground 2 — Penetration by finger (count 2):
   • The court accepted the categorisation advanced in mitigation (harm category 1 for penetration by finger; culpability A for abuse of trust and targeting a particularly vulnerable child with a significant age disparity), with a stated starting point of five years and a category range of four to ten years.
   • Although the Appellant's counsel accepted the categorisation and argued that there was nothing to justify an upward move from the starting point, the court identified material aggravating features justifying the sentence imposed. In particular, the Complainant's very young age (13) was a significant aggravating feature and she was especially vulnerable at the time because she was unwell with tonsillitis and had passed out after the bath. The insertion of the finger into the vagina of a particularly vulnerable child justified going above the five-year starting point.
   • On that basis the court found the six-year sentence for count 2 was not manifestly excessive.
3. Ground 3 — Totality:
   • The court examined the sentencing judge's treatment of concurrency and consecutiveness. It recorded that the sentencing judge had been entitled to impose consecutive sentences for separate offences, noting that key offending episodes (for which six-year and nine-year sentences were imposed) were separated by about two years and that there were other separate offending episodes on other occasions.
   • The sentencing judge expressly considered totality. Counts 4, 5, 6 and 12 were ordered concurrent with the sentence on count 7 (reflecting related conduct at the same time), and the sentences on counts 3 and 9 were limited to six months each as part of the totality exercise even though the facts could have justified longer sentences for those counts considered individually.
   • The court observed that the judge's references to totality were not merely formulaic adjustments but real reductions to ensure a just and proportionate overall sentence. The judge also took into account the Appellant's age, health and limited mitigation when fixing the overall term.
   • Given the seriousness and persistent nature of the offending and its severe impact on the Complainant, the court concluded the overall sentence of 16 years' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive and that there was no error of principle in the sentencing exercise.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE DISMISSED; THE SENTENCE OF 16 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT IS UPHELD.

Direct consequences (as stated in the opinion): the Appellant's appeal against sentence was dismissed and the total sentence of 16 years' imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge remains in force. The court found no error of principle in the sentencing exercise and concluded the individual and aggregate sentences were not manifestly excessive.

Broader implications: the opinion does not purport to establish new legal precedent; it applies established sentencing principles (including culpability/harm categorisation and the principle of totality) to the facts of this case to uphold the sentence imposed. No broader doctrinal changes were articulated in the provided text.