Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment was delivered by Judge [Last Name] on 11 August 2025. It concerns a dispute arising from linked property transactions agreed on 13 August 2007 between the Plaintiff and Third parties, and a subsequent contract by which the Plaintiff sold a property (described below as "Property A") and purchased an apartment (described below as "Property B") from the First‑Named Defendant.
Key factual elements (as found by the court):
- On 13 August 2007 the parties recorded an agreement under which Property A (the Plaintiff's former property) was to be sold for €785,000 (part cash) and, in tandem, the Plaintiff would purchase Property B from the First‑Named Defendant for €450,000. A deposit of €125,000 was to be paid immediately to the Plaintiff.
- The Plaintiff engaged the solicitor who later became a defendant (the Second‑Named Defendant's solicitor) to act in respect of those transactions. Contracts were exchanged and completion occurred on 24 October 2007; the Plaintiff moved into Property B soon after completion.
- On or shortly after closing it became apparent that the vendor (the First‑Named Defendant) had not provided a stamped and registered root lease (referred to in the judgment as the "2000 lease") that ought to have been available. The solicitor acting for the vendor gave an undertaking to forward title documents and the purchaser's solicitor (the Second‑Named Defendant's solicitor) proceeded to close on the basis of that undertaking.
- Two principal post‑completion difficulties emerged: (a) a charge/mortgage registered against Property A (relating to prior family law solicitor fees) which complicated matters but was subsequently remedied; and (b) the title documentation for Property B was not delivered and a comprehensive title defect emerged affecting Property B and other units in the development.
- A new lease dated 29 May 2009 and a later assignment (dated in documents as 2009) were advanced by the vendor's then solicitors in mid‑2009 in an attempt to cure the title position; these steps did not in fact result in good and marketable title being given to the Plaintiff. Earlier interlocutory litigation followed: the Plaintiff re‑entered Property A in 2009 (on the basis that she had not received full consideration), the purchasers obtained inter partes injunctive relief and the Plaintiff's counterclaim was dismissed at first instance. The Plaintiff appealed aspects of that litigation and the Supreme Court later allowed her appeal on the issue of whether good and marketable title had been given.
- Company A (the management company for the development) and later court‑appointed conveyancing counsel identified systemic defects in the documentary title for units in the development. A remediation process culminating in a Trustee Act application and first registration with the Property Registration Authority was pursued; that application eventually achieved registration in July 2022 and the relevant folio was adjusted by June 2023.
- The present proceedings were issued on 15 October 2013 and a Statement of Claim and later an Amended Statement of Claim (20 July 2020) alleged breach of contract by the First‑Named Defendant and breach of retainer and negligence by the Second‑Named Defendant in respect of the two transactions. Defences were served, but shortly before the hearing the defendants admitted liability. The remaining issues were confined to the quantum and heads of damage.
- The principal heads of loss pursued at trial were: (i) diminution of value / loss of opportunity to sell Property B; (ii) costs incurred in the Trustee Act application; and (iii) general damages for distress, anxiety and related non‑pecuniary losses (a claim for aggravated damages was also advanced at the hearing). Several earlier pleaded heads (contractual interest, costs of the earlier injunction proceedings and management company proceedings, and a standalone claim for loss of earnings) were withdrawn or not pursued to judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, given the defendants' admitted liability, the Plaintiff is entitled to damages for non‑pecuniary loss (distress, anxiety and ill‑health) arising from (a) the defective condition of Property B and/or (b) the failure to procure or transfer good and marketable title.
- Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to damages representing diminution in value or loss of opportunity to sell Property B (and, if so, the correct legal measure and valuation date for such damages).
- Whether the Plaintiff may recover the costs of the Trustee Act application as damages caused by the defendants' breach.
- Whether aggravated damages are recoverable given the conduct alleged (including alleged intermeddling with title documentation and alleged misleading conduct by the solicitor‑defendant).
- If damages are recoverable, how should they be quantified (including the relevant period, applicable authorities for measure, and any reduction for causation, mitigation or contributory conduct)?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff submitted that she suffered significant distress, anxiety and deterioration in health as a consequence of (i) moving into Property B which displayed damp and mould, and (ii) the failure of the First‑Named Defendant and the Second‑Named Defendant to provide or secure good title promptly, which prevented her from borrowing to effect repairs and selling the apartment.
- She sought an award for diminution in value (loss of bargain / loss of opportunity), costs of the Trustee Act application, and general damages for distress and anxiety (with a claim for aggravated damages also advanced at the hearing).
- The Plaintiff asserted that she intended to sell once remedial works were known to be necessary, that she consulted a builder who estimated remedial costs (c. €50,000 per her evidence), and that she was unable to obtain finance because she lacked title.
- At trial she abandoned contractual interest and certain costs claims; she did not pursue a stand‑alone claim for loss of earnings but asked the court to have regard to that loss when assessing general damages.
- In respect of aggravation, she alleged that the First‑Named Defendant had intermeddled with title documents (the 2009 lease/assignment) and that the Second‑Named Defendant had given misleading evidence in earlier proceedings; she said these matters prolonged the dispute and caused additional stress.
First‑Named Defendant's Arguments
- The First‑Named Defendant (and her advisers) argued that steps taken in 2009 were an attempt to rectify title anomalies affecting multiple units and not a dishonest intermeddling designed to confer financial advantage on the First‑Named Defendant.
- She noted that the Trustee Act application addressed the title problem affecting the whole development and that she was, in effect, in the same initial position as other long leaseholders.
- The First‑Named Defendant accepted that failure to provide title caused stress but disputed the extent of recoverable loss; she emphasised causation and mitigation issues and contended that parts of the Plaintiff's distress were attributable to the Plaintiff's own actions (notably the re‑entry and the consequent litigation).
Second‑Named Defendant's Arguments (Solicitor / Firm)
- The Second‑Named Defendant accepted liability but disputed several elements of the Plaintiff's case on quantum and causation. It emphasised that the charge on Property A (a prior legal costs charge) greatly complicated the factual matrix and the work required.
- It submitted that completion on the basis of an undertaking from the vendor's solicitors was, in the circumstances, a recognised or understandable practice and that the Plaintiff had not established that she would not have completed the transaction even if told about the undertaking.
- In relation to diminution of value, the Second‑Named Defendant argued that the proper analysis was of a "completed transaction" (or at least not a classic "no transaction" case) because title could be and was ultimately rectified; this affected the measure of damages.
- The Second‑Named Defendant disputed the Plaintiff's valuation evidence and argued that the Plaintiff failed to prove diminution at the relevant starting date; it also resisted an award of aggravated damages and contested entitlement to various costs claimed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Patrick O'Donnell & Martin Walsh v Janice O'Brien [2011] IEHC 21 |
Background litigation (injunction proceedings) concerning the same transactions; established interlocutory relief and disposition of counterclaims at first instance. |
Cited as factual background: the earlier judgment framed the history and some contested facts (including the question whether title had been perfected). |
| Murray v Budds [2017] 2 IR 178 |
Sets out the modern approach to recoverability of non‑pecuniary losses in contract/tort; confirms general rule that worry and stress (absent psychiatric injury) are not ordinarily recoverable but identifies limited exceptions. |
The court used Murray as the primary legal framework to test whether the Plaintiff's claim for distress could succeed under the recognised exceptions. |
| Walter v Crossan [2014] IEHC 37 |
Authority that damages for worry and stress not giving rise to psychiatric injury are not recoverable in tort. |
Adopted as supporting authority for the general rule discussed in Murray and applied to limit recoverable non‑pecuniary losses. |
| Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488 |
Foundational authority on the historic rule regarding recovery for mental distress in contract. |
Referred to as foundational material when considering the exceptions to the general rule on non‑pecuniary loss. |
| Watts v Morrow [1991] WLR 1421 |
Bingham LJ: general rule that contract‑breaker not liable for distress except where the very object of the contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from molestation. |
The court applied Bingham LJ's formulation to assess whether the property contracts here had as their very object the provision of peace of mind (the court concluded they did not). |
| Baltic Shipping Co. v Dillon (1993) 11 ALR 289 |
Illustrates how to ascertain whether peace of mind is the object of a contract by reference to terms and context. |
Used to assist in construing whether the purchase contract should be characterised as one whose object included peace of mind (court concluded it did not). |
| Smyth v Huey & Co [1993] NI 236 |
Identifies two relevant categories for recovery of distress in professional negligence/conveyancing contexts: (1) distress caused by physical discomfort/inconvenience resulting from the breach; (2) contracts whose object is peace of mind. |
The court applied Smyth to determine that the Plaintiff's entitlement, if any, would have to fall within these limited categories (it proceeded on the first category: distress caused by physical discomfort/inconvenience). |
| Dinnegan v Ryan [2002] 3 IR 178 |
Example of contract where enjoyment was the essence (wedding reception): damages awarded for denial of occasion of enjoyment. |
Cited as an illustration of the personal‑contract exception; the court distinguished the present conveyancing contract from such personal contracts. |
| Leahy v Rawson & Ors (Unreported, O'Sullivan J, 14 Jan 2003) |
Example of award of general damages in a building‑defect context for anxiety/upset and financial distress over a multi‑year period. |
Referred to as contextual precedent on quantum; the court treated it (and similar authorities) as guidance when assessing an annual figure for general damages. |
| Mitchell v Mulvey Developments Ltd & Ors [2014] IEHC 37 |
Hogan J awarded €10,000 per plaintiff per year for anxiety/distress in severe building defect cases; used as a recent benchmark. |
The court regarded Mitchell as the most recent useful comparative authority for quantum and adjusted the annual figure to reflect the facts of the present case. |
| Johnson v Longleat Properties (Dublin) Ltd [1976‑1977] ILRM 93; Jarvis v Swan Tours [1973] 1 QB 233; Roche v Peilow (Unreported, High Court, Carroll J., 8 July 1986); Doran v Delaney (No. 2) [1999] 1 IR 303 |
Illustrative authorities where general damages were awarded for inconvenience, loss of enjoyment, anxiety or upset in housing/contract contexts. |
These were cited and discussed to illustrate the range and scale of awards in analogous circumstances; the court used them to guide quantum but emphasised case‑specific assessment. |
| Ruxley Electronics v Forsythe [1996] 1 AC 344 |
Commentary (Lord Mustill) that general damages for disappointment are traditionally modest. |
Used to remind the court to be restrained and principled in assessing awards for non‑pecuniary loss. |
| Duffy v Ridley Properties [2008] 4 IR 282 |
Confirms that damages are normally assessed at date of breach but a court may assess at date of judgment or another date in appropriate cases. |
Relied upon in considering the correct valuation date for any claim in respect of the sale/purchase of land. |
| Roberts v O'Neill (Unreported, Supreme Court, McWilliam J, 3 July 1981) |
Authorities on measure of damages in contracts for sale of land (difference between contract value and judgment value). |
Cited as the conventional approach in sale of land cases; the court considered but also examined whether the present case fitted alternative frameworks. |
| ACC Bank plc v Johnston & Co. Solicitors & Ors [2010] IEHC 236 |
Explains the "no‑transaction" concept in professional negligence: where competent advice would have prevented the transaction, damages analysis must consider what would have occurred absent the negligence; surrogate approaches may be used. |
The court relied on ACC Bank to frame the analysis for the Second‑Named Defendant's negligence claim and to distinguish "no transaction" from "completed transaction" and intermediate cases. |
| Kelleher v O'Connor [2010] IEHC 313 |
Emphasises causation in conveyancing negligence: the need to infer whether, had the negligence been avoided, the client would have become aware and pulled out; classifies cases as "no transaction", "completed transaction" or intermediate. |
Applied to assess whether the Plaintiff would have refrained from completing had the defects been identified and thus to choose the appropriate measure of damages. |
| Joyce v Bowman Law (as discussed in Kelleher) |
Illustrates an intermediate case where damages for loss of opportunity are assessed on a "completed transaction" basis reduced for the risk that renegotiation would have failed. |
Cited to support the court's approach to intermediate cases and loss‑of‑opportunity reasoning. |
| Phillip v Ryan [2004] 4 IR 241 |
Used in assessing likelihoods and weighting in hypothetical scenarios when a solicitor failed to identify problems. |
Referenced to support the court's method of weighing alternative hypothetical outcomes in intermediate cases. |
| Rosbeg Partners v LK Shields [2018] IESC 23 |
Where the negligence is a failure to do something that could be done and was eventually done, the prima facie measure is: (i) the cost of substitute performance; and (ii) any foreseeable loss in value caused by the delay. |
The court followed Rosbeg to hold that, where title defects were curable, damages prima facie include the cost of rectification and any loss caused by delay; this influenced the finding that the present case was closer to a "completed transaction" scenario. |
| Bacciottini & Anor v Gotelee & Goldsmith (A Firm) [2016] EWCA Civ 170 |
Demonstrates that, depending on factual context, the award may be limited to the cost of remedying a defect where no loss otherwise arises; emphasises factual context in measure of damages. |
Relied on by the Second‑Named Defendant; the court treated it as compatible with Rosbeg and as not precluding recovery of other foreseeable losses in appropriate circumstances. |
| Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (authority cited) |
Older authority relevant to measure of damages in property defect contexts (as cited in later authorities). |
Referenced in the discussion of Bacciottini; used indirectly to frame the court's understanding of measure principles. |
| McKew v Holland, Hammond & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621 |
Mitigation principle: if the injured person acts unreasonably (novus actus), the chain of causation may be broken and losses caused by the injured person's conduct may not be recoverable. |
Applied to reduce the Plaintiff's award because the Plaintiff's unilateral re‑entry and conduct leading to further litigation were significant contributory causes of distress. |
| Hyland & Ors v Dundalk Racing (1999) Ltd [2017] IECA 172 |
Describes common law mitigation principles and the operation of s.34 Civil Liability Act 1961 to reduce damages when the plaintiff's want of care contributed to loss. |
Used to support the proportionate reduction of the Plaintiff's award in light of contributory conduct and to explain the statutory framework for reduction. |
| Civil Liability Act 1961, s.34(1) & s.34(2)(b) |
Statutory mechanism requiring reduction of damages where plaintiff's own want of care contributed to the damage. |
Applied as part of the mitigation and contributory negligence analysis when assessing an appropriate reduction to general damages. |
| Johnson v Gore‑Wood [2002] 2 AC 1; Henderson v Henderson (principle) |
Rules on abuse of process / res judicata: a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter; later proceedings may be abusive if issues could and should have been raised earlier. |
Invoked by the defendants to resist recovery of the Trustee Act costs; the court analysed Henderson jurisprudence and concluded it did not bar the present claim (different parties/issues). |
| Culkin v Sligo County Council & Ors [2017] IECA 104; Mitchell v Ireland [2007] IESC 11 |
Authorities emphasising that the rule in Henderson must be applied flexibly and merits‑based, not mechanically. |
Supported the court's conclusion that the Plaintiff's claim for Trustee Act costs was not precluded by earlier orders because the relevant considerations differed. |
| Camiveo v Dunnes Stores [2019] IECA 138; Conway v INTO [1991] 2 IR 305 |
Conway sets out principles for aggravated damages: manner of wrongdoing, post‑wrong conduct (refusal to apologise, threats), and conduct in defending proceedings may aggravate harm. |
Used to test the Plaintiff's late claim for aggravated damages; the court concluded the facts did not meet the threshold for such an award. |
| O'Donnell v O'Donnell [2005] IEHC 216; Sutcliffe v Pressdram [1990] 1 All ER 269; Cooper v O'Connell (Supreme Court, 5 June 1997) |
Authorities discussing when maintenance of a denial of liability and conduct in litigation may justify aggravated damages; caution that mere denial is usually insufficient. |
Applied to reject aggravated damages based on a late admission of liability and to examine whether litigation conduct warranted enhancement of compensatory damages (court found it did not). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Overview of methodological approach
The defendants admitted liability shortly before trial, which narrowed the court's task to the assessment of loss and the applicable legal tests. The court proceeded by (i) identifying the legal categories that permit recovery of non‑pecuniary loss; (ii) assessing the factual foundation for each head of claimed loss (condition of Property B, the Plaintiff's intentions and acts, title chronology and remedial steps); (iii) applying causation and mitigation principles; and (iv) quantifying any award using comparative authorities and evidence adduced in the trial.
1. Legal test for recovery of distress
The court began from the foundational proposition that non‑pecuniary losses — particularly worry and stress short of psychiatric injury — are generally not recoverable in contract or tort absent recognised exceptions. It relied principally on Murray v Budds and associated authorities (including Watts v Morrow and Smyth v Huey & Co) to set out the two relevant exceptions relied upon in this case:
- where mental distress is caused by physical discomfort or inconvenience resulting from the defendant's breach (the "physical discomfort" exception); and
- where the very object of the contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from molestation (the "personal contract" exception).
The court held that the purchase and conveyancing contracts here were not of the "personal" type; a conveyancing contract is ordinarily a transactional contract to transfer property rather than a contract whose object is peace of mind. Therefore the Plaintiff's claim, if it was to succeed, had to fit within the first exception (distress consequent on physical discomfort/inconvenience).
2. Factual findings relevant to the first exception
- The court accepted the Plaintiff's evidence that Property B developed damp and mould soon after she moved in and that these issues caused significant physical discomfort and living difficulties. The condition was corroborated to an extent by valuation evidence and was not robustly challenged by the defendants.
- The court accepted that the Plaintiff wished to sell the apartment because of its condition and that she consulted a builder who gave an indicative estimate for remedial work; however, the builder was not called as a witness and the estimate was not proved by independent evidence.
- The court found as a fact that the Plaintiff did not have title and that this inability to give title to a lender or purchaser materially restricted her capacity to borrow to remediate the defects and to market the property, thereby causing a period of enforced occupation in poor conditions.
3. Causation, scope of recoverable harm and mitigation
Even where the Plaintiff established physical inconvenience and resulting distress, the court examined causation and contributory factors. The court identified material non‑defendant causes of the Plaintiff's distress:
- the Plaintiff's own conduct in re‑entering Property A in 2009 and the litigation which followed (the injunction proceedings and subsequent appeals) were significant contributors to her distress and financial exposure;
- a serious facial injury suffered by the Plaintiff in 2012 with ongoing neuralgia contributed to her vulnerability and stress; and
- the Plaintiff adduced no medical evidence establishing a causal link between the defendants' breaches and the more serious episodes of physical illness she described (e.g. renal failure, lung problems), and therefore personal injury or related loss could not be established for compensation.
Applying the mitigation and contributory negligence principles (McKew; Hyland; Civil Liability Act 1961 s.34), the court concluded that a substantial proportion of the Plaintiff's distress was attributable to her own actions and to unrelated health events. Those contributions had to be reflected by an appropriate reduction in any award.
4. Quantum of general (non‑pecuniary) damages
For quantum the court considered comparative authorities in building defect and conveyancing contexts (Leahy, Mitchell, Roche and others). Hogan J's figure in Mitchell v Mulvey (€10,000 per year) was the most recent relevant benchmark, but the court found the severity of the present facts to be less than some of the worst examples in Mitchell.
Having regard to the authorities and the particular facts (period of claimed distress running from the Plaintiff's awareness of lack of title in April 2008 to the hearing (approximately 15 years)), the court concluded that an appropriate annual figure, if the distress had been entirely caused by the defendants, would be €6,000 per year. That produced a gross figure of €90,000 for the period. The court then applied a substantial reduction (60%) to reflect the Plaintiff's contributory conduct and other significant non‑defendant causal factors. The resulting award for general damages for distress and anxiety was €36,000.
5. Diminution of value / loss of opportunity claim
The court addressed whether this should be treated as a "no‑transaction" case, a "completed transaction" case, or an intermediate case. Having considered ACC Bank, Kelleher, Joyce v Bowman Law and Rosbeg Partners, the court concluded the matter was closer to a "completed transaction" case because:
- the title defects were of a kind that could be and ultimately were rectified (the Trustee Act route and registration were available and were used);
- there was no compelling evidence that the Plaintiff would definitely have declined to complete the agreed transactions if told of the vendor's failure to produce title at closing (the Plaintiff was under pressure to obtain funds to meet a family law contingency and there was no clear contemporaneous evidence that she would have refused to proceed); and
- thus Rosbeg's guidance applied: where a failure to perform something which could be done is the negligence, the prima facie measure is the cost of substitute performance (rectifying title) and any foreseeable loss due to delay (fall in value occasioned by the delay).
On the evidentiary record the Plaintiff failed to prove the value of the property at the relevant starting date (April 2008) with sufficient particularity. The valuation evidence adduced (a valuation of €350,000 for the current condition from the Plaintiff's valuer and €425,000 from the defendant's valuer) was found to be unimpressive and inconsistent; the burden of proof for the diminution claim rested on the Plaintiff and she did not establish a reliable baseline value for April 2008. In those circumstances the Plaintiff's claim for diminution of value / loss of opportunity was not made out and no damages were awarded on that head.
6. Costs of the Trustee Act application
The court found that the Trustee Act application and related work were steps necessitated by the defendants' breach and that the costs of that application fell within the species of loss recoverable in circumstances where title was ultimately rectified by third‑party steps (following the approach in Rosbeg). The defendants argued that the Plaintiff could not recover those costs because a separate order (made by another judge) had recorded no order as to costs and because the Trustee Act application had not been brought by the defendants and involved different parties.
The court considered the rule in Henderson v Henderson (as explained in Johnson v Gore‑Wood) and the flexible, merits‑based approach urged by the appellate authorities (Culkin; Mitchell v Ireland). It concluded that the rule did not operate to preclude the Plaintiff's present claim for those costs: the parties and issues differed sufficiently and the remedy sought in the present proceedings addressed whether those costs were a foreseeable consequence of the defendants' breaches. The court therefore awarded the Plaintiff the agreed amount of €56,580 for the costs of the Trustee Act application.
7. Aggravated damages
The Plaintiff sought aggravated damages late in the proceedings, alleging (a) that the First‑Named Defendant had intermeddled with title documents to obtain financial advantage and (b) that the solicitor (Second‑Named Defendant) had misled the earlier trial judge. Applying the principles in Conway v INTO and related authorities (Camiveo; O'Donnell v O'Donnell; Sutcliffe), the court required proof of aggravating conduct such as malice, insolence, or conduct calculated to aggravate the injury.
The court found that the Plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence to prove dishonest intermeddling or that the defendants' post‑2017 conduct reached the threshold for aggravated damages. The challenged acts (the production of the 2009 lease, delay in rectification, and adversarial positions in litigation) were either explained by legitimate attempts to rectify complex title issues or did not, on the evidence, demonstrate the deliberate, outrageous or dishonest conduct necessary to justify an aggravated award. The court therefore refused the claim for aggravated damages.
8. Costs and procedural follow up
The court indicated a provisional view that, having succeeded on the entitlement to damages, the Plaintiff was entitled to her costs of the proceedings. The court ordered that the question of costs be put into the list for mention on 9 October (parties may notify the Registrar within six weeks if they wish to make submissions on costs).
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling:
The court awarded the Plaintiff €36,000 for general damages for mental distress, and €56,580 for the costs of the Trustee Act application.
Further holdings and immediate consequences:
- The Plaintiff succeeded on a claim for non‑pecuniary loss within the limited category of distress caused by physical discomfort/inconvenience together with the inability to move due to lack of title; the award was reduced substantially to reflect the Plaintiff's own contributory conduct and other causal factors.
- The Plaintiff did not establish a diminution in value or loss of opportunity to sell because she failed to prove the relevant baseline value at the appropriate date; no damages were awarded on that head.
- The Plaintiff was awarded the agreed sum of €56,580 in respect of the Trustee Act application, on the basis that those costs were reasonably incurred and were a foreseeable consequence of the defendants' breaches; the court held that the earlier order in the Trustee Act proceedings (which made no order as to costs) did not preclude recovery in these proceedings.
- The court refused the Plaintiff's claim for aggravated damages, concluding that the alleged conduct did not meet the legal threshold for such an award on the evidence presented.
- The court expressed a provisional view that the Plaintiff should recover her costs of these proceedings; the precise costs order is to be considered at a further mention date if parties wish to make submissions.
Wider implications: This judgment applied established Irish and UK authorities on the recoverability of non‑pecuniary loss in contract and professional‑negligence contexts, and on the appropriate measures of damages where title defects can be remedied. The decision does not purport to depart from existing precedent; it illustrates the application of the "physical discomfort" exception to non‑pecuniary loss and the Rosbeg/ACC/Kelleher framework for assessing damages in conveyancing negligence. No new legal principle was declared; the ruling is fact‑specific to the particular chronology, evidence and remedial pathway present in the case.
If any party wishes to make submissions on costs they must notify the Registrar within six weeks of delivery of the judgment, and the matter will be listed for mention as directed by the court.