Court of Appeal — Judgment Summary (Judge Bean; Judge Davies; Judge Cobb)

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is strictly drawn from the provided opinion. The Plaintiff (local planning authority) issued proceedings on 11 August 2025 seeking an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to restrain the Defendant from using a hotel ("The Hotel" at [Number] Main Street, The City) to accommodate asylum seekers on the basis that such use amounted to a material change of use in breach of planning control.

At a hearing before Judge Eyre on 15 August 2025, the Plaintiff applied for an interim injunction (and an interim declaration which was refused). On 19 August 2025 the judge considered an application by the Appellant (the Secretary of State / Government Department) to be joined as a party; that application was refused. The judge then granted an interim injunction by order dated 19 August 2025, prohibiting the Defendant from using, permitting the use of, or facilitating use of The Hotel for accommodating asylum seekers or for any use other than as a hotel (Class C1) from 4:00pm on 12 September 2025 until final judgment or further order. The judge fixed the trial of the substantive claim for the week of 13–17 October 2025.

The Defendant and the Appellant sought permission to appeal the order(s) of Judge Eyre. The Court of Appeal considered two linked applications for permission to appeal: one by the Defendant and one by the Appellant, and then proceeded to determine the appeals if permission was granted.

Key factual background (as set out in the opinion): The Hotel (80 bedrooms) had historically been used as a hotel but had periods of use as asylum accommodation: during the Covid-19 pandemic (May 2020 – March 2021) and later between October 2022 and April 2024. A temporary planning application was made on 14 February 2023 but was withdrawn in March 2024. The Hotel was closed on 26 April 2024 and reopened in April 2025. By contract dated 24 March 2025 the Defendant granted exclusive use of the Hotel to Company A (a registered service provider) to accommodate asylum seekers for an initial 12‑month term; Company A provided welfare and managed occupancy and movements. Company B and Company C were previous service providers during earlier periods. Since April 2025 the Hotel has been used under that contract; protests and disorder began in July 2025, police restrictions under section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 were imposed, and a small number of arrests of residents were made in April, July and August 2025. The Plaintiff began injunction proceedings in August 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge erred in refusing the Appellant's application under CPR Part 19 (rule 19.4 / 19.2(2)) to be joined as a party — specifically, whether he misapplied the "desirability" / "gateway" test in rule 19.2(2) and/or mis-exercised his discretion.
2. Whether the judge erred in law in his assessment of the balance of convenience when granting an interim injunction under section 187B of the 1990 Act — including (a) the approach to what matters are relevant to planning harm and the breach of planning control, and (b) the weight to be given to the Appellant's statutory duty to accommodate asylum seekers (and related public interest considerations).
3. As advanced by the Defendant, whether the judge made principal errors of law/principle in his treatment of four specific matters relevant to the balance of convenience: (i) treating the Defendant's deliberate decision not to apply for planning permission as a factor in favour of an injunction; (ii) the judge's approach to considerations of hardship; (iii) the judge's conclusion that a stop notice was unavailable; and (iv) the judge's conclusion that any delay by the Plaintiff did not weigh against interim relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff contended that the use of The Hotel to accommodate asylum seekers constituted a material change of use from hotel (Class C1) to a Sui Generis or other use, and therefore a breach of planning control.
• The Plaintiff sought an interim injunction under section 187B to restrain the ongoing use until trial, relying on planning harm and the public interest in the enforcement of planning control.
• The Plaintiff explained it had tolerated earlier uses while there were no protests, and that the outbreaks of protests and associated disorder in July 2025 were the trigger for seeking injunctive relief.
• The Plaintiff argued that delay did not operate against it because the decision to seek an injunction was prompted by changed circumstances (protests) and that the matter required prompt relief to prevent continuing harm to amenity and local services.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant argued that the lawful planning use remained as a hotel (Class C1) and that the accommodation of asylum seekers under contract with Company A did not amount to a material change of use.
• The Defendant emphasised it acted openly and in good faith, had taken advice from the Government Department that no change of use application was required, and that it relied on the contract with Company A as necessary for financial stability.
• The Defendant submitted that the absence of Company A as a party to the proceedings hindered the court's factual assessment, because Company A controlled occupancy, movements and welfare of residents.
• In its grounds of appeal the Defendant argued the judge erred in treating the Defendant's deliberate stance (not applying for permission) as a reason for an injunction, in the assessment of hardship, in the approach to delay and in the stop notice point.

Appellant's (Government Department / Secretary of State) Arguments

• The Appellant sought to be joined on the basis of her statutory duties under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (notably section 95 read with the Reception Conditions Regulations and section 98) to provide accommodation and support for destitute asylum seekers. She said those duties required the court to hear evidence on the impact of any injunction on the national asylum accommodation system and on the individuals housed at The Hotel.
• The Appellant argued that CPR Part 19 should be given a wide interpretation (as in prior authority) and that joinder was "desirable" because the Appellant had evidence and statutory responsibilities that could materially affect the balance of convenience.
• The Appellant warned of systemic consequences if local injunctions forced closures of accommodation without consideration of national capacity: the risk of incentivising further ad hoc challenges, the need for a structured national response, and practical difficulties in relocating residents on short notice.
• The Appellant also contended that the judge erred in the analysis of the balance of convenience and in attributing weight to the Defendant's conduct and to protest-related disruption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeal addressed two principal strands: (A) the refusal to join the Appellant under CPR Part 19; and (B) the grant of the interim injunction under section 187B. Its reasoning is set out below in the sequence in which these issues were addressed in the opinion.

A. Joinder under CPR Part 19 (rule 19.2(2) & rule 19.4)

• The Court began by identifying the relevant statutory and procedural background: the Appellant has statutory duties under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (notably sections 94, 95 and 98 and accompanying regulations) to provide accommodation/support to destitute asylum seekers, and the Appellant had become aware of the injunction proceedings only after the application was issued.
• The Court emphasised the correct legal approach to rule 19.2(2): it must be given a wide interpretation (Pablo Star) and the "desirable" condition is a control against gatecrashers but should not be used to exclude legitimately affected rights from being heard. The Court relied on Betta Oceanway, Pablo Star, Dunwoody and Blenheim to explain that third parties should be joined where their rights/duties may be affected and where their evidence would materially assist the court.
• The Court concluded the first-instance judge erred in two ways. First, he failed to apply rule 19.2(2) with sufficient breadth: he treated the dispute as narrowly between the Plaintiff and the Defendant on an "alleged planning breach" and underestimated the range of issues that would arise if the injunction were granted which directly impacted on the Appellant (such as the practical challenge of relocating a large number of asylum seekers and the Appellant's statutory responsibilities).
• Second, the judge conflated or overly emphasised "necessity" rather than "desirability" when considering joinder; his language revealed he set too high a bar for admission, thereby applying a test closer to necessity. That approach was criticised as unsound because rule 19.2(2) requires a pragmatic, purposive exercise of judicial discretion.
• The Court also held that evidence the Appellant could provide (specifically, the scale of displaced persons, the impact on the asylum accommodation estate, and the logistics of relocation) would materially assist the court and therefore provided a further, independent basis for joinder.
• Although the first-instance judge also relied on delay by the Appellant in seeking to intervene as a discretionary ground to refuse joinder, the Court found that the judge gave insufficient weight to the Appellant's statutory duties and to the public interest implications; the short delay in taking steps to be heard did not justify exclusion in all the circumstances.
• The Court therefore allowed the Appellant to be added as a party from that stage and allowed the appeal on the joinder issue.

B. The interim injunction under section 187B — balance of convenience and errors identified

• The Court reviewed the judge's application of American Cyanamid principles and the long-standing principle that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with a discretionary interlocutory decision (Hadmor), but it stressed that interference is appropriate where the judge's decision is based on errors of law or where the exercise of discretion is vitiated.
• The Court identified several errors of principle in Judge Eyre's reasoning which, cumulatively, undermined his exercise of discretion on the balance of convenience:
  • Reliance on the Defendant's "deliberate" decision not to seek planning permission as a significant factor favouring an injunction. The Court held that (i) the Defendant had acted openly and in good faith after taking advice, and (ii) the planning system does not compel a landowner to test the lawfulness of its use by applying for planning permission — therefore treating that deliberate stance as a weighty factor was erroneous.
  • Inadequate consideration of the desirability of preserving the status quo in the short period before trial and insufficient weight given to the potential injustice to residents of The Hotel who would need to be relocated within a short timeframe.
  • Failure to take sufficient account of the systemic and public interest consequences of granting the injunction — in particular the risk (identified by the Appellant) that ad hoc local applications could incentivise further closures and produce chaotic pressure on the national asylum accommodation estate.
  • Problematic treatment of protests and disorder: the judge had taken into account the impact of lawful and unlawful protests as matters potentially weighing in favour of an injunction, but the Court warned that this approach risked incentivising further protest and could penalise a use on the basis of third-party unlawful conduct; the Court regarded such an approach as precarious without the Appellant's input and a fuller exploration of mitigation measures.
  • The judge found no disqualifying delay on the part of the Plaintiff. The Court disagreed and found that the Plaintiff's conduct in the timing and manner of issuing the urgent application (short notice service and substantial bundles) was relevant and should have been given more weight in the balancing exercise.
• The Court further observed that the judge had engaged in an assessment of the relative strengths of the parties' legal cases on change of use — an approach that, while sometimes necessary in exceptional cases, was undertaken without sufficient caution. Although the judge concluded the Plaintiff's case had considerable force, the other errors above rendered the overall balancing exercise flawed.
• Taking the matters together, the Court concluded that the risk of injustice from refusing interim relief was not greater than the risk of injustice from granting it, once the correct approach to joinder, status quo, delay, systemic public interests and the proper weight to be given to the Defendant's conduct were applied.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

• The Court granted permission to the Appellant to intervene and allowed the appeal on the joinder issue.
• The Court granted permission to appeal against the interim injunction, allowed the appeals, and set aside the interim injunction granted by Judge Eyre on 19 August 2025.

Implications and immediate consequences (as specified in the opinion):

• The Appellant may be added as a party to the High Court proceedings from this point onwards so that the court can consider the substantive application with the benefit of the Appellant's evidence and submissions.
• The interim injunction (preventing use of The Hotel for accommodating asylum seekers from 12 September 2025 until final judgment) was set aside; the Court left the first-instance case management directions in place subject to any amendment necessitated by the Appellant's joinder.
• The Court directed that submissions on costs be exchanged and filed by 12 noon on 1 September 2025.
• The Court's reasoning clarifies two important practical points (based on the authorities cited and the Court's analysis): (a) CPR Part 19 joinder gateways are to be interpreted widely so that persons with duties or rights materially affected by a decision can generally be heard, and (b) in assessing interim relief under section 187B the court must take a cautious and principled approach to (i) the relevance of a defendant's decision not to apply for planning permission, (ii) the desirability of preserving the status quo pending trial, (iii) systemic public-interest consequences of site closures, and (iv) the risk that giving weight to protest-related disruption may incentivise further unlawful conduct. These points are drawn from the Court's reasons rather than framed as novel legal propositions.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the contents of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that text. All personal names and location identifiers have been replaced with consistent anonymised placeholders as required.