Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal concerns whether the Appellant is entitled to succeed to a secure tenancy previously held by the deceased tenant. The deceased tenant had been in an intimate relationship with the Appellant's mother but they were neither married nor in a civil partnership. The tenancy was granted by Company A on 16 July 2015 and the tenant died on 31 March 2021. The Appellant, the biological child of the tenant's partner, lived with the deceased tenant from 2018 until his death, latterly as his carer, and claimed to be his stepchild for succession purposes.
Company A's policy defined "stepchild" narrowly as a child of a person's spouse by a previous marriage or civil partnership. The Appellant's claim to succeed the tenancy was refused on that basis. Following the tenant's death, Company A served possession notices and commenced possession proceedings, which the Appellant defended on the basis of entitlement under the policy. The trial judge rejected the defence and ordered possession, granting permission to appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the correct interpretation of the term "stepchild" in Company A's policy on succession to secure tenancies?
- Whether the policy unlawfully discriminates against the Appellant contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly articles 8 and 14.
- Whether the policy should be read down under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to avoid incompatibility with Convention rights.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant argued that the definition of "stepchild" should not be restricted to children of a spouse by previous marriage or civil partnership but should include children of a person in a subsequent intimate relationship, relying on a modern dictionary definition.
- She contended that the policy unlawfully discriminated against her as a biological child of an unmarried partner, amounting to discrimination on "status" under article 14 of the ECHR.
- The Appellant also argued that the policy should be "read down" under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to avoid incompatibility with her Convention rights.
Company A's Arguments
- Company A maintained that the policy's definition of "stepchild" mirrored the closed list in section 113 of the Housing Act 1985, which requires a marriage or civil partnership for that status.
- They argued that the policy was designed to provide certainty and avoid costly investigations by relying on objective documentary evidence.
- Company A contended that any difference in treatment was justified as a proportionate means of pursuing the legitimate aim of efficient allocation of scarce public housing resources.
- They further submitted that section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply as the policy was not legislation and no incompatibility with Convention rights arose.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Wandsworth LBC v Michalak [2002] EWCA Civ 271 |
Section 113 of Housing Act 1985 comprises a closed list to ensure certainty in housing succession rights. |
Supported the interpretation that "stepchild" is limited to children of a spouse or civil partner, rejecting broader definitions. |
| Sheffield CC v Wall [2010] EWCA Civ 922 |
Foster children do not fall within the closed list under section 113 despite de facto family relationships. |
Reinforced that "stepchild" requires formal legal status, not merely a de facto relationship. |
| R (SC and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2021] UKSC 26 |
Article 14 ECHR discrimination analysis framework including status and proportionality. |
Adopted Lord Reed's summary to assess whether differential treatment was justified. |
| Re McLaughlin [2018] UKSC 48 |
Being unmarried can constitute a "status" for the purposes of article 14 discrimination claims. |
Accepted that the unmarried status of the tenant's partner could confer relevant status for discrimination analysis. |
| Yigit v Turkey (2011) 53 EHRR 25 |
Absence of marriage tie between parents is a personal status relevant to discrimination under article 14. |
Supported the notion that differential treatment based on marital status can be justified. |
| R (Turley) v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 189 |
Test for proportionality in social housing and welfare benefits cases is whether the measure is manifestly without reasonable foundation. |
Applied to confirm the legitimacy of housing allocation policies limiting succession rights. |
| R (Z) v Hackney LBC [2020] UKSC 40 |
Appellate courts should defer to lower courts' proportionality assessments unless there is a clear error undermining the conclusion. |
Limited scope for appellate interference with the trial judge's proportionality finding. |
| Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 |
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires legislation to be read compatibly with Convention rights where possible. |
Held not applicable here because the policy is not legislation and no incompatibility was found. |
| Bah v United Kingdom [2012] HLR 12 |
Bright line rules in legislation or policy are permissible if not arbitrary or discriminatory. |
Supported the validity of Company A's clear policy definition to ensure certainty and fairness in housing allocation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the statutory framework governing succession to secure tenancies, particularly section 86A of the Housing Act 1985, which provides a limited statutory right to succession primarily to spouses or civil partners. The relevant policy of Company A, while broader than the statutory scheme, is based on the earlier sections 87 and 113 of the 1985 Act, which contain a closed list of family members entitled to succeed, including "stepchildren" defined as children of a spouse or civil partner by prior marriage or partnership.
The court rejected the Appellant's reliance on a broad, modern dictionary definition of "stepchild" that would include children of a partner in an intimate but unmarried relationship. It emphasized the importance of certainty and administrative practicality in the policy's operation, noting that the policy aims to avoid time-consuming qualitative assessments of relationships. The court agreed with the trial judge's view that the relevant meaning of "stepchild" is that which would have been ascertained at the time the policy was issued or at the tenant's death, not a wider contemporary meaning.
Regarding the discrimination claim under articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, the court accepted that the Appellant's status as a biological child of an unmarried partner could constitute a "status" for article 14 purposes. However, the court found that the difference in treatment was justified as a proportionate means of pursuing the legitimate aim of allocating scarce public housing resources efficiently. The court applied the established test that such social and economic policy measures are entitled to a wide margin of appreciation and are only unlawful if manifestly without reasonable foundation.
The court also declined to permit a new argument on appeal seeking to extend the definition of "stepchild" to include children of persons living together as if married, as this would require new evidence and a different trial approach. Finally, the court held that section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply to the interpretation of Company A's policy, which is not legislation, and that no incompatibility with Convention rights was established.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court held that the Appellant is not entitled to succeed to the tenancy under Company A's policy because she does not fall within the defined category of "stepchild," which requires a marriage or civil partnership between the tenant and the Appellant's parent. The policy was found to be lawful and compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The court emphasized the importance of certainty and administrative efficiency in housing succession policies and upheld the legitimacy of bright-line rules in the allocation of scarce public housing.
No new precedent was established beyond affirming the application of existing legal principles to the interpretation of tenancy succession policies and the proportionality of differential treatment in social housing contexts.