Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, aged 25, pleaded guilty on 1 November 2024 at the Magistrates' Court to possession of a bladed article in a public place, contrary to section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. He was committed for sentence under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020. On 23 January 2025, the Crown Court sentenced the Appellant to 16 months' imprisonment. The Appellant applied for leave to appeal against that sentence, and the application was referred to the full court by the Registrar.
The offence occurred on 30 October 2024 near a large shopping centre in Greater Manchester, known for being crowded with shoppers, including families and children. The Appellant was stopped by police in a car park, searched, and found to be carrying a concealed sheath knife. He admitted carrying the knife for protection due to previous attacks on him. The sentencing judge found the offence to be highly dangerous, committed in a place where vulnerable people were likely present, and under circumstances posing a risk of serious disorder.
The Appellant had a prior conviction from 2019 for possession of class A drugs with intent to supply, sentenced to 28 months detention, and was on bail at the time of the current offence awaiting trial for other matters.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the offence as Category A1 under the sentencing guidelines by equating the shopping centre to a school or similar place where vulnerable people are likely to be present.
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the offence as Category A1 by finding a risk of serious disorder.
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in refusing to suspend the sentence based on the risk posed by the Appellant and the lack of realistic prospect of rehabilitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge incorrectly found the offence fell within Category A1 by treating the shopping centre as equivalent to a school or similar vulnerable place.
- The judge erred in assessing that there was a risk of serious disorder justifying Category A1 classification.
- The judge wrongly concluded that the sentence could not be suspended due to risk and lack of rehabilitation prospects.
Respondent's Arguments
- The offence was rightly categorised as Category A1 given the dangerous nature of the weapon and the location with vulnerable people present.
- There was a clear risk of serious disorder given the Appellant’s anticipation of trouble and the carrying of a deadly weapon in a public place.
- The refusal to suspend the sentence was appropriate based on risk to the public and the Appellant’s poor rehabilitation prospects.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Manzeke [2019] EWCA Crim 1287 |
Confirmed that offences committed near places where vulnerable people (e.g., schools) are likely to be present qualify as Category 1 harm under sentencing guidelines. |
The Court distinguished the present case from Manzeke, noting the shopping centre is not equivalent to a school but acknowledged risk to vulnerable people as an aggravating factor. |
| Akinjiola [2023] EWCA Crim 158 |
Confirmed presence of children and families at a location justifies Category 1 harm classification. |
The Court referenced this case to support that children and families present in a public place can be an aggravating factor, though the shopping centre did not meet the higher threshold of a school or similar institution. |
| Dabin [2023] EWCA Crim 399 |
Supported refusal to suspend sentence where there is risk to public safety and inadequate deterrence. |
The Court agreed with the principle that sentences involving serious harm risk are unlikely to be suitable for suspension, endorsing the sentencing judge’s decision. |
| Dunn [2024] EWCA Crim 1651 |
Addressed issues of totality in sentencing. |
The Court noted this precedent but did not consider it relevant to the present appeal’s issues. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first affirmed that the weapon involved—a concealed sheath knife—placed the offence within Category A culpability due to its dangerous nature and lack of legitimate use. The Appellant’s deliberate carriage of the knife, anticipating trouble in a public place, justified this categorisation.
Regarding harm, the Court analysed the two Category 1 harm factors: offences committed at places where vulnerable people are likely present and offences committed in circumstances with risk of serious disorder. The Court concluded that while the shopping centre is a public place frequented by vulnerable people, it does not equate to a school or similar institution where the guideline’s higher category applies. Nonetheless, the presence of families and children was a relevant aggravating factor.
The Court found the risk of serious disorder factor plainly present, given the Appellant’s anticipation of conflict and armed presence in a crowded public place. This justified the Category 1 harm classification and the sentencing starting point.
The Court also upheld the sentencing judge’s decision to increase the sentence due to the Appellant’s prior conviction, habitual carriage of a knife, and commission of the offence while on bail. Full credit for an early guilty plea was properly applied.
Concerning suspension of the sentence, the Court agreed with the judge’s findings that there was a high risk of serious harm to the public and no realistic prospect of rehabilitation, making suspension inappropriate. The Court noted that such decisions are governed by proper application of sentencing guidelines rather than precedent alone.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the appeal against sentence.
The direct effect is that the Appellant’s 16-month custodial sentence remains in place. The decision clarifies the application of Category 1 harm factors under the sentencing guidelines, emphasizing the distinction between places where vulnerable people are deliberately gathered (such as schools) and public places frequented by vulnerable people. The ruling reinforces judicial discretion in assessing risk of serious disorder and rehabilitation prospects when considering sentence suspension. No new precedent was established beyond the authoritative application of existing guidelines to the facts of this case.