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Parsonage, R. v

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 11 September 2023, in the Crown Court at Gloucester before His Honour Judge Lowe, the Applicant, aged 65, pleaded guilty to owning a dog that caused injury while dangerously out of control in a public place, contrary to section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1981. On 26 February 2024, the Applicant was sentenced to a 12-month community order, a dog destruction order was made for his dog, "Rocco," and the Applicant was disqualified from having custody of a dog for five years.

The Applicant sought permission to appeal the dog destruction order, which was referred to the full court by Judge Yip. The appeal is supported by a separate application to rely on fresh evidence.

The incident leading to the charge occurred on 10 September 2021, when the complainant was walking her dog, Biggles, in a public playing field. Rocco, off his lead, approached and bit the complainant's leg, causing severe injury. The Applicant initially pleaded not guilty, disputing which dog caused the bite, but changed his plea to guilty on the day of trial. A Newton hearing was held, where the judge found it "absolutely clear" that Rocco was the aggressor.

There were at least two prior incidents involving Rocco biting others, one in 2017 involving a woman who required medical treatment, and another in 2019 where Rocco bit another dog. Following the 2017 incident, the Applicant received a police caution and signed a Dog Behaviour Contract requiring Rocco to be kept on a lead and under control at all times. The Applicant disputed the severity and nature of these incidents but was found to have an unrealistic view of Rocco's behaviour.

The dog was not surrendered to the police following the destruction order and was left in the care of the Applicant's sister, which raised concerns about public safety.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the judge was entitled to make a mandatory dog destruction order under section 4 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1981 following the aggravated offence.
  2. Whether a contingent destruction order under section 4A could have been appropriate or should have been considered.
  3. Whether fresh evidence submitted post-sentencing could justify allowing the appeal or altering the destruction order.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Applicant initially denied that Rocco was the dog responsible for the bite, suggesting it could have been the complainant's dog.
  • He argued the previous incidents were exaggerated or mischaracterized, including denying the 2017 bite was a bite rather than a paw mark.
  • The Applicant contended that a contingent destruction order should have been made, especially since Rocco could be re-homed with his sister.
  • He challenged police records relating to the 2019 incident.
  • He sought to rely on fresh evidence post-sentencing, including statements from his sister and Dog Legislation Officers, to demonstrate Rocco's improved behaviour and suitability of his sister as a custodian.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Respondent argued that the mandatory destruction order was appropriate given the aggravated offence and the history of Rocco's aggressive behaviour.
  • They maintained that no evidence was presented at sentencing to justify a contingent destruction order.
  • They opposed the admission of fresh evidence, contending it was untimely and insufficient to outweigh the clear danger posed by Rocco.
  • The Respondent highlighted the Applicant's failure to comply with the Dog Behaviour Contract as evidence of ongoing risk.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v Flack [2008] EWCA Crim 204 Consideration of immediate vs contingent destruction orders under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (analogous provisions). The court held that a contingent destruction order may be appropriate if conditions reduce the danger to public safety; however, where no evidence or alternative was presented, an immediate destruction order was justified.
R (Killeen) v Birmingham Crown Court [2018] EWHC 174 (Admin) Summary of legal principles regarding aggravated offences under section 3(1) and the mandatory destruction order unless the dog is not a danger to public safety. Reinforced the burden on the dog owner to provide evidence justifying displacement of the mandatory destruction order, including the possibility of a contingent order with conditions.
R v Davies [2010] EWCA Crim 1923 Evidence required to satisfy the court that a dog does not pose a danger to public safety. Cited in Killeen to demonstrate the evidential burden on the owner to provide expert or lay evidence on the dog's character and behaviour.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1981, focusing on the mandatory nature of destruction orders for aggravated offences under section 3(1) unless the dog owner satisfies the court that the dog does not pose a danger to public safety.

The court found that the Applicant failed to provide any evidence at sentencing to support a contingent destruction order or to demonstrate that Rocco was no longer dangerous. Despite the judge's suggestion months before sentencing that a contingent destruction order might be considered, the Applicant did not pursue this option or submit relevant evidence.

The court rejected the Applicant's arguments minimizing Rocco's aggressive history and found the judge's findings about the Applicant's lack of insight and responsibility to be well-founded.

Regarding the fresh evidence submitted post-sentencing, the court applied the criteria under section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It found that although the evidence was admissible and credible, it was untimely, should have been presented earlier, and would not have altered the sentencing outcome given the dog's history and the Applicant's failure to propose clear conditions or transfer ownership.

The court also dismissed an unsworn and unexplained email from a Dog Legislation Officer attempting to undermine the Dog Behaviour Contract, noting the lack of justification and inconsistency with the judge's findings.

Overall, the court concluded that the destruction order was the only appropriate order on the evidence before the sentencing judge and that the appeal should be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal against the dog destruction order.

The decision confirms the mandatory nature of destruction orders in aggravated dog attack cases absent credible evidence to the contrary. It underscores the necessity for dog owners to present any alternative proposals, including contingent destruction orders with clear conditions and evidence, at the original sentencing hearing. The court expressly rejected attempts to raise such alternatives only on appeal without prior evidence.

No new precedent was established, but the court emphasized procedural expectations and the importance of compliance with statutory obligations and court orders. The court also expressed concern about the failure to keep the dangerous dog in police custody following the destruction order, highlighting public safety risks.

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Parsonage, R. v

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Parsonage, R. v
(Jan 21, 2025)