Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, a politician and brother of the late Veronica Guerin, initiated defamation proceedings against the Defendant, who describes herself as an investigative journalist, arising from social media publications made on the 11th and 12th of July, 2019. The publications allegedly referred to the Plaintiff as the "paedophile brother of Veronica Guerin," which the Plaintiff claims is defamatory due to the failure to clearly identify the correct brother. The Defendant admitted publication of the material, a fact not in dispute, having made this admission with legal advice prior to the first trial.
The proceedings have been ongoing since their institution on the 9th of September, 2019, and have consumed significant judicial resources, including a trial before judge and jury in November 2023 which resulted in a hung jury. Multiple interlocutory applications have been made, including orders restraining the Defendant from publishing defamatory material about the Plaintiff’s legal team. The Defendant, previously legally represented, now represents herself and has applied to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim while maintaining a counterclaim against the Plaintiff.
The case is currently awaiting retrial, having been adjourned pending the resolution of various applications, including the present application to strike out the proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Plaintiff’s defamation claim discloses a reasonable cause of action or is bound to fail.
- Whether the proceedings constitute an abuse of process.
- Whether the Defendant’s reports are protected by privilege under section 17 of the Defamation Act 2009.
- Whether the Defendant’s application to strike out should be granted pursuant to Order 19 Rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The proceedings are malicious, vexatious, frivolous, based on fraud, perjury, and deception.
- The claim is a grave attack on press freedom and has no cause of action.
- The Defendant contends that her reports referred to a third party, not the Plaintiff, and that no one was misled into believing it was the Plaintiff.
- She asserts that her report is protected by absolute privilege under section 17 of the Defamation Act 2009 as a fair, accurate, and truthful court report.
- The proceedings are maintained with the improper purpose of silencing her as a journalist.
- Claims that the Plaintiff’s litigation is champertous and funded by a third party.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff maintains that the claim discloses a clear cause of action in defamation.
- The Defendant’s reports were neither fair nor accurate and failed to correctly identify the individual concerned, breaching proper journalistic standards.
- The Defendant’s privilege claim is rejected as the reports do not meet the statutory requirements for fairness and accuracy.
- The proceedings are not an abuse of process and have tangible benefit in vindicating the Plaintiff’s good name.
- The Defendant’s strike out application is unsubstantiated and was not pursued earlier despite opportunity.
- The Plaintiff seeks costs of the application.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Mohan v. Revenue Commissioners, Ireland and the Attorney General [2025] IEHC 63 |
Summary of the amended Order 19, Rule 28 strike out jurisdiction and its codification of inherent jurisdiction principles. |
The court adopted the summary of legal principles from this case to guide the strike out application analysis. |
| Keohane v. Hynes [2014] IESC 66 |
Clarification that dismissal of proceedings as bound to fail is an abuse of process jurisdiction to be sparingly exercised, not a summary trial. |
The court applied this principle to emphasize the high threshold for strike out and the need to avoid premature factual determinations. |
| Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers & Ors. [2017] IECA 190, [2017] 2 I.R. 701 |
Defamation strike out principles including constitutional protection of the right to a good name and the requirement of tangible benefit to the plaintiff. |
The court relied on Gilchrist to hold that proceedings which could yield tangible benefit to the plaintiff should not be struck out as abuse of process. |
| Jeffrey v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence [2019] IESC 27, [2020] 1 I.L.R.M. 67 |
Strike out not appropriate where legal issues are complex and not straightforward. |
The court applied this to confirm that the issues in this defamation case are not suitable for summary disposal. |
| Beaumont Hospital v. O'Doherty [2021] IEHC 469 |
Balance between freedom of expression and protection against defamatory statements by journalists. |
The court cited this case to reject Defendant’s argument that press freedom permits defamatory publications. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by outlining the amended strike out jurisdiction under Order 19 Rule 28, as clarified in recent jurisprudence, which allows consideration of the underlying merits to a limited extent but requires a high threshold to dismiss proceedings as bound to fail or abuse of process.
Given the constitutional protection of a person's good name and the right of access to courts, particularly in defamation cases, the court emphasized that strike out should only be granted in clear cases where no reasonable cause of action exists or the proceedings are bound to fail.
The court noted that the proceedings have already proceeded to a jury trial which ended in a hung jury, indicating that the claim is not frivolous or bound to fail. The Defendant's arguments about privilege and misidentification raise factual issues properly resolved at trial, not on strike out.
The court expressed concern about the Defendant’s repeated serious allegations unsupported by evidence and cautioned against treating court proceedings as a platform for unsubstantiated accusations.
The Defendant's claims of abuse of process and improper purpose were found to be bare assertions without evidential foundation. The Plaintiff’s claim discloses a cause of action in defamation, and there is a tangible benefit in vindicating the Plaintiff's reputation.
Previous rulings and judgments in the proceedings, including those addressing service, contempt, and trial conduct, were not disturbed, and the court refused to revisit those issues on this application.
The court also noted the difficulty in reconciling the Defendant’s desire to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim while maintaining a counterclaim, given their intertwined nature.
Holding and Implications
The court REFUSED the Defendant’s application to strike out the proceedings.
This decision means that the defamation claim will proceed to retrial as scheduled, allowing the issues to be fully determined on the evidence before a jury. No new precedent was established; the ruling reinforces the high threshold for strike out in defamation cases and the importance of protecting constitutional rights to a good name and access to justice. The Plaintiff is preliminarily entitled to costs of this application, subject to further submissions.