Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application for leave to appeal against sentence following the applicant's guilty pleas to violent disorder and failing to surrender to custody. The offences arose from a violent disorder incident on 31 July 2024 outside a hotel housing asylum seekers in Aldershot.
The applicant pleaded guilty in the magistrates' court and was committed for sentence to the Crown Court, where he was sentenced to 28 months' imprisonment for violent disorder and one month consecutive for the Bail Act offence, totaling 29 months. There is no appeal against the latter sentence.
The violent disorder involved a crowd targeting the hotel, with acts of property damage and intimidation motivated by racial hostility. The applicant actively participated by damaging property and intimidating the occupants. Other defendants involved in the same incident were sentenced later by a different judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the culpability element of the violent disorder offence, resulting in an excessive starting point for sentencing.
- Whether there is an unfair disparity between the applicant's sentence and those imposed on other defendants involved in the same incident.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge wrongly categorised the offence as Category 1A culpability, whereas it should have been Category 1B, as the violent disorder targeted the building, not individuals, and no individual was put at risk of physical violence.
- This miscategorisation led to a manifestly excessive sentence, with the starting point set too high at four years instead of three years.
- There is an unfair disparity between the applicant's sentence and those of other defendants sentenced later, despite the applicant having pleaded guilty earlier and thus deserving greater credit.
- The applicant's sentence was the longest among those sentenced for the same incident, which undermines the encouragement of early guilty pleas.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Crown concedes the judge erred in categorising the offence as Category 1A but contends this error did not make the sentence manifestly excessive.
- Even with a Category 1B starting point, the multiple culpability and harm factors, along with the racial hostility aggravating factor, justify the sentence imposed.
- The disparity argument lacks merit because different judges sentenced the defendants at different times, and the applicant was sentenced promptly due to his guilty plea.
- It is not unusual or improper for sentences to vary between judges, and no right-thinking person would consider the administration of justice flawed on this basis.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| [2024] EWCA Crim 1382 (Cush and others) |
Clarification of culpability categories in violent disorder; distinguishing targeting of individuals (Category 1A) from group violence against another group (Category 1B). |
The court accepted the concession that the offence was miscategorised as 1A and should be 1B, but upheld that the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the factors present. |
| Fawcett (1983) Cr. App. R. (S.) 158 |
Test for assessing unfair disparity in sentencing based on public perception of justice administration. |
Referenced by appellant to argue that the disparity in sentences would cause right-thinking members of the public to believe something had gone wrong. |
| Williamson [2020] EWCA Crim 1085; [2021] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 29 |
Guidance on credit for guilty pleas in circumstances where the plea is not at the earliest opportunity. |
The court noted that credit for plea may be reduced in cases where the plea was not entered at the first opportunity, relevant to the applicant’s plea timing. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first addressed the miscategorisation of culpability. It accepted the Crown's concession that the offence should have been categorised as 1B rather than 1A, consistent with precedent in Cush where targeting a building rather than individuals does not meet the level A culpability factor.
However, the court found that despite this error, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The judge had correctly identified multiple level B culpability factors and several Category 1 harm factors, justifying a significant uplift from the Category 1B starting point. The statutory aggravating factor of racial hostility further warranted a substantial increase in sentence.
The court concluded that the sentence imposed, effectively 3.5 years before credit, was within the appropriate range for a Category 1B offence with significant aggravating features.
Regarding the disparity ground, the court considered the sentences imposed on other defendants by a different judge at a later date. It found no unfair disparity because the applicant was sentenced promptly due to an early guilty plea, whereas others pleaded guilty later and received less credit.
The court emphasized that differences in sentencing between judges at different times do not inherently create unfair disparity, particularly where the sentencing judge was entitled to impose the sentence he did. The court rejected the argument that the applicant’s sentence was manifestly excessive due to disparity concerns.
Holding and Implications
The court REFUSED LEAVE TO APPEAL against the sentence for violent disorder.
This decision confirms that a miscategorisation of culpability does not necessarily render a sentence manifestly excessive if other aggravating factors justify the sentence within the applicable guideline range. It also underscores the principle that sentencing disparities between different judges, especially when defendants are sentenced at different times and with varying plea timings, do not automatically amount to unfairness or error in principle.
The direct effect is that the applicant remains subject to the original sentence imposed. The court did not establish new precedent but applied existing sentencing principles and case law to uphold the sentence.