Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns whether the Defendant, Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council ("the Council"), was justified in declining to accept a housing application under section 183 of the Housing Act 1996 by the Plaintiff. The Council rejected the application on the basis that it was founded on the same facts as a prior application, in which the Council had concluded the Plaintiff was intentionally homeless and not owed the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the 1996 Act.
The Plaintiff previously held a secure tenancy from 2007 until eviction in 2016 due to rent arrears. Subsequently, the Plaintiff had temporary accommodation in a YMCA hostel and supported housing but was evicted again. The Council accepted the Plaintiff had a priority need but found her intentionally homeless from the supported housing. After a series of reviews and appeals, including a third review by an officer, the finding of intentional homelessness was upheld.
The Plaintiff's solicitors submitted that the Plaintiff's failure to pay rent was not deliberate due to severe mental health problems impairing her capacity. The Council's review officer rejected this claim, finding no sufficient evidence of a mental breakdown causing the arrears. The Plaintiff's subsequent appeal to the County Court was dismissed.
The Plaintiff made a fresh application in September 2023, supported by a new psychiatric report from a consultant psychiatrist, asserting new medical evidence of mental health conditions affecting the ability to maintain tenancy. The Council declined to accept this new application, stating it was based on the same facts as before and that the new report did not provide new substantive evidence.
The Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Council's decision, which was refused permission twice before the Court of Appeal granted permission to apply for judicial review, considering the grounds had a sufficient prospect of success.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Plaintiff's fresh application was based on the same facts as the previous application or whether the new psychiatric report constituted or included a new fact ("The New Fact Issue").
- Whether the Council's review officer was entitled to inquire into the basis of the psychiatric report's conclusions and, if not, the consequences of such inquiries ("The Inquiries Issue").
- Whether the Plaintiff should be refused relief on the basis of abusive conduct ("The Abuse Issue").
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The new psychiatric report constituted or included a new fact, as it provided expert evidence from a consultant psychiatrist based on a lengthy interview and medical records, addressing gaps previously criticized by the Council.
- The comparison for determining whether a new application is based on the same facts should be between the facts found in the earlier application and those alleged in the later one, disregarding only trivial or fanciful allegations.
- The Council was obliged to accept the new application and conduct inquiries under section 184 of the 1996 Act.
Respondent's Arguments
- The psychiatric report was merely repackaging of previously known facts and could not itself constitute a new fact.
- The new application was based on the same facts as the earlier application when considering the evidence submitted previously.
- The review officer was entitled to inquire into the basis of the psychiatric report to determine whether it introduced anything new.
- The Plaintiff's conduct in failing to disclose the new report during the appeal amounted to improper conduct warranting refusal of relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Harrow London Borough Council, Ex p. Fahia [1998] 1 WLR 1396 |
Second applications based on exactly the same facts as a previous one can be treated as no application at all; no short cut for local authorities to reject applications without inquiry. |
Guided the Court's approach that only very special cases justify rejecting a subsequent application as not being a fresh application. |
| Rikha Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2005] 1 WLR 2103 |
Clarified that a subsequent application is valid unless based on precisely the same facts as the earlier one; comparison should be with facts as known when the earlier application was decided. |
Confirmed the need to compare the substance of applications and that new facts must be neither trivial nor fanciful to require acceptance of a new application. |
| R (Minott) v Cambridge City Council [2022] EWCA Civ 159 |
Two-stage test: (1) whether an application is a fresh application (not identical to an earlier one), and (2) whether it is well-founded requiring inquiry. |
Applied the test to distinguish between identical applications and those based on new facts, emphasizing that local authorities must accept fresh applications unless clearly identical. |
| R (Hoyte) v Southwark London Borough Council [2016] EWHC 1665 (Admin) |
New evidence supporting previously alleged facts can constitute a new fact; authorities cannot ignore fresh evidence simply because it relates to facts previously alleged but rejected. |
Supported the principle that fresh evidence may render a new application valid even if facts were previously rejected. |
| R (Bukartyk) v Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council [2019] EWHC 3480 (Admin) |
Local authority must consider whether new evidence was known and taken into account previously; new evidence not previously considered can constitute new facts. |
Reinforced that new medical evidence not considered in earlier decisions can render a new application valid. |
| R (Ibrahim) v Westminster City Council [2021] EWHC 2616 (Admin) |
Failure to consider relevant evidence in earlier decisions affects whether a new application is based on the same facts; new reports can constitute new facts even if related to earlier reports. |
Confirmed that new expert reports can amount to new facts, especially where earlier evidence was not considered. |
| Bubb v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1285 |
Scope for adducing evidence during appeals is limited; judicial review involves reviewing decisions, not making them, limiting fresh evidence. |
Used to explain why the Plaintiff did not adduce new psychiatric evidence during prior appeal proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed the statutory framework under the Housing Act 1996, particularly sections 183 and 184, which impose a mandatory duty on local authorities to make inquiries when a person applies for housing assistance and the authority has reason to believe the person may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.
The Court examined the established case law addressing successive applications, notably the House of Lords decision in Fahia, and subsequent Court of Appeal decisions in Rikha Begum and Minott. These cases clarify that a second or further application can only be rejected as not being a valid application if it is based on exactly the same facts as a previous application, disregarding only trivial or fanciful differences.
The Court emphasised that the relevant comparison is between the substance of the earlier application (including all facts and matters relied on up to the point of final determination) and the later application. New evidence supporting previously rejected factual assertions can constitute a new fact, requiring the local authority to accept and consider the new application.
Applying these principles, the Court found that the new psychiatric report submitted by the Plaintiff, based on a lengthy interview and medical records, provided significant new evidence that was not previously before the Council. This evidence was not trivial or fanciful and thus rendered the new application different from the earlier one.
The Court held that the Council's review officer was not entitled to investigate the accuracy of the new facts at the stage of determining whether the application was fresh. His inquiries into the basis of the psychiatric report and reliance on the absence of responses to questions constituted taking into account irrelevant considerations.
Regarding the alleged abusive conduct by the Plaintiff in not disclosing the psychiatric report during the appeal, the Court found that the report post-dated the appeal decision and was not relevant to that appeal, thus the Plaintiff’s conduct did not justify refusing relief.
Consequently, the Court quashed the Council's decision to reject the new application and ordered that the Council must make the necessary inquiries under section 184 of the Act. It also directed that a different officer should handle the application to avoid prejudice.
There was a divergence of views among the Judges on the precise nature of the comparison to be made between successive applications. One view was that the comparison is between the facts alleged in the new application and the facts as found in the earlier application. The alternative view was that the comparison should be between the new application and the earlier application itself, including all evidence. Both approaches, however, lead to the same outcome in this case.
Holding and Implications
The Court's final decision was to QUASH the Council's refusal to accept the Plaintiff's fresh housing application made on 4 September 2023.
The Council is required to treat the fresh application as valid and conduct the inquiries mandated by section 184 of the Housing Act 1996. The case clarifies that a fresh application must be accepted unless it is based on exactly the same facts as a previous application, disregarding trivial or fanciful differences.
The decision underscores that new expert evidence supporting previously rejected factual assertions can constitute a new fact, obliging local authorities to consider the application. It also confirms that local authorities are not entitled to investigate the accuracy of alleged new facts at the initial stage of determining whether an application is fresh.
No broader precedent altering statutory duties was established; the ruling affirms existing principles on successive homelessness applications and procedural fairness in their consideration.