Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns the jurisdiction to extend time for the service of a claim form in a planning statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("TCPA"). The underlying dispute arose after a local planning authority issued an enforcement notice and refused planning permission related to land in South Staffordshire. The Respondent appealed the enforcement notice and brought two challenges: a planning statutory review under s.288 and an appeal under s.289 of the TCPA. The statutory time limits for service were 28 days for the s.289 appeal and six weeks for the s.288 review.
The Respondent filed documents with the court office on 18 April 2023, but there was confusion as to which documents related to which challenge, and the claim form was misleadingly labelled. Despite filing in advance of the deadlines, the court office delayed sealing and issuing the claim form for the s.288 review. The sealed claim form was only issued on 11 July 2023, more than two months after the deadline expired on 4 May 2023. The Respondent served the unsealed claim form on the Appellant on 21 June 2023, which was ineffective service.
The Respondent subsequently applied to extend the time for service of the claim form. The Appellant opposed the extension, arguing the court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim due to time expiry. The Deputy High Court Judge extended the time for service, finding the delay was due to the court office and outside the Respondent's control. The Appellant now appeals that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court erred in concluding that the failure to serve the claim form within the six-week statutory period was due to matters outside the control of the Respondent.
- Whether the court erred in failing to properly consider the prejudice to the Appellant caused by the loss of a limitation defence and the Respondent’s lack of promptitude in applying for an extension of time.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge wrongly relied on events occurring after the deadline expired and failed to apply the correct legal test under CPR 7.6(3), which requires the claimant to show they took all reasonable steps to serve within time and acted promptly in seeking an extension.
- The Respondent failed to take all reasonable steps before the expiry of the six-week period, notably by not alerting the court office to the urgency or chasing the issue of the claim form effectively.
- The Respondent did not act promptly in making the application for an extension, waiting approximately ten weeks after the deadline expired.
- The judge failed to consider the prejudice to the Appellant caused by the loss of a limitation defence.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Respondent filed the claim form and related documents with the court office in good time, which should constitute taking all reasonable steps to serve within time.
- The delay was caused by the court office’s failures and confusion, which were outside the Respondent's control.
- The Respondent’s solicitors reasonably focused on chasing the court office for the sealed claim form before applying for an extension of time.
- The Respondent acted promptly once the sealed claim form was issued, applying for an extension shortly thereafter.
- The potential prejudice from the loss of a limitation defence should not outweigh the circumstances caused by the court office’s errors.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R (Good Law Project) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355 |
Application of CPR 7.6(3) by analogy to extensions of time for serving claim forms in judicial review and planning statutory review claims. |
The court adopted the principles from Good Law as governing the test for extensions of time under CPR 7.6(3) in this planning statutory review context. |
| Carnegie v Drury [2007] EWCA Civ 497 |
Events after expiry of the service period are irrelevant to whether all reasonable steps were taken before expiry. |
The court applied this principle to focus on the Respondent’s conduct before the six-week deadline. |
| Denton v TH White Limited [2014] 1 WLR 3926 |
Principles relating to relief from sanctions do not apply to service of originating processes under CPR 7.6. |
The court clarified that merits and Denton principles are irrelevant to the extension of time for service under CPR 7.6. |
| Halton Borough Council v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 293 |
Application of Good Law principles and the importance of promptness and taking reasonable steps. |
Referenced as part of the recent planning cases refusing extensions where delays and promptness were insufficient. |
| Telford and Wrekin Council v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 2439 |
Confirmation that Good Law principles apply equally to s.288 planning statutory reviews. |
Demonstrated that failure to take all reasonable steps and lack of promptness results in refusal of extension. |
| Home Farm Land Ltd v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 2566 |
Requirement to take all reasonable steps and act promptly; loss of limitation defence as palpable prejudice. |
Supported the approach that extensions should be refused where reasonable steps and promptness are lacking. |
| Aurora Properties (UK) Ltd v Welwyn Hatfield BC [2024] EWHC 1213 (Admin) |
Failure to take all reasonable steps and to act promptly results in refusal of extension. |
Used as a recent example of refusal of extension for late service and delayed application. |
| R (Merrills) v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2024] EWHC 1219 (Admin) |
Importance of alerting court office to urgency and acting promptly to seek extension. |
Distinguished from the present case where the judge had previously found failure to take reasonable steps. |
| Farnham Town Council v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2024] EWHC 2458 (Admin) |
Higher standard for service in s.288 planning statutory reviews; refusal of extension despite late filing. |
Illustrates the importance of finality and certainty in planning decisions, supporting refusal of extension. |
| Walton v Pickerings Solicitors [2022] EWHC 2073 (Ch) |
Focus on reasonable steps after issue of sealed claim form in non-planning cases; court office error in sealing date. |
Discussed to contrast with planning cases where time runs regardless of issue; court office cannot backdate sealed claim form. |
| Croke v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2019] EWCA Civ 54 |
Emphasis on certainty and consistency in fixed statutory time limits for planning statutory review claims. |
Referred to in support of the importance of strict adherence to the six-week time limit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the application of CPR 7.6(3) by analogy to the planning statutory review under s.288, confirming that the Respondent must demonstrate (a) all reasonable steps were taken to serve the claim form within the six-week statutory period, and (b) promptness in applying for an extension of time thereafter.
The court found that although the Respondent filed the documents with the court office in good time, the solicitors failed to alert the court office to the urgency and the statutory deadlines, nor did they follow up with sufficient diligence to ensure the claim form was sealed and issued promptly. The court emphasised that taking all reasonable steps requires proactive communication, including alerting the court office to deadlines, chasing by email and telephone, and if necessary personal attendance.
The court criticised the Respondent’s solicitors for failing to clarify which documents related to which application, thereby contributing to confusion and delay. The court noted that the Respondent’s solicitors allowed the statutory deadlines to pass without taking adequate steps to prevent delay or to apply promptly for an extension.
The court rejected the judge’s approach below that placed heavy weight on events after the statutory deadline expired and sympathy for the Respondent, holding that such events are largely irrelevant to the key question of whether all reasonable steps were taken before the deadline.
Regarding promptness, the court held that the Respondent’s application to extend time was made approximately ten weeks after expiry of the six-week period, which was not prompt as required by CPR 7.6(3)(c). The court rejected the argument that the Respondent’s solicitors were entitled to delay the application while chasing the court office, holding that both actions should have proceeded concurrently.
The court further held that the potential prejudice to the Appellant from the loss of a limitation defence was a relevant consideration but not decisive. The Respondent’s failure to act promptly was fatal to the application regardless.
In sum, the court concluded that the Respondent failed to satisfy either limb of the CPR 7.6(3) test and that the judge below erred in her analysis by failing to apply the correct legal framework and by giving undue weight to post-deadline events and sympathy.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and ruled that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the planning statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 because the time for service of the claim form had expired and no valid extension was granted.
The direct effect is that the Respondent’s statutory review claim is barred for failure to comply with the strict six-week service deadline. The decision reinforces the strict application of CPR 7.6(3) by analogy to planning statutory reviews, emphasizing the necessity for claimants to take all reasonable steps before the deadline and to act promptly thereafter in seeking extensions.
No new precedent was set beyond clarifying the application of existing principles from Good Law and related authorities to the particular context of planning statutory reviews. The court underscored the importance of finality and certainty in planning decisions and the procedural consequences of non-compliance with statutory time limits.