Factual and Procedural Background
On 6th April 2023, following a trial in the Crown Court at The City before Her Honour Judge Clemitson and a jury, the applicants, Plaintiff and Co-Defendant, were each convicted by a majority of false imprisonment (Count 1). Plaintiff was acquitted of further counts of false imprisonment. On 23rd June 2023, Plaintiff was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment (less time spent on qualifying electronic curfew), and Co-Defendant was sentenced to a Suspended Sentence Order of six months' imprisonment suspended for 18 months with rehabilitation and curfew requirements. Plaintiff's sentence was later amended to ten months' imprisonment and he was made subject to a Criminal Behaviour Order for an indefinite period.
The applicants renewed their application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge. They are represented pro bono by their trial counsel.
The offences arose from Plaintiff's membership of a voluntary organisation ("COST") which sought to identify and apprehend online paedophiles using decoy children and sting operations to effect citizen's arrests. The prosecution alleged that Plaintiff used COST for bullying and self-publicity, ultimately resulting in false imprisonment of complainants.
Specifically, on 6th February 2020, a complainant was detained by COST members following online communications with a COST decoy. Plaintiff recorded the detention, which formed the subject matter of Count 1. The complainant's evidence was given via an Achieving Best Evidence interview, and Plaintiff gave evidence at trial asserting lawful detention based on honest and reasonable belief that the complainant was committing or had committed a criminal offence and that arrest was necessary to prevent harm or escape.
Co-Defendant denied criminality and relied on the defence that any detention was lawful and any force used was reasonable and proportionate. The prosecution alleged false imprisonment, though conceded reasonable grounds to suspect the complainant had committed an offence.
The applicants argued lawful justification under section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE"), and common law. The trial judge ruled on the availability of these defences and their application to the facts.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge erred in withdrawing from the jury the defences under section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 relating to the use of reasonable force in the prevention of crime and in assisting lawful arrests.
- Whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the reasonableness of force by reference to dicta in R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16, a case concerning the section 3 defence and not section 24A of PACE.
- Whether the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence from witnesses related to Count 3, of which Plaintiff was acquitted.
- Whether the trial judge erred in her directions regarding Plaintiff's bad character, particularly whether the directions improperly suggested propensity to commit offences.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants' Arguments
- The judge improperly withdrew defences under section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 that allow reasonable force to prevent crime or assist lawful arrests.
- The jury directions on reasonableness of force were flawed by reliance on R v Jones, which was not directly applicable to section 24A of PACE.
- Plaintiff contended the judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence from Sydney and Tracey Wilkinson, which undermined Plaintiff’s credibility despite acquittal on Count 3.
- Plaintiff argued the judge’s directions on bad character went beyond credibility and improperly suggested propensity, without proper safeguards as required by R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824.
Respondent's Arguments
- The judge carefully considered and correctly withdrew the section 3 defences beyond those applicable under section 24A of PACE and lawful arrest circumstances.
- The jury directions were clear, appropriate, and consistent with the Route to Verdict document; no hybrid or confusing test was created.
- The hearsay evidence was properly admitted under section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 due to witnesses’ fear, supported by body-worn footage and corroborated testimony.
- The judge’s directions on Plaintiff's bad character were appropriate and limited to issues of credibility, not propensity, and did not render the conviction unsafe.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16 |
Clarification of the reasonableness of force under section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 |
The court considered the dicta to explain the limits on citizen use of force and upheld the trial judge’s direction on reasonableness of force. |
| Laporte v CC of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55 |
Common law right to use force to prevent breach of the peace |
The court accepted the trial judge’s ruling that no imminent risk of sexual violence existed, so this defence was unavailable. |
| DPP v Stratford Magistrates' Court [2017] EWHC 1794 (Admin) |
Principles limiting citizen use of force and self-help remedies |
The court relied on this case to support the principle that force by citizens is tightly controlled and only justified in exceptional, imminent emergency situations. |
| R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824 |
Safeguards in directions relating to bad character evidence and propensity |
The court addressed concerns that the trial judge’s directions did not amount to a propensity direction, maintaining the safety of the conviction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the availability of defences under section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 and section 24A of PACE, emphasising the limited circumstances in which a citizen may use reasonable force. It underscored the state's monopoly on legitimate physical force, restricting citizen self-help to emergencies where immediate action is necessary and police intervention is not practicable.
The judge concluded that the defendants’ belief that the complainant was committing an offence of attempting to meet a child was insufficient to justify the use of force to prevent the offence because no real child existed and the offence was either completed or impossible to commit at the time of detention. Preventing future, non-imminent crimes or preserving evidence does not justify use of force under section 3.
The court accepted that reasonable force may be used to assist a lawful arrest by a constable, but here the force was used to effect a citizen’s arrest before police arrival, which does not qualify for the section 3 defence.
The court found no error in the trial judge’s directions on the reasonableness of force, which appropriately referenced R v Jones. The hearsay evidence was properly admitted after applying the correct legal test, supported by evidence of witness fear. The directions on bad character were limited to credibility and did not amount to a propensity direction.
Overall, the court found the grounds of appeal unarguable and upheld the reasoning of the single judge refusing leave to appeal.
Holding and Implications
The renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction are REFUSED.
The court’s decision confirms the narrow scope for citizen use of force in preventing crime or assisting arrests, reinforcing the principle that such force must be reasonable, necessary, and typically reserved for emergencies where police cannot act promptly. The ruling underscores the importance of police monopoly on legitimate force and the limited exceptions for citizen intervention. No new precedent was set; the decision affirms existing legal principles and the trial judge’s application thereof.