Factual and Procedural Background
This judicial review concerns the State's difficulties in providing accommodation to certain applicants for international protection ("IP applicants") in the period from late 2023 to May 2024. The applicants who could not be accommodated have been referred to as unaccommodated IP applicants. The State is legally obliged under EU law and domestic regulations to provide material reception conditions, including housing, food, clothing, and a daily expenses allowance (DEA), to IP applicants. Due to accommodation shortages, the State adopted a policy prioritising vulnerable categories such as families with children, resulting in many single male IP applicants not receiving accommodation. Instead, the State provided increased DEA payments and other ancillary supports.
The proceedings were brought by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission ("the Commission") under section 41 of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Act 2014 ("the 2014 Act"). This was the first time the Commission exercised this power. The Commission sought declaratory and mandatory reliefs on behalf of a class of unaccommodated IP applicants who arrived between 4 December 2023 and 10 May 2024. The State opposed the proceedings on both procedural and substantive grounds, including challenging the Commission's power to bring the action under section 41, and contending that the State's current measures adequately meet the basic needs of unaccommodated IP applicants.
The High Court had previously addressed similar issues in early 2023 in cases involving individual applicants, finding breaches of the State’s obligations. The present case differs as it involves a class action by the Commission and concerns more recent circumstances.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Commission has the statutory power under section 41 of the 2014 Act to bring proceedings on behalf of a class of persons without identifying or obtaining consent from each individual member.
- The scope and meaning of "human rights" within section 41, particularly whether rights derived from EU secondary legislation (such as the Reception Conditions Directive and Regulations) can be directly relied upon.
- Whether the State has breached the human rights of unaccommodated IP applicants by failing to provide adequate material reception conditions, including accommodation and sufficient financial assistance.
- Whether declaratory and/or mandatory relief should be granted in respect of those breaches.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments (The Commission)
- The Commission is empowered by section 41 of the 2014 Act to bring proceedings concerning the human rights of any person or class of persons, without needing to identify or obtain consent from each individual.
- The class of unaccommodated IP applicants is precisely defined as those who arrived between 4 December 2023 and 10 May 2024 and were entitled to but did not receive accommodation.
- The Commission relies on breaches of fundamental human rights, primarily under Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees respect for human dignity, supported by EU Directive 2013/33/EU and the 2018 Regulations.
- The increased DEA payment and ancillary supports provided by the State are insufficient to meet basic needs such as housing, food, clothing, and hygiene, leaving many applicants homeless or inadequately supported.
- Evidence from individual applicants and NGOs demonstrates the inadequacy of the State’s response and the vulnerability of the unaccommodated IP applicants.
- The Commission seeks declaratory relief and mandatory orders requiring the State to meet its obligations to this class of persons.
Respondents' Arguments (The State)
- The Commission’s reliance on section 41 is misplaced; the power does not envisage proceedings on behalf of a class without identifying and obtaining consent from each member.
- The definition of "human rights" in Part 3 of the 2014 Act is narrow and excludes rights derived solely from secondary EU legislation, limiting the Commission’s claims.
- The State has taken significant steps to address the accommodation crisis, including prioritising vulnerable applicants, increasing DEA payments by €75 per week, providing a €100 voucher, and arranging day services for food and hygiene.
- The DEA payment level is higher than equivalent payments in comparable EU Member States and intended to avoid incentivising Ireland as a place to apply for protection.
- The State faces unprecedented and unforeseeable pressures, including a surge of Ukrainian nationals under the Temporary Protection Directive and local hostility to accommodation centres, which hinder efforts.
- The vulnerability triage and referral system effectively prioritises those most in need, and the State is actively working to increase accommodation capacity.
- The Commission has failed to demonstrate that the State’s current measures constitute a breach of human rights or justify mandatory relief.
- The granting of mandatory relief would interfere with the separation of powers and is not appropriate given the State’s ongoing efforts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Heather Hill Management Company CLG & McGoldrick v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors [2022] IESC 43 |
Principles of statutory interpretation emphasizing language, context, and purpose. |
The court applied the interpretative approach to construe section 41 of the 2014 Act. |
| A, B and C (A Minor Suing by his Next Friend, A) v. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade [2023] IESC 10 |
Summary of statutory interpretation principles. |
Used to affirm the approach to interpreting section 41 in context. |
| Lofinmakin & ors v. Minister for Justice & ors [2013] IESC 49; [2013] 4 IR 274 |
Courts do not give advisory opinions or decide abstract/hypothetical issues; mootness principles. |
Supported the conclusion that section 41 does not permit advisory opinions and requires a live dispute. |
| Grace v. Hendrick and Garvey [2021] IEHC 320 |
Interpretation of Order 15, Rule 9 RSC concerning representative actions. |
Distinguished from section 41 actions; section 41 is not a representative action. |
| S.Y. (A Minor) v. Minister for Children [2023] IEHC 187 |
State’s obligation to provide material reception conditions and breach where basic needs unmet. |
Followed and applied to the present class, confirming breaches where accommodation was lacking. |
| S.A. v. The Minister for Children & Ors and R.J. v. The Minister for Children & Ors [2023] IEHC 717 |
Clarification of State obligations under Directive and Regulations; rejection of force majeure defence. |
Supported the court's rejection of force majeure defence and confirmed mandatory nature of obligations. |
| Case C-79/13 Federaal agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers v. Saciri and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:103 |
Member States must ensure minimum reception standards and respect human dignity under the Charter. |
Applied to affirm that failure to meet basic needs breaches Article 1 of the Charter. |
| Case C-233/18 Haqbin v. Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers ECLI:EU:C:2019:956 |
Material reception conditions cannot be withdrawn or reduced if it deprives applicants of basic needs. |
Applied to confirm that even sanctioned applicants must have basic needs met. |
| PMcD v. Governor of X Prison [2021] IESC 65 |
Discretion in granting declaratory relief; declarations refused if no practical utility or public body complies. |
Guided the court’s exercise of discretion in granting declaratory but refusing mandatory relief. |
| Omega Leisure Ltd v. Superintendent Barry [2012] IEHC 23 |
Factors for granting declarations: good reason, real and substantial issue, sufficient interest, proper contradictor. |
Used to assess whether declaratory relief was appropriate in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by interpreting section 41 of the 2014 Act, concluding that the Commission was entitled to bring proceedings concerning the human rights of a class of persons without the need to identify or obtain consent from each individual. The court distinguished section 41 actions from traditional representative actions and found that the statute contemplates actions "about" a class rather than "on behalf of" the class. The court accepted that the definition of "human rights" in Part 3 of the 2014 Act is narrower than the general definition, limiting claims to rights derived from foundational instruments that have the force of law in the State, such as the Constitution, certain treaties, and the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.
The court held that while the Commission could not rely directly on breaches of the Directive or Regulations as standalone grounds, evidence of such breaches was relevant and admissible to prove breaches of the foundational human rights under Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and related instruments.
On the substantive issues, the court reviewed extensive evidence from the Commission, individual IP applicants, and NGOs, as well as the State’s evidence. It was undisputed that a significant number of IP applicants were not offered accommodation between 4 December 2023 and 10 May 2024, with the State acknowledging a shortage of accommodation and a policy prioritising vulnerable groups.
The court found that the increased DEA payment and other ancillary supports provided by the State were insufficient to meet the basic needs of unaccommodated IP applicants, particularly housing, food, clothing, and hygiene. The financial assistance was inadequate to secure private accommodation, and day services were overwhelmed and unable to meet all hygiene needs. The court rejected the State’s inference that many unaccommodated applicants had found alternative accommodation, noting the lack of evidence supporting such a conclusion.
The court also considered the effectiveness of the State’s vulnerability triage system and found it to be reactive and limited, leaving many vulnerable applicants without accommodation. The court emphasized that the failure to meet basic needs breaches the right to human dignity under Article 1 of the Charter, as affirmed by the CJEU in Saciri and Haqbin.
Regarding relief, the court found that declaratory relief was warranted, applying the criteria from Omega Leisure Ltd v. Superintendent Barry and PMcD v. Governor of X Prison. However, the court exercised its discretion to refuse mandatory relief, noting that the State was actively working to address the crisis and that mandatory orders in broad terms would be difficult to enforce and potentially interfere with the separation of powers.
Holding and Implications
The court’s final decision is summarized as follows:
The court grants declaratory relief declaring that the respondents' failure to provide for the basic needs of newly arrived international protection applicants between 4 December 2023 and 10 May 2024, including accommodation, shelter, food, and basic hygiene facilities, breaches the rights of that class of persons under Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The court refuses to grant mandatory relief, reasoning that the State is actively endeavouring to meet its obligations, and mandatory orders in the general terms sought would present enforcement difficulties and risk interfering with executive functions.
The direct effect is to affirm the State’s ongoing human rights obligations toward unaccommodated IP applicants and to require the State to continue its efforts to comply. No new legal precedent beyond the application of existing statutory and EU human rights law was established. The court invited the parties to agree on the form of final orders and reserved costs for further submissions.