Sledziewski & Anor v Persons Unknown & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns a dispute arising from a video uploaded by the First Defendant on a YouTube channel dedicated to cycling videos. The video showed a van belonging to the Second Claimant driving dangerously close to the First Defendant, who was cycling and filming the incident. The First Defendant posted the video with critical commentary referencing the Second Claimant's company name. The First Claimant, managing director of the Second Claimant, requested removal of the company name from the video content, framing the concern as trademark infringement rather than defamation. The First Defendant responded with further posts and emails denying infringement and seeking compensation for what he described as an unjustified legal threat. The Second Defendant, operating a separate legal commentary YouTube channel, posted videos discussing the trademark issues and appeared to support the First Defendant's position.

These exchanges led to a claim by the Claimants for harassment, breach of data protection law, and trademark infringement. The current judgment concerns an application by the First Claimant for an interim injunction against the First Defendant on harassment grounds. The injunction application against the Second Defendant was withdrawn after he gave undertakings without admission of liability.

The First Defendant did not respond to the claim form and particulars of claim served by email, nor did he attend the injunction hearing. The court proceeded to hear the application in his absence, having found the Human Rights Act 1998 requirements satisfied.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the First Defendant's course of conduct, including YouTube posts, emails, and the involvement of the Second Defendant and third-party comments, amounted to harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
2. Whether the First Claimant was likely to establish at trial that the conduct crossed the threshold from unreasonable or disagreeable behavior to unacceptable and oppressive harassment.
3. Whether the conduct of third parties (End-Users) and the Second Defendant could be attributed to the First Defendant under section 7(3A) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
4. Whether an interim injunction should be granted to restrain the First Defendant's conduct given the competing right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The First Defendant's YouTube posts (the First, Second, and Third Posts) and his two emails to the First Claimant constitute a course of conduct amounting to harassment.
• The Second Defendant's videos and the abusive comments from third parties (End-Users) should be treated as part of the First Defendant's conduct under section 7(3A) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, as the First Defendant encouraged or facilitated these actions.
• The First Defendant's posts incited third parties to harass the First Claimant, causing distress and anxiety.
• The First Defendant's conduct has caused ongoing distress to the First Claimant, warranting an interim injunction.

Respondent's Arguments

• The First Defendant denied trademark infringement and claimed the First Claimant's legal threat was unjustified and caused him anxiety.
• The Second Defendant's videos were independently produced and not encouraged or assisted by the First Defendant.
• The End-User comments were not incited or facilitated by the First Defendant, and the Third Post explicitly discouraged harassment.
• The First Defendant's conduct, including the emails, did not meet the high threshold required to constitute harassment.
• The First Defendant's rights to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR must be protected, especially given the citizen journalism context of the posts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first considered whether the conduct of the Second Defendant and the End-Users could be attributed to the First Defendant under section 7(3A) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. On the evidence, it was unlikely the First Defendant had encouraged or assisted the Second Defendant’s videos, which appeared to be an independent decision. Similarly, the End-User comments, though possibly foreseeable, were not directly encouraged or facilitated by the First Defendant, and the Third Post explicitly discouraged harassment. The court rejected the suggestion that the First Defendant’s mere provision of a comment facility on his YouTube channel amounted to aiding or abetting abusive third-party comments.

Focusing then on the First Defendant’s own conduct—the three YouTube posts and two emails—the court found that these acts formed a connected course of conduct targeted at the First Claimant. The court applied established harassment principles, emphasizing that harassment requires unacceptable and oppressive conduct, not merely unreasonable or disagreeable behavior.

The court noted the significance of freedom of expression protections under Article 10 ECHR, especially given the citizen journalism context of the First Defendant’s posts. The posts did not identify the First Claimant by name after the Second Post was edited, and the First Defendant withdrew the false suggestion that the First Claimant was the van driver. The posts were responses to ongoing developments, not gratuitous repetitions. The court found no incitement to racial hatred or similar extreme conduct.

Regarding the emails demanding retraction of the trademark threat and suggesting £10,000 compensation, the court acknowledged that the First Claimant had initially admitted an unjustified threat under the Trade Marks Act 1994, making the First Defendant’s response arguably reasonable. Although the compensation demand was unreasonable, it was not aggressively made and did not reach the high threshold of harassment established in prior cases.

Overall, the court concluded that while some conduct may have been unreasonable, it was unlikely to be found oppressive or unacceptable to the degree required for harassment. The court emphasized that the First Defendant’s conduct did not constitute a conscious or negligent abuse of media freedom.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED the application for an interim injunction against the First Defendant on harassment grounds.

The direct effect is that the First Defendant is not presently restrained from publishing the disputed content or continuing the conduct alleged. The court indicated that the First Claimant is unlikely to obtain an injunction at trial based on the current evidence and legal principles. The decision does not establish new precedent but reaffirms the high threshold for harassment claims involving publication and the strong protections for freedom of expression, particularly in the context of citizen journalism. The court acknowledged the distress experienced by the First Claimant but concluded that this alone does not suffice to justify an injunction in these circumstances.