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London Borough of Brent v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Anor

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, the London Borough of Brent ("LBB"), appealed under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against the decision of an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State which quashed an enforcement notice issued by LBB concerning a terraced house at 51 Nutfield Road, London ("the Property"). The Property was owned by the Second Respondent ("Mr Rothchild"). The enforcement notice alleged an unauthorised change of use to a House in Multiple Occupation (HMO) and flats, and the erection of a single storey rear extension without planning permission.

Prior to the enforcement notice, the then owner notified LBB in February 2015 of an intention to build a rear single-storey extension under permitted development rights provided by the GPDO 1995 (and later GPDO 2015). LBB resolved that prior approval was not required for the extension. Mr Rothchild acquired the Property in 2016, completed the extension, and made alterations for use as an HMO.

In May 2019, LBB issued a Planning Contravention Notice alleging breach of planning control for change of use into flats and erection of the extension. Mr Rothchild responded confirming the extension and use as an HMO. LBB issued an enforcement notice in December 2019 requiring cessation of the use and demolition of the extension.

Mr Rothchild appealed the enforcement notice under various grounds. The appeal proceeded on written representations, but Mr Rothchild’s late submissions were not considered by the Inspector. The Inspector conducted a site visit in June 2021, observed the extension's current layout, and ultimately allowed the appeal in August 2021, quashing the enforcement notice. The Inspector found no flats existed, only a single HMO within Use Class C4, and that the extension was permitted development under the GPDO.

LBB sought permission to appeal the Inspector’s decision concerning the extension, contending legal errors in the Inspector’s assessment of whether the Property was a dwellinghouse at the time the extension was built, and whether the extension complied with prior approval requirements.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Inspector erred in law by concluding that a single storey extension to a Property in use as a House in Multiple Occupation (HMO) under Use Class C4 was permitted development as a "dwellinghouse" under the GPDO 2015.
  2. Whether the Inspector erred in law by failing to consider if the extension was built in accordance with the information previously provided to the local planning authority in the prior approval notification.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Inspector failed to determine whether the Property was still in use as a dwellinghouse at the time the extension was built in 2016, which was an essential precondition for permitted development rights under the GPDO.
  • It was not sufficient that the Property met the Gravesham test (providing facilities for day-to-day private domestic existence); it must also be occupied by or akin to a single household to qualify as a dwellinghouse under the GPDO.
  • The Inspector erred by not investigating whether the extension complied with the prior approval notification, particularly given apparent differences in the extension’s layout and fenestration observed during the site visit.
  • The Property could not fall within Use Class C4 as it was either flats, a mix of flats and HMO, or an HMO exceeding six residents, contrary to LBB’s evidence. However, this ground was not pursued at the final hearing.

Respondent's Arguments

  • It is sufficient that the Property met the Gravesham test to be considered a dwellinghouse; an HMO within Use Class C4 must necessarily be a dwellinghouse attracting permitted development rights under the GPDO.
  • The Inspector was correct to proceed on the basis that the Property was a dwellinghouse in C4 use at the time the extension was built, making the extension permitted development regardless of whether it was occupied as a single household or as an HMO.
  • The Inspector was not obliged to consider compliance with the prior approval notification absent any objection or evidence from LBB before the Inspector.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1984) 47 P&CR 142 Defines a "dwellinghouse" as a building affording facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence. Applied as the foundational test to determine whether the Property qualified as a dwellinghouse under planning law.
Moore v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWCA Civ 1202 ("Moore 2012") Consideration of whether a dwellinghouse is occupied in a manner akin to a single household can be relevant to material change of use. Rejected by the court as requiring such a test for GPDO rights; distinguished between use class and dwellinghouse status.
Rectory Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2020] EWHC 2098 (Admin) A dwellinghouse may be used in different ways and is not confined to occupation by a single household; Use Classes C3 and C4 do not exhaust the concept of dwellinghouse. Supported the position that an HMO in C4 use is a dwellinghouse for GPDO purposes regardless of household occupation.
R (Innovia Cellophane Limited) v Infrastructure Planning Commission [2012] PTSR 1132 Interpretation of statutory terms in pari materia; terms used in related legislation should be construed consistently. Supported consistent interpretation of "dwellinghouse" across planning legislation.
Blackpool Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1980) 40 P&CR 104 Material change of use must be determined on facts; use by different groups does not necessarily change dwellinghouse status. Confirmed that a dwellinghouse can retain its status despite varied residential occupation.
Moore v Secretary of State for the Environment (1999) P&CR 114 ("Moore 1999") Self-contained units can be dwellinghouses despite temporary or commercial use. Reaffirmed Gravesham test and that use as holiday lets does not necessarily change dwellinghouse status.
Newsmith Stainless Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 74; [2017] PTSR 1126 Parties are generally required to place material before the inspector; new arguments not raised in representations may be rejected. Supported refusal to entertain new arguments not raised before the Inspector regarding compliance with prior approval.
Commercial Land Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2002] EWHC 1264 (Admin) Procedural fairness requires parties to have opportunity to respond to new points raised by the Inspector. Supported the conclusion that it was unfair for the Inspector to consider matters not raised by LBB without further representations.
Taylor & Sons v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWCA Civ 1254 Inspectors have discretion to not reopen proceedings for new matters revealed on site visits. Supported the Inspector's discretion not to pursue unraised issues about extension layout.
West v First Secretary of State [2005] EWHC 729 (Admin) The inspector is entitled to decide on the basis of material put before them; inquisitorial role is limited. Supported the principle that the Inspector was entitled to reach a decision on the basis of LBB’s written case alone.
E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49 Errors of fact can give rise to errors of law only if facts are established and undisputed. Found that LBB’s claim about extension layout was not an established fact and thus did not constitute an error of law.
City & Country Bramshill Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2021] 1 WLR 5761 Decision letters should be read fairly with tolerance for minor imperfections. Supported reading the Inspector’s decision as proceeding on the correct legal basis despite minor infelicities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the definitions of "dwellinghouse" and Use Classes C3 and C4 within the Town and Country Planning framework, focusing on the Gravesham test which requires that a dwellinghouse provide facilities for day-to-day private domestic existence. The court rejected the Appellant’s submission that an HMO must be occupied in a manner akin to a single household to qualify as a dwellinghouse under the GPDO. This was because Use Class C4 expressly applies to "use of a dwellinghouse by not more than six residents as a house in multiple occupation," which logically presupposes the building is a dwellinghouse.

The court distinguished the Moore 2012 case relied upon by the Appellant, explaining that it concerned material change of use and not the definition of dwellinghouse for GPDO purposes. It emphasized that the concept of dwellinghouse in planning law is consistent across related legislation and that the GPDO rights apply to any building properly characterised as a dwellinghouse, regardless of whether it is occupied by a single household or as an HMO within C4.

The court acknowledged minor imprecisions in the Inspector’s decision letter but found these did not undermine the lawfulness of the decision. The Inspector’s conclusion that the Property was a dwellinghouse in C4 use and that the extension was permitted development was legally sound.

Regarding the second issue, the court held that the Inspector was not obliged to consider whether the extension complied with the prior approval notification when no such objection or evidence was presented before the Inspector. Introducing this point at appeal would require new factual findings and planning judgments, which was procedurally inappropriate and unfair to the Respondent. The Inspector’s discretion not to investigate the observed differences in the extension’s layout during the site visit was lawful.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal.

The court held that the Inspector did not err in law in concluding that the Property, used as an HMO within Use Class C4, was a dwellinghouse for the purposes of the GPDO and that the single storey extension was permitted development. The court also held that the Inspector was not legally required to consider compliance with the prior approval notification absent any objection or evidence before the Inspector.

The direct effect is that the enforcement notice remains quashed and the extension is lawful as permitted development. No new precedent was set beyond affirming established principles regarding the definition of dwellinghouse and procedural fairness in planning appeals.

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London Borough of Brent v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Anor

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London Borough of Brent v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Anor
(Jul 29, 2022)