Padman v Regina

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns a conviction entered on 01/09/2021 at the Crown Court at Woolwich, where the Appellant, then aged 59, was convicted by a majority verdict of 10 to 2 of indecent assault involving digital penetration of the vagina, contrary to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. The Appellant was acquitted of a second count of indecent assault involving oral penetration. The offending allegedly took place in the early 1990s, between 1993 and 1995, against a female child who was approximately five years old at the time. The Appellant was sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment, a victim surcharge was imposed, and indefinite compliance with the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was ordered.

The allegations arose after the victim confided in a family friend in 2017, leading to a police investigation and subsequent trial. The indictment included two counts with identical wording initially, insufficiently particularised as to the specific conduct constituting the offences. During the trial, the prosecution identified two distinct incidents: the "Chair Incident" involving digital penetration and the "Dummy Incident" involving oral penetration. A third incident involving digital penetration was also adduced in evidence but was not charged.

The trial judge provided directions to the jury emphasizing the need for separate consideration of each count, clarifying the nature of the allegations. The jury returned a majority guilty verdict on count 1 and a not guilty verdict on count 2 after deliberations of over ten hours.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the conviction is unsafe due to the indictment lacking sufficient particulars to distinguish the specific sexual activity alleged in each count.
2. Whether the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury to distinguish between the two counts, potentially leading to a non-unanimous verdict based on different incidents of digital penetration.
3. Whether the prosecution’s closing speech failed to clearly distinguish between the two counts, contributing to the risk of an unsafe conviction.
4. Whether the presence of evidence relating to a third incident of digital penetration, uncharged and without proper direction, rendered the conviction unsafe.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The counts on the indictment were not adequately particularised, failing to specify the distinct incidents of sexual activity alleged.
• The judge’s summing up did not sufficiently distinguish the two counts, risking that the jury’s majority verdict on count 1 was based on different incidents of digital penetration.
• The prosecution’s closing speech did not clearly differentiate between the counts, potentially confusing the jury.
• The evidence of a third incident of digital penetration was admitted without direction, possibly leading some jurors to rely on different incidents to convict on count 1, thus compromising unanimity.

Appellee's Arguments

• Despite initial inadequacies in the indictment, the trial process made clear the distinct nature of the two charged incidents.
• The judge repeatedly and clearly directed the jury to consider each count separately and to be sure of the specific conduct alleged.
• The prosecution’s closing addressed the two charged incidents distinctly, supporting proper jury understanding.
• The third incident evidence was before the jury without objection and was properly considered as background or bad character evidence, not undermining the safety of the conviction.
• There was no realistic possibility that the jury convicted on count 1 based on different incidents, given the clarity and consistency of the evidence and directions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that the indictment was initially inadequately particularised, lacking clear specification of the distinct incidents underlying each count. However, throughout the trial, the prosecution and the judge clarified that count 1 related to digital penetration during the "Chair Incident" and count 2 to oral penetration during the "Dummy Incident." The judge’s summing up repeatedly emphasized separate consideration of each count and the necessity for the jury to be sure of the specific conduct alleged before convicting.

The court noted the presence of evidence about a third incident involving digital penetration, which was uncharged and not the subject of a bad character direction. The court classified this as bad character evidence admitted without objection but not relied upon for propensity. The court considered the risk that the jury might have convicted on count 1 based on different incidents but found no realistic possibility of this occurring given the clarity of the directions and the evidence.

The court rejected the appellant’s contention that the jury’s majority verdict on count 1 could have been based on different incidents of digital penetration, contrasting this with the acquittal on count 2. It found the evidence and directions sufficiently clear that the jury understood the distinct nature of each count and that unanimity was required as to the same incident.

Applying the principle from R v Hobson, the court held that although the indictment lacked particulars, the trial process resolved this deficiency and ensured the safety of the conviction. The court also found that the absence of a bad character direction regarding the third incident did not undermine the conviction’s safety, given the evidence’s nature and the trial context.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was safe despite the initial inadequacies in the indictment and the presence of evidence relating to an uncharged third incident. The judgment confirms that where indictments lack particulars, clear trial directions and prosecution clarity can remedy potential defects and safeguard the fairness of the verdict. The decision has no broader implications beyond affirming the conviction and does not set new precedent.