Majera, R (on the application of v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, a Rwandan national who came to the United Kingdom as a child and obtained indefinite leave to remain, was convicted of serious offences in 2006 and became subject to a deportation order in November 2012. After serving his custodial term he was transferred to open conditions and, on 30 March 2015, the Parole Board directed his release on licence. Immediately upon release, however, the Secretary of State detained him under the Immigration Act 1971.

On 30 July 2015 the First-tier Tribunal granted the Appellant immigration bail. The bail order required him to report to his offender manager and expressly permitted unpaid voluntary work. Contrary to that order, an immigration officer issued a separate notice imposing (i) a prohibition on all work, paid or unpaid, and (ii) an 8 pm-7 am curfew.

The Appellant’s solicitors asserted that the Secretary of State had no power to modify bail conditions unilaterally and requested withdrawal of the added restrictions; the requests were refused on 3 December 2015 and 4 January 2016. The Appellant sought judicial review of those refusals. The Upper Tribunal quashed the Secretary of State’s decisions, holding that the bail order, although defective, remained binding until varied or set aside.

The Secretary of State appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, declaring the bail order a nullity because it failed to comply with statutory wording, and concluded that the Secretary of State’s restrictions were therefore lawful. The present appeal to the Supreme Court followed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a governmental authority (or any person) may lawfully act inconsistently with a court or tribunal order it considers defective without first having that order varied or set aside.
2. Whether a defect in a First-tier Tribunal bail order rendered the order void ab initio, thereby freeing the Secretary of State to impose independent immigration restrictions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• A court order—defective or not—must be obeyed unless and until it is varied or set aside; acting inconsistently is unlawful.
• The Secretary of State should have applied either to the First-tier Tribunal to vary the bail conditions or to the Upper Tribunal for judicial review, rather than impose fresh restrictions unilaterally.

Secretary of State's Arguments

• The bail order was void because it did not oblige the Appellant to appear before an immigration officer as required by paragraph 22(1A) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.
• Being void, the bail order had no legal effect, allowing reliance on paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 3 to impose residence, employment and reporting restrictions.
• (Conceded) There was no statutory power to impose a curfew, following R (Gedi).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Reed, delivering judgment for a unanimous Supreme Court panel, held that the Court of Appeal applied an incorrect analytical framework. While the Court of Appeal focused on administrative-law concepts of “nullity,” the Supreme Court emphasised that a bail order is a judicial order. Constitutional principles dictate that such orders are binding and must be obeyed unless and until varied or set aside by a competent court or altered by legislation.

The Court traced the historical line from Chuck v Cremer through Hadkinson, M v Home Office and modern authorities, confirming a “plain and unqualified obligation” to comply with court orders. Assertions that the order was defective—whether for non-compliance with paragraph 22(1A) or any other reason—did not give the executive licence to disregard it.

By contrasting authorities on subordinate legislation (Hoffmann-La Roche, Boddington) with those on judicial orders, the Court clarified that notions of “voidness” and collateral challenge do not override the constitutional hierarchy of courts. Even if the bail order were “null,” it carried legal force until formally set aside; the Secretary of State therefore acted ultra vires by imposing new conditions.

Procedurally, the Supreme Court criticised the Court of Appeal for entertaining a collateral attack on the bail order within the Secretary of State’s defence rather than requiring a separate, timely judicial-review claim subject to permission, timeliness and discretionary bars.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED. The Secretary of State’s decisions of 3 December 2015 and 4 January 2016 remain quashed; the Appellant continues on the bail granted 30 July 2015.

Implications: The ruling re-affirms the constitutional principle that court and tribunal orders bind all parties—including the executive—until varied or set aside. It clarifies that administrative-law “voidness” doctrines do not justify unilateral executive non-compliance with judicial orders and underscores proper procedural routes for challenging allegedly defective orders. No new statutory interpretation was created, but the decision strengthens rule-of-law safeguards governing interactions between the judiciary and the executive.