Factual and Procedural Background
The claim arises from a memorandum referred to as "Memorandum 112," which is part of a dossier concerning alleged cooperation between Kremlin and a business group in relation to the 2016 US presidential election. The claimants, three men describing themselves as international businessmen of Russian extraction, brought the claim under the Data Protection Act 1998, alleging breaches in the processing of their personal data by the defendant company, Company A, which produced the memorandum.
Company A was engaged by Fusion GPS, a consultancy based in Washington DC, to provide intelligence memoranda concerning Russian influence on the 2016 US presidential campaign. Memorandum 112 was delivered to Fusion and also circulated to senior politicians and security officials in the US and UK.
The claimants allege that Memorandum 112 contains personal data about them that is inaccurate and was processed unlawfully, unfairly, and in breach of the data protection principles. They seek compensation, declarations of inaccuracy, and orders for rectification or destruction of the data, including notification to third parties.
Company A admits that the memorandum contained some personal data of the claimants but disputes the extent and nature of that data and denies breaches of data protection principles. The defence also relies on the claim that reasonable care was taken to ensure accuracy.
The procedural history includes the service of particulars of claim, defence, and reply between May and December 2018, followed by case management and directions for expert evidence in early 2020. Witness statements were exchanged in February 2020. Subsequently, the claimants applied to strike out parts of a key witness statement of Mr Steele, a former UK Crown servant and founder of Company A, and Company A applied for permission to amend its defence to clarify its position on the accuracy of the data.
The pre-trial review addressed these applications and other case management issues prior to a four-day trial scheduled to commence in March 2020.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendant should be permitted to amend its defence to modify its case regarding the accuracy or misleading nature of the personal data contained in Memorandum 112.
- Whether certain paragraphs of the witness statement of Mr Steele should be struck out on grounds including irrelevance, abuse, and exceeding the scope of the pleaded defence.
- Whether the defendant should be debarred from relying on expert evidence from a specified expert.
- Case management issues including inspection of documents and other procedural matters.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The claimants argued that the defendant's case on accuracy was not pleaded with sufficient particularity and that no positive case of accuracy had been advanced.
- They contended that the defendant's application to amend was late, lacked a good explanation for the delay, and would prejudice the claimants by introducing new matters late in the proceedings.
- The claimants submitted that the witness statement of Mr Steele contained extensive material on accuracy that was irrelevant or outside the scope of the defence and that striking out was appropriate.
- They emphasized the burden on the defendant to provide clear reasons and factual detail supporting any denial of inaccuracy in accordance with procedural rules.
Appellee's Arguments
- The defendant contended that much of the disputed statements were matters of opinion or evaluation rather than fact and therefore not subject to claims of inaccuracy.
- It argued that the existing defence sufficiently denied the allegations of inaccuracy and that no further detailed positive case was required, particularly given the claimants’ failure to specify which facts were incorrect.
- The defendant submitted that the amendments sought were protective and made out of caution, and that if an adjournment were necessary to deal with new evidence, public interest would favour granting it.
- The defendant relied on provisions of the Data Protection Act and relevant case law to support its position that reasonable care was taken to ensure accuracy and that some inaccuracies, if any, did not cause unwarranted prejudice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Quah v Goldman Sachs International [2015] EWHC 759 (Comm) |
Principles governing late applications to amend pleadings and the need for a good explanation for delay beyond mere lack of prejudice. |
The court applied these principles to assess whether the defendant’s late application to amend was justified and whether it would disrupt trial preparation. |
| Ashcroft v Foley [2012] EWCA Civ 423 |
Principles concerning pleading truth as a defence in defamation cases and the importance of allowing both parties to fully present their case. |
The court considered these principles in relation to the defendant’s proposed amendments to plead accuracy as a defence under the Data Protection Act context. |
| Mackenzie v Business Magazines UK Ltd (CA, 18 January 1996) |
Importance of allowing parties to deploy their full case and the concept of avoiding "false vindication" by restricting evidence. |
Referenced to evaluate the impact of refusing the amendment on the defendant’s ability to present its case on accuracy. |
| Basham v Gregory (CA, unreported, 21 February 1996) |
Similar principles to Mackenzie regarding fairness in allowing parties to present their full case. |
Supported the court’s consideration of public policy in relation to evidence and amendments. |
| Associated Leisure v Associated Newspapers Limited [1972] QB 450 |
Standards for sufficiency of pleadings, specifically criticizing "loose, ineffective" pleadings. |
The court applied this to describe the inadequacy of the defendant’s pleading on accuracy as it stood. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the central issue as whether the defendant’s defence sufficiently pleaded a positive case of accuracy regarding the personal data in Memorandum 112. It noted the burden on the claimants to assert inaccuracy with sufficient particulars and on the defendant to provide reasons and a different version of events if denying allegations.
The court found that the defendant’s existing denial was a bare denial insufficient to provide proper notice of a positive case on accuracy. The defendant had effectively both denied and non-admitted the claimants’ allegations, creating ambiguity.
The court emphasized the requirements of CPR 16.5, which mandates that a defence must state reasons for denial and, if applicable, the defendant’s own version of events. The defendant’s defence failed to comply with this rule, as the first detailed factual assertions appeared only in the witness statement of Mr Steele, which was served late and was the subject of an application to strike out.
The court considered the defendant’s late application to amend and found no satisfactory explanation for the delay, deeming it inexcusable. It also weighed the prejudice to the claimants, the public interest, and the administration of justice, concluding that granting the amendment and consequent adjournment would cause disproportionate prejudice compared to refusing permission.
While the defendant sought to rely on Schedule 1 Part II paragraph 7 of the Data Protection Act, which allows for certain inaccuracies if reasonable steps were taken to ensure accuracy, the defence as pleaded did not clearly assert reliance on this provision. The court granted permission for a limited amendment to clarify reliance on information obtained from a third party, subject to conditions.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the disputed statements were merely opinion and not factual, clarifying that the issue was whether the defence adequately pleaded a positive case on the accuracy of factual data.
Finally, the court acknowledged that amendments to the witness statement of Mr Steele would be necessary to remove material not relevant to the defendant’s state of mind or conduct at the relevant time.
Holding and Implications
The court REFUSED PERMISSION for the defendant to amend its defence to assert a positive case of accuracy beyond reliance on information obtained from a third party under Schedule 1 Part II paragraph 7 of the Data Protection Act.
However, the court granted permission for a limited amendment to clarify reliance on third-party information, subject to the defendant identifying the third party or parties involved.
The refusal to permit a broader amendment means the defendant cannot present a detailed positive case on accuracy beyond what was already pleaded, thereby limiting the scope of its defence at trial. The claimants retain the benefit of clearer procedural boundaries and reduced risk of prejudice from late amendments.
No new legal precedent was established; the decision follows established principles on pleading and case management, emphasizing the importance of timely and sufficiently detailed pleadings to ensure fairness and efficient administration of justice.