Factual and Procedural Background
The Parent executed two deeds on 18 November 2016 to provide missing security related to a corporate acquisition in 2012. Barclays Bank plc was originally the security agent and party to the deeds but was later replaced by GLAS Trust Corporation Limited, the present appellant. The missing security involved an assignment of the benefit of a shareholder loan, a small but significant omission unnoticed until 2016 by the Parent's lawyers during a review. The deeds were intended to provide this missing security by having the Parent accede to two pre-existing Intercompany Receivables Security Assignments (IRSAs), which inadvertently imposed additional onerous obligations on the Parent beyond the missing security. The trial judge found that neither party realised this effect at execution and that the parties had a common intention to provide only the missing security. The judge granted rectification to exclude the additional obligations. The appellant challenges the legal test applied but not the factual findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the correct legal test for rectification of written contract terms due to a common mistake?
- Whether the test for rectification is purely objective, based on what a reasonable observer would think the parties' common intention was, or whether it requires proof of the parties' actual subjective common intention communicated between them.
- Whether the deeds should be rectified to exclude additional obligations assumed by the Parent due to mistake about the legal effect of accession to the IRSAs.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The test for rectification is purely objective: the court should determine what an objective observer would conclude the parties’ common intention was, rather than reviewing the trial judge’s factual findings.
- Communications between the parties objectively indicated the Parent intended to accede to all terms of the IRSAs, including additional obligations.
- Any mistake was about commercial consequences, not legal effect, and thus does not justify rectification.
Respondent's Arguments (The Parent)
- The trial judge’s findings of fact, including the parties’ actual subjective common intention, are not challenged and are sufficient to justify rectification.
- The law requires proof that the parties were actually mistaken about the content or effect of the contractual document.
- The common intention must be the parties’ real and subjective intention, communicated between them, not merely an objective inference.
- The Parent contends the judge’s decision should be upheld regardless of whether the test is objective or subjective.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 |
Established that rectification requires proof of a common continuing intention, with an outward expression of accord, not necessarily a prior concluded contract. |
Affirmed as binding authority requiring actual common intention and communication between parties before rectification. |
| Britoil plc v Hunt Overseas Oil Inc [1994] CLC 561 |
Rejected purely objective test for rectification; emphasized importance of parties’ subjective states of mind and actual common mistake. |
Held that rectification requires proof of a common mistake as a matter of fact, not just objective agreement. |
| Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38 |
Obiter dicta suggesting rectification test should be purely objective, based on what reasonable observer would understand common intention to be. |
Not binding; court declined to follow this purely objective test and critically analyzed it in light of precedent. |
| Daventry District Council v Daventry & District Housing Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1153 |
Applied Chartbrook’s objective test but with reservations; emphasized difficulties and that actual mistake remains essential. |
Court proceeded on objective test assumption but expressed doubts and acknowledged unsettled law. |
| Rose v Pim [1953] 2 QB 450 |
Denning LJ’s judgment cited for objective approach to rectification, but read in context supports prior contract requirement. |
Distinguished and limited in application; does not support dispensing with actual common intention. |
| Lovell & Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 104 LT 85 |
Held rectification requires prior contract or continuing common intention with outward expression. |
Supports requirement of actual common intention and communication for rectification. |
| Crane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc [1939] 1 All ER 662 |
Confirmed rectification can be granted without prior contract if common continuing intention exists, requiring proof of parties' actual intentions. |
Reinforces need for subjective proof of intention, not merely objective inference. |
| AMP (UK) plc v Barker [2001] Pens LR 77 |
Distinguished rectification in pension scheme context; consent sufficient without common agreement. |
Clarifies that pension cases differ from contractual rectification requiring common intention. |
| Inland Revenue Commissioners v Raphael [1935] AC 96 |
Explains the rationale for rectification as equitable remedy to correct real intention where objective construction fails. |
Supports principle that rectification corrects mistakes about actual intention, not mere interpretation. |
| Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65 |
Australian case rejecting objective-only test; requires proof of subjective common intention communicated between parties. |
Persuasive authority endorsing subjective common intention requirement in common law jurisdictions. |
| Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corp [2016] HCA 47 |
High Court of Australia reaffirmed need for actual or true common intention for rectification. |
Confirmed rejection of Chartbrook’s purely objective test in Australian law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed review of the history, principles, and authorities concerning rectification for common mistake. It emphasized that the equitable doctrine of rectification traditionally requires proof of the parties' actual, subjective common intention, mutually communicated and continuing at the time of execution, which the written document fails to record. The court rejected the purely objective test proposed in the Chartbrook case, holding that it conflicts with binding precedent, legal principle, and policy considerations.
The court distinguished two forms of rectification: one enforcing a prior binding agreement objectively ascertained, and the other correcting an actual common mistake about the terms of a contract, grounded in equitable principles of good faith. The latter requires proof of a real mistake by the parties in believing the document reflected their true intention.
The court noted that an objective approach to contract interpretation is justified by the need for certainty and predictability. However, when a contract does not reflect the parties' actual common intention, rectification is appropriate to prevent injustice. The remedy is not to impose an objectively inferred agreement over a deliberately executed formal contract but to enforce the parties' true shared intention.
The court found that the trial judge had correctly identified that the parties subjectively intended the deeds to provide only the missing security and did not intend to bind the Parent to additional onerous obligations. The judge also found that this common intention was communicated between the parties, satisfying the requirement of an outward expression of accord.
The appellant’s argument that the mistake was only about commercial consequences and not legal effect was rejected. The court held the mistake related to the legal effect of the deeds, a classic case warranting rectification.
Although the trial judge also found that an objective observer would have understood the parties' common intention in the same way, the court held that this was not an additional legal requirement but a factual finding consistent with the subjective intention requirement.
Finally, the court observed that the decision to rectify the deeds was supported by commercial context, the absence of any negotiation or discussion of the additional obligations, and the implausibility of the Parent intending to assume such obligations without consideration or negotiation.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is DISMISSED.
The court upheld the trial judge's decision to grant rectification of the accession deeds on the basis of a common mistake about the legal effect of the deeds. It confirmed that the correct legal test for rectification requires proof of the parties' actual, subjective common intention communicated between them, not a purely objective test based on what a reasonable observer would infer. The decision preserves the traditional equitable principles underpinning rectification and emphasizes the need for clear and convincing evidence of a real mistake. No new precedent was created beyond clarifying and reaffirming existing law and rejecting the purely objective test suggested in the Chartbrook case. The direct effect is that the deeds will be rectified to exclude the additional onerous obligations mistakenly included.