Factual and Procedural Background
On 5th October 2018, in the Crown Court at Stafford, before Judge Chambers QC and a jury, the Appellant was convicted of murder. On 11th December 2018, the Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 4,842 days (13 years and 97 days) pursuant to section 269(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Appellant appealed against the conviction with leave granted by a single judge.
The Appellant and her mother (the Deceased) lived together at 2 Sun Street, Cheadle in Staffordshire. The Appellant was 24 years old and the Deceased was 53. On 16th March 2018, the Appellant called emergency services reporting that her mother had committed suicide. Emergency responders found the Deceased with multiple stab wounds to her neck and a knife in her right hand; she was pronounced dead at the scene.
Following arrest, the Appellant made statements acknowledging killing her mother, attributing it to prolonged abuse and emotional instability. Medical evidence revealed the Deceased had self-harm scars and that death resulted from multiple stab wounds inflicted in a sustained attack. Social Services and medical records confirmed the Deceased had psychiatric problems with aggressive behaviour, which negatively affected the Appellant. The Appellant was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with PTSD features, autistic spectrum disorder, and mild intellectual disability.
The prosecution contended that the Appellant lost her temper during an argument about money and stabbed her mother intentionally. The defence presented evidence of long-term abuse, psychological disorders, and argued diminished responsibility due to mental abnormalities. The jury was tasked with determining issues including lawful self-defence, intent to kill or cause serious injury, loss of control, and diminished responsibility.
Trial evidence included witness testimony, police interviews, and psychiatric assessments. The Appellant admitted to stabbing her mother during escalating arguments but denied intent to kill. Expert witnesses described the Appellant's mental health conditions and their impact on her behaviour and self-control.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judge erred in failing to withdraw the charge of murder at the close of the prosecution case.
- Whether the judge erred in refusing to admit a joint expert statement.
- Whether the judge erred in not giving a propensity direction regarding the Deceased's character.
- Whether the judge erred in failing to provide a complete and proper direction on loss of control, particularly in light of R v Rejmanski.
- Whether the judge erred in failing to give appropriate safety warnings in directions on diminished responsibility.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge should have withdrawn the murder charge because the defence psychiatric evidence was unchallenged and established diminished responsibility and loss of control.
- The joint expert statement should have been admitted as it supported the defence's position regarding diminished responsibility and the irrelevance of precise details of the incident.
- A propensity direction regarding the Deceased's violent character was necessary to properly contextualise the killing.
- The judge's direction on loss of control failed to adequately explain the objective test, particularly neglecting the Appellant's history of abuse and controlling relationship with her mother.
- The judge failed to provide necessary safety warnings to the jury about diminished responsibility, including that brutal killings may be caused by disordered minds and that planning can be consistent with disordered thinking.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The judge correctly ruled there was a case to answer for murder, as the prosecution disputed that the psychiatric evidence explained the killing or substantially impaired the Appellant’s self-control.
- The joint expert statement had minimal evidential value and its non-admission did not affect the safety of the conviction.
- The jury had ample evidence of the Deceased’s violent tendencies, making a propensity direction unnecessary.
- The judge’s directions on loss of control were legally correct and consistent with statutory requirements, including the prohibition against considering mental disorders in assessing the degree of tolerance and self-restraint of the hypothetical person.
- The judge’s directions on diminished responsibility were appropriate and sufficiently clear; specific safety warnings were not required in every case and adequate guidance was provided elsewhere in the summing-up.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Brennan [2014] EWCA Crim 2387 |
Guidance on when a judge may withdraw a charge of murder in the context of diminished responsibility evidence. |
Referenced to confirm that it is rare for a judge to withdraw murder charges when prosecution disputes diminished responsibility; supported the decision to leave the matter to the jury. |
| R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61 |
Clarification of the four questions in diminished responsibility and the role of the jury in assessing substantial impairment and causation. |
Applied to affirm that questions of substantial impairment and causation are for the jury, reinforcing that the judge should not withdraw murder charges absent consensus on diminished responsibility. |
| R v Blackman [2017] EWCA Crim 190 |
Emphasis on prosecution's right to challenge medical evidence and the jury's primacy in determining diminished responsibility. |
Cited to support the principle that unchallenged defence psychiatric evidence does not automatically warrant withdrawal of murder charges from the jury. |
| R v Khan (Dawood) [2009] EWCA Crim 1569 |
Approach to withdrawal of murder charges in diminished responsibility cases. |
Followed as part of the broad approach that withdrawal is rare and the jury should determine disputed issues. |
| R v Hussain [2019] EWCA Crim 666 |
Endorsement of the cautious approach to withdrawal of murder charges in diminished responsibility cases. |
Cited with approval to affirm the approach taken in this case. |
| R v Rejmanski [2017] EWCA Crim 2061 |
Interpretation of section 54(3) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 regarding loss of control and the exclusion of mental disorders from the tolerance and self-restraint standard. |
Applied to confirm the judge’s correct direction that mental disorders are not relevant to the degree of tolerance and self-restraint of the hypothetical person but may be relevant to the gravity of the qualifying trigger. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully considered the evidence and legal principles governing diminished responsibility and loss of control. It acknowledged the Appellant’s history of abuse and psychiatric diagnoses, which were accepted by the prosecution as arising from recognised medical conditions. However, the prosecution disputed that these conditions substantially impaired the Appellant’s self-control at the time of the killing or that they explained the killing.
The court emphasized that whether the impairment was substantial and whether it caused or significantly contributed to the killing are questions for the jury, not the judge. It rejected the argument that unchallenged expert evidence automatically requires withdrawal of the murder charge, citing established case law.
The court found that the prosecution’s evidence of the Appellant’s conduct—such as fabricating a false suicide scene and inconsistent accounts—provided a rational basis to contest diminished responsibility, making the case appropriate for jury determination.
Regarding the joint expert statement, the court held that its non-admission was within the judge’s discretion and did not affect the safety of the conviction.
On the issue of propensity direction, the court concluded that extensive evidence of the Deceased’s violent character was already before the jury, making a formal direction unnecessary.
In relation to loss of control, the court found the judge’s direction legally correct and consistent with statutory provisions, particularly section 54(3) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the guidance in R v Rejmanski. The judge properly excluded the Appellant’s mental disorders from the objective tolerance and self-restraint standard but allowed their consideration regarding the gravity of the qualifying trigger.
On diminished responsibility directions, the court noted that while the Appellant sought additional safety warnings based on Golds, the judge’s directions were sufficiently clear, fair, and comprehensive. The judge explained the jury’s role in assessing expert evidence and the necessity of a rational basis to reject it, thus providing appropriate guidance without requiring all suggested warnings in every case.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeal.
The direct effect of this decision is that the Appellant’s conviction for murder and sentence stand as determined by the trial court. The court found no error in the trial judge’s rulings on evidential matters, jury directions, or procedural decisions. No new legal precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles concerning diminished responsibility, loss of control, and the role of the jury in such determinations.