Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant and the Respondent were formerly married. Their relationship ended acrimoniously in 2012. On 23 December 2012 the Appellant posted several messages on Facebook addressed to “Individual A,” the Respondent’s new partner. In the course of that exchange, the Appellant wrote that the Respondent “tried to strangle me,” and referred to prior arrests involving “gun issues,” threats, and an alleged breach of a non-molestation order that had followed an incident on 23 March 2003.
The Respondent issued defamation proceedings in the High Court. Before Judge Mitting, the Respondent argued that “tried to strangle me” meant he had attempted to kill the Appellant. The Appellant denied that meaning and pleaded justification, contending that the words would be understood as an allegation of violent neck-gripping that inhibited breathing and caused fear, rather than an attempt to kill.
Judge Mitting accepted a dictionary-based interpretation: either “strangle” meant killing or painful constriction; since the Appellant had survived, the judge concluded the only possible meaning was an attempted killing. He therefore found the statement defamatory and held that the Appellant had failed to justify the “sting” that the Respondent was “dangerous.”
The Court of Appeal (judgment of Judge Sharp) upheld that decision, finding no error in the trial judge’s use of dictionary definitions and agreeing that the defence under section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 could not succeed.
The Supreme Court, constituted by Judge Kerr (with Judge Reed, Judge Black, Judge Briggs and Judge Kitchin agreeing), heard the Appellant’s further appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- What natural and ordinary meaning would an ordinary reasonable Facebook reader attribute to the words “he tried to strangle me” in context?
- Did Judge Mitting commit a legal error by relying on dictionary definitions to reach that meaning?
- Given the correct meaning, does the defence of justification succeed under section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 (now section 2(3) of the 2013 Act)?
- What standard should an appellate court apply when reviewing a trial judge’s finding on defamatory meaning (the “single meaning” rule)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- An ordinary Facebook reader would understand “tried to strangle” to mean that the Respondent violently gripped the Appellant’s neck, inhibiting breathing, not that he attempted to kill her.
- The trial judge erred in restricting possible meanings to dictionary definitions detached from context, especially the informal, fleeting nature of social-media communications.
- Even on the meanings found, the statements were substantially true; section 5 should bar liability because any inaccuracies did not materially injure the Respondent’s reputation compared to the truth that was proved (neck-gripping, visible injuries, arrests, breach of non-molestation order).
Respondent's Arguments
- The natural and ordinary meaning was that he attempted to kill the Appellant by strangulation, which is self-evidently defamatory.
- The trial judge correctly used authoritative dictionary definitions as an aid; the result was supported by existing case law on determining meaning.
- The Appellant failed to justify the core allegation of an attempted killing and therefore could not rely on section 5.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|
| Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130 |
Eight propositions on determining natural and ordinary meaning, focusing on the “ordinary reasonable reader.” |
Provided the framework; Supreme Court emphasised proposition 6 (context) and warned against over-analysis. |
| Rufus v Elliott [2015] EWCA Civ 121 |
Supplemented Jeynes, clarifying that courts are not obliged to select a non-defamatory meaning merely because one exists. |
Supported the view that the task is to identify the single meaning actually conveyed, not a benign alternative. |
| Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 |
Described the “single meaning rule” as artificial but necessary. |
Discussed historically to explain why judges must choose one meaning. |
| Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Ming Pao Holdings Ltd [2013] EMLR 7 |
Defended the single meaning rule. |
Cited to show the rule’s continued acceptance. |
| Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2001] EWCA Civ 1263 |
Warning against strained or unreasonable meanings. |
Referenced within the Jeynes propositions. |
| Neville v Fine Arts Co [1897] AC 68 |
Authority that a meaning must be more than hypothetical to be actionable. |
Cited within Jeynes. |
| Bukovsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] EWCA Civ 1529; [2018] 4 WLR 13 |
Underlined importance of context; discussed appellate standards on meaning. |
Supreme Court adopted its emphasis on context and appellate “disciplined restraint.” |
| Waterson v Lloyd [2013] EWCA Civ 136 |
Words must be read in the way they are presented. |
Used to support attention to Facebook’s informal setting. |
| Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 |
Impressionistic approach to Twitter messages. |
Analogous guidance applied to Facebook posts. |
| Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB) |
Social-media readers react quickly; courts must avoid over-analysis. |
Reinforced need for realistic assessment of a Facebook post. |
| Smith v ADVFN plc [2008] EWHC 1797 (QB) |
Bulletin-board comments are conversational and fleeting. |
Supported the Supreme Court’s view on social-media context. |
| Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1996] MLR 278 |
Appellate deference to trial judge’s finding of meaning; “should not interfere unless quite satisfied.” |
Discussed and contrasted; Supreme Court said deference yields to legal error. |
| Cruddas v Calvert [2013] EWCA Civ 748 |
Seriousness of imputations can justify appellate intervention. |
Cited in debate on appellate standards. |
| Cammish v Hughes [2012] EWCA Civ 1655 |
Appellate court should not depart unless “clear that some other meaning applies.” |
Part of discussion on review thresholds. |
| McGraddie v McGraddie [2013] UKSC 58 |
General principles on appellate review of factual findings. |
Referred to illustrate disciplined restraint but willingness to correct legal error. |
| Anderson v City of Bessemer (1985) 470 US 564 |
Rationale for deference to trial fact-finder in U.S. jurisprudence. |
Quoted for comparative perspective on appellate restraint. |
| Housen v Nikolaisen [2002] 2 SCR 235 |
Canadian authority on advantages of trial judge’s familiarity with evidence. |
Used to support general discussion of appellate review. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court found that Judge Mitting committed a legal error by treating two Oxford English Dictionary meanings of “strangle” as exhaustive and mutually exclusive. That approach artificially constrained the possible interpretations and ignored the conversational, informal nature of Facebook posts.
Re-applying the Jeynes framework with a focus on context, the Court held that an ordinary reasonable Facebook reader would not parse the words with linguistic precision. Knowing the Appellant was alive, such a reader would conclude that the Respondent forcibly gripped her neck, causing harm and fear, rather than attempting to kill her.
Once that meaning was adopted, the defence of justification had to be reconsidered. The Respondent had admitted or the evidence established: (i) forceful neck-gripping leaving visible marks; (ii) breach of a non-molestation order; and (iii) threatening behaviour. Under section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952, minor inaccuracies do not defeat a justification defence if the “sting” of the publication is substantially true. The Court found that the proven facts were sufficient; any unproven embellishments did not materially worsen the Respondent’s reputation beyond what was true.
Regarding appellate review, the Court emphasised “disciplined restraint” but stated that deference yields where the trial judge’s interpretation falls outside the range of reasonable meanings or is tainted by legal error. Here, the reliance on dictionary definitions amounted to such an error, permitting the Supreme Court to substitute its own meaning rather than remit the case.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
The Supreme Court set aside the findings of defamation, concluded that the words meant the Respondent gripped the Appellant’s neck (not attempted murder), and ruled that the defence of justification succeeded under section 5 of the 1952 Act. Costs were ordered against the Respondent, subject to further submissions.
Implications: The judgment underscores that courts must interpret social-media communications through the eyes of an ordinary user, avoiding technical linguistic analysis and recognising the medium’s informal nature. It cautions against over-reliance on dictionary definitions, affirms the single-meaning rule, clarifies the appellate standard of “disciplined restraint,” and illustrates the continued relevance of section 5 (now section 2(3) of the 2013 Act) in defending substantially true statements.