Alconbury

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment consolidates three conjoined appeals that reached the House of Lords directly from the Divisional Court pursuant to section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969. Each appeal concerns whether specific statutory decision-making powers exercised by the Secretary of State comply with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998.

• Company A sought planning permission to redevelop a disused airfield. After the local planning authority refused permission, the Secretary of State “recovered” the appeal for his own determination under Schedule 6 to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
• Company B applied for permission to use land for the storage and sale of damaged cars. Citing the proposal’s wider economic and safety implications, the Secretary of State “called-in” the application under section 77 of the 1990 Act.
• Company C objected to proposed compulsory purchase orders needed for a major highway junction improvement. At the company’s request, the Secretary of State sought a ruling on the compatibility of the statutory procedure with Article 6.

The Divisional Court declared a range of provisions in four statutes (Town and Country Planning Act 1990, Transport and Works Act 1992, Highways Act 1980 and Acquisition of Land Act 1981) incompatible with Article 6. The Secretary of State appealed; the Lord Advocate intervened because similar issues had arisen in Scotland.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Does the Secretary of State’s role in determining “called-in” or “recovered” planning matters, transport orders, highway schemes and compulsory purchase orders breach the requirement in Article 6(1) that civil rights be decided by an “independent and impartial tribunal”?
2. If incompatibility exists, is a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 the appropriate remedy?
3. Is the judicial review/ statutory appeal available in the High Court a form of “full jurisdiction” sufficient to cure any lack of independence at the administrative stage?

Arguments of the Parties

Secretary of State’s Arguments

• Article 6(1) is satisfied because affected parties receive a public inquiry before an inspector and then have access to the High Court on conventional judicial-review grounds.
• European case-law (e.g., Bryan v UK) recognises that, in specialised planning matters, limited judicial review suffices; the Convention does not mandate a merits appeal.
• Even if the Secretary of State is not an independent tribunal, the combined two-stage process (inquiry + court supervision) meets the Convention test.

Respondents’ & Supporting Parties’ Arguments

• The Secretary of State is both policy-maker and final decision-taker; that structural bias violates the “independent and impartial” requirement.
• Internal departmental advice unseen by objectors undermines procedural fairness.
• Because the High Court cannot reconsider planning merits, subsequent judicial review cannot rectify the initial lack of independence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The House of Lords accepted that decisions about planning permission, transport orders and compulsory purchase affect “civil rights”; however, it held that:

• The Secretary of State is not, and need not be, an independent tribunal when exercising democratically-entrusted policy functions. His structural role does not itself breach Article 6.
• European jurisprudence (Bryan, Zumtobel, Chapman) establishes a two-stage model: an administrative determination may stand if followed by court supervision possessing “full jurisdiction” appropriate to the context.
• The English High Court’s powers—error of law, irrationality, failure to consider relevant factors, material error of fact and proportionality—constitute a sufficiently robust form of jurisdiction for specialised planning disputes.
• Public-inquiry procedures before inspectors provide substantial procedural safeguards (oral hearing, cross-examination, reasoned report). Although inspectors are not wholly independent for policy purposes, their fact-finding neutrality, combined with judicial review, satisfies Convention standards.
• The Divisional Court’s focus on internal departmental advice misconceived the constitutional reality that civil servants merely assist the Secretary of State; such input does not create impermissible bias.
• Allegations of specific impropriety (for example, the financial interest of another Government department) are remediable through ordinary judicial-review grounds and do not require a systemic declaration of incompatibility.

Holding and Implications

Appeals ALLOWED; cross-appeals DISMISSED; declarations of incompatibility SET ASIDE.

The House of Lords ruled that the impugned statutory procedures are compatible with Article 6(1). The decision confirms that:

• Ministers may both formulate policy and decide individual cases, provided affected parties enjoy adequate procedural safeguards and access to judicial review.
• The existing scope of English judicial review meets the Convention requirement of “full jurisdiction” in specialised administrative fields; no merits appeal is constitutionally or conventionally required.
• The planning, transport and compulsory-purchase regimes need not be re-structured; Parliament’s long-standing allocation of responsibility between local authorities, inspectors and the Secretary of State remains intact.