Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Advocates
- Jan Luba QC and Zeeshan Dhar for the Appellant
- Michael Brompton QC and Denis Barry (instructed by CPS) for the Respondent
Judges
- MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS
- LORD JUSTICE THOMAS
See more information ...
Click here to read the full judgment
Regina v. Kelly
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
In March 2004, the Appellant opened a club in The City where he organised a variant of poker called "Texas Hold 'Em Poker" (TH Poker). He charged players for participation and levied a charge on winnings without holding the necessary licence under the Gaming Act 1968. Following a complaint from the Gaming Board, covert police visits were conducted in late 2004 and early 2005. The Appellant was charged under section 8 of the Act with offences relating to organising gaming with levies and participation fees. At trial before Judge Wilkinson and a jury in January 2007, the Appellant conceded organising the game and charging fees but contested whether TH Poker constituted a "game of chance" under the Act, which was the sole issue. Expert evidence was presented by the Appellant indicating the game involved both skill and chance, with skill predominating, while no expert evidence was called by the prosecution. The judge directed the jury that the statutory definition of a game of chance did not require chance to predominate over skill, only that there be a significant element of chance. The Appellant was convicted, conditionally discharged, and ordered to pay prosecution costs. He appealed by leave of a single judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judge correctly directed the jury on the statutory definition of a "game of chance" under section 52(1) of the Gaming Act 1968 in the context of TH Poker.
- Whether TH Poker, as organised by the Appellant, constituted a "game of chance" within the meaning of the 1968 Act, given the evidence that skill predominated over chance.
- Whether the legal test for a "game of chance" should consider predominance of chance over skill or include any significant element of chance.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The 1960 and 1968 Acts fundamentally changed the law such that older case law was no longer relevant.
- The statutory definition of "game of chance" should be construed to exclude games where skill predominates over chance.
- Applying the predominance test, TH Poker is a game of skill and therefore not a game of chance under the Act.
- Relying on expert evidence, the Appellant contended that skill predominated in TH Poker.
- Reference to foreign case law, including US and Canadian decisions, supported the predominance test to distinguish games of chance from games of skill.
- The judge misdirected the jury by not instructing them that predominance of skill excludes a game from being a game of chance.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The statutory definition of a "game of chance" in the 1968 Act includes games combining chance and skill without qualification based on predominance.
- The prosecution had to prove only that there was a significant element of chance, not that chance predominated.
- The judge correctly directed the jury on the statutory test.
- No expert evidence was called to challenge the Appellant's experts on the predominance of skill.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Jenks v Turpin (1884) 13 QBD 505 |
Distinction between unlawful games and games of mere skill; unlawful games include games of chance or mixed chance and skill. |
Historical context showing games of chance or mixed games were unlawful if played in common gaming houses; the case was considered part of the old law no longer directly applicable. |
| Pessers, Moody, Wraith and Gurr Ltd v Catt (1913) 77 JP 429 |
Test for games involving machines: skill as dominant factor makes the game one of skill. |
Distinguished from card games; used to illustrate older tests not applicable under the 1968 Act. |
| Dalton v Adelphi Club [1938] 4 All ER 556 |
Stud poker is not a game of mere skill; it is always a game of chance. |
Part of the historical common law framework; not determinative post-1960 legislation. |
| R v Tompson [1943] 1 KB 650 |
Whether a card game is one of mere skill is a question of fact for the jury. |
Referenced as old authority; the court rejected its application to the post-1960 regime. |
| Armstrong v DPP [1965] AC 1262 |
Partial definition of "playing a game" of chance; limited assistance on defining a game of chance. |
Considered but found not materially helpful in defining "game of chance" under the 1968 Act. |
| Stubbs v Dick (1949) 89 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio) |
Predominance test: a game of chance is one where chance is the determining element. |
Used to illustrate foreign approaches advocating predominance of chance over skill. |
| State v Stroupe (1953) 76 S.E.2d 313 (North Carolina) |
Predominance test for distinguishing games of chance and skill. |
Referenced as persuasive authority on predominance test. |
| Re Allen (1962) 377 P.2d 280 (California) |
Predominance of chance determines a game of chance. |
Used to support argument that predominance test is common in foreign jurisdictions. |
| Joker Club v Hardin (2007) 643 S.E.2d 626 (NC Court of Appeals) |
Poker held to be a game of chance applying the predominance test. |
Illustrates application of predominance test to poker; noted as pending appeal. |
| Ross, Banks and Dyson v The Queen (1968) 70 DLR (2d) 606 (Supreme Court of Canada) |
Majority: "mixed" games include any proportion of chance; minority: predominance of skill excludes game from being a game of chance. |
Majority judgment adopted by UK court as consistent with statutory interpretation; minority judgment rejected. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by acknowledging the significant legislative changes made by Parliament in 1960 and consolidated in the 1968 Act, which repealed the older statutory framework and introduced a statutory definition of "game of chance" that included games combining chance and skill. The court agreed with the Appellant that the old case law, which applied different tests depending on whether games involved cards or machines, was no longer relevant for interpreting the 1968 Act.
However, the court held that the statutory definition in section 52(1) of the 1968 Act was clear and unqualified: it includes games of chance and skill combined without requiring that chance predominate over skill. The court reasoned that if Parliament had intended the predominance test, it would have expressly stated so. The court considered that the only circumstance where chance should be disregarded is when it is so insignificant as to be de minimis or merely token.
The court distinguished subsection (6) of section 52, which addresses games played against the bank, as not relevant to the present case and not supporting the predominance argument. The court also found no assistance from the exemption provisions in section 40(2) of the Act or from foreign authorities that applied a predominance test, although it acknowledged the persuasive nature of those decisions.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the judge at trial correctly directed the jury to determine whether TH Poker included a significant element of chance, irrespective of whether skill predominated. The jury was entitled to find that TH Poker was a game of chance under the statutory definition, and there was no misdirection.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeal against conviction.
The direct effect is that the Appellant's conviction for organising gaming without a licence was upheld on the basis that TH Poker was a game of chance under the 1968 Act. The court confirmed that the statutory definition of a game of chance includes games combining chance and skill without requiring that chance be the predominant element. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the proper interpretation of the statutory definition. The decision affirms the legislative framework governing gaming and licensing and supports enforcement against unlicensed gaming premises involving games with any significant element of chance.
Click here to read the full judgment