Anyanwu and Another v. South Bank Student Union and Another And Commission For Racial Equality

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellants, former students at The University, were elected full-time salaried officers of Company A (the student union) for the academic year commencing 1 August 1995. Disciplinary concerns led The University to suspend them on 22 February 1996 and, after non-attendance at disciplinary hearings, to expel them on 29 March 1996. The expulsion letters barred the Appellants from all university premises, including Company A’s offices. Unable to enter the workplace, the Appellants received letters dated 2 April 1996 treating their employment as terminated.

Acting without legal assistance, the Appellants lodged complaints with an Employment Tribunal alleging that Company A had dismissed them on racial grounds contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976 (“the 1976 Act”) and that The University had knowingly aided that dismissal within the meaning of section 33(1). The University applied to strike out the claims, arguing that issues of suspension and expulsion were res judicata following failed judicial-review applications.

The Employment Tribunal struck out the claim against The University. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) allowed an appeal and reinstated it. On further appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeal reversed the EAT, holding that—even taking the Appellants’ allegations at their highest—The University could not be said to have “knowingly aided” Company A’s dismissal decision. The House of Lords (per five Law Lords) heard the Appellants’ final appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. The correct construction of section 33(1) of the 1976 Act, specifically the meaning of “knowingly aids another person to do an act made unlawful by this Act.”
2. Whether, on the assumed facts, The University’s conduct could arguably constitute such “knowing aid” to Company A’s allegedly discriminatory dismissal of the Appellants.
3. Consequently, whether the claim against The University was so unsustainable that it should be struck out before trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

• The University’s suspension and expulsion of the Appellants, coupled with communications accusing them of financial misconduct and intimidation, were designed to secure their removal and therefore aided Company A’s discriminatory dismissal.
• The factual matrix showed close collaboration: allegations were conveyed to Company A, new trustees (selected by The University under an interim constitution) signed the dismissal letters, and both entities allegedly fostered an environment of racial prejudice.
• Given this factual entanglement, the claim should proceed to a merits hearing; discrimination disputes are inherently fact-sensitive and should rarely be struck out summarily.

Respondent University’s Arguments

• On the pleaded facts The University was the “prime mover” of events; it caused the dismissal but did not “aid” Company A, which merely reacted to an unavoidable situation created by the expulsions.
• Section 33(1) requires assistance by a secondary actor; a principal instigator cannot simultaneously be an aider.
• Earlier judicial-review refusals rendered the employment-tribunal claim an abuse of process.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Five Law Lords delivered concurring speeches. The lead analysis rejected the Court of Appeal’s “prime mover / free agent” dichotomy as an impermissible gloss on the statute.

• Purposive Construction: Section 33(1) must be read in the context of a remedial statute aimed at eradicating discrimination. The ordinary meaning of “aid” (“help” or “assist”) suffices; Parliament did not restrict liability to subordinate helpers.
• Meaning of “Aid”: Assistance may be substantial or minimal, provided it is more than negligible. Whether the assister also “caused” or “procured” the act is irrelevant; overlapping concepts in other sections do not narrow section 33(1).
• Application to Allegations: Taking the Appellants’ pleaded case (including the issues clarified before the Tribunal) at face value, there is an arguable inference that The University:
  • Supplied adverse allegations to Company A about the Appellants’ conduct;
  • Interfered with funding and governance, culminating in appointment of trustees who executed the dismissals; and
  • Created a climate in which Company A’s dismissal decision was facilitated.
  These matters, if proven, could amount to “knowing aid” under section 33(1).
• Strike-out Threshold: Discrimination cases are fact-sensitive and should be struck out only where hopeless. Given the arguable factual nexus, summary dismissal was inappropriate.
• Res Judicata Point: Prior judicial-review refusals concerned procedural fairness of the expulsions, not the distinct statutory claim of aiding unlawful dismissal; hence they did not bar the present proceedings.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal was ALLOWED; the Court of Appeal’s order striking out the claim against The University was set aside. The matter was remitted to an Employment Tribunal for a full hearing against both Company A and The University.

Implications: The judgment confirms that “aid” in section 33(1) bears its ordinary meaning and is not confined to subordinate participation. Entities that materially assist another’s discriminatory act—whether or not they also instigate it—may face derivative liability. The decision emphasises the reluctance of appellate courts to dispose summarily of fact-dependent discrimination claims, thereby reinforcing access to a merits determination in employment-related racial-discrimination disputes.