REGINA v Clarke & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

On 23rd October 2017, in the Crown Court at The City, three offenders—referred to as Clarke, Thompson, and Andrews—were sentenced by Her Honour Judge Goddard QC for multiple serious offences including kidnapping. The offending occurred in early 2017 when Clarke was 18, Thompson was 19, and Andrews was 17 years old.

The Attorney General applied under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer their sentences as unduly lenient. Andrews also sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive.

The offences included kidnapping and blackmail by all three offenders; Clarke alone was convicted of attempted robbery and possession of an offensive weapon; Thompson and Andrews together were convicted of perverting the course of public justice and theft; Thompson alone was convicted of possession of offensive weapons and other driving and handling stolen goods offences; Andrews alone was convicted of possession of offensive weapons.

The offenders pleaded guilty and received varying custodial sentences, with Clarke and Thompson sentenced to detention in a young offender institution and Andrews sentenced under the relevant statutory provision for young offenders.

The kidnapping involved the unlawful and forcible taking of a 16-year-old victim, Carl Cain, with the intention of extorting money from his brother Connor Cain. The offenders threatened violence, moved the victim to remote locations, and made ransom demands. The ordeal lasted approximately twelve hours, causing significant distress to the victim and his family.

Subsequent offences included entering the victim’s family home to intimidate them and prevent them from giving evidence, theft of bicycles, possession of weapons, attempted robbery involving violence, and other related offences.

Each offender had varying criminal histories and personal circumstances, including troubled backgrounds, mental health issues, and mitigating factors such as youth and immaturity, which were considered during sentencing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed on the offenders were unduly lenient under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. Whether Andrews' sentence was manifestly excessive, warranting leave to appeal against sentence.
3. The extent to which youth and immaturity should mitigate sentences, particularly the distinction between offenders under and over 18 years of age.
4. Whether the sentencing judge was required to consider the definitive guideline on aggravated burglary when sentencing for offences related to perverting the course of justice.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney General's Arguments

• The sentence for kidnapping should have been significantly higher for all offenders, with a starting point in double figures before discounts for youth and mitigation.
• Clarke and Thompson should have received higher sentences than Andrews due to existing court orders at the time of offending.
• Clarke’s sentence for attempted robbery should have been longer and consecutive.
• Thompson and Andrews’ sentences for perverting the course of justice should have been significantly longer and consecutive.
• The sentencing judge should have explicitly considered the aggravated burglary guideline as relevant under section 125 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
• Overall, the totality of sentences should have been significantly higher.
• Youth discounts should have been minimal given the seriousness of the offences.

Offenders' Arguments

• The sentencing judge carefully evaluated all relevant factors, including youth and mitigation.
• The sentences imposed were within appropriate ranges and cannot be characterised as unduly lenient.
• Andrews’ sentence should be lower than those of Clarke and Thompson due to his age (17 at the time of offending) and mitigating factors.
• Andrews’ curfew, although not qualifying for statutory reduction, should be considered in sentencing totality.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully considered the ages and maturity of the offenders, emphasizing that turning 18 does not create a sudden transition to full maturity for sentencing purposes. The judge had appropriately taken youth and immaturity into account for all offenders.

The court reviewed the detailed facts of the offending, including the serious nature of the kidnapping, blackmail, perverting the course of justice, and violent offences, alongside the offenders’ backgrounds and prior convictions.

Regarding the Attorney General’s submission that the aggravated burglary guideline should have been explicitly considered for the perverting the course of justice offence, the court held that the statutory duty to follow guidelines applies only to guidelines relevant to the offence or offender’s circumstances. Since no guideline exists for kidnapping and the aggravated burglary guideline was not formally submitted as relevant, the judge was not required to apply it. Nonetheless, the judge had regard to similarities with aggravated burglary in sentencing.

The court rejected the argument that youth discounts should have been minimal, finding that the sentencing judge was sensitive to youth and immaturity and applied appropriate reductions. The starting points for sentences before mitigation were substantial, reflecting the seriousness of the offences.

Applying the established test from Attorney General's Reference No 4 of 1989, the court concluded that the sentences did not fall outside the range of reasonable sentencing options and thus were not unduly lenient.

Similarly, Andrews’ application to appeal his sentence as manifestly excessive was refused. Although a different judge might have imposed a greater distinction between Andrews and the other offenders, no objectionable disparity was found, and the non-qualifying curfew was not a significant factor.

Holding and Implications

Leave to refer the sentences as unduly lenient is refused.

Leave to appeal against sentence on behalf of Andrews is refused.

The court’s decision upholds the original sentencing. The ruling confirms that youth and immaturity remain relevant mitigating factors beyond the age of 18 and that judges have discretion in applying guidelines, particularly where no specific guideline exists for an offence. No new precedent was established, and the decision primarily affects the parties by affirming the appropriateness of the sentences imposed.