Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was tried at a Crown Court on an eight-count indictment, charged with indecent assault on a male under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 for Counts 1 to 7, and sexual assault under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for Count 8. The complainant, referred to as the Complainant, was the same individual on all counts. The Appellant was convicted on Counts 2 and 3 and acquitted on the remaining counts. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, later reduced on appeal, and required to register under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
The Complainant had a troubled childhood and maintained social contact with the Appellant and his family until 2004. The allegations concerned incidents occurring primarily between 1985 and 1992 at two residences associated with the Appellant: a house on Long Lane and another known as the Old Sweet Factory. The Complainant first reported the allegations to the police in 2014, alleging indecent assaults beginning around age nine, continuing into his teenage years, and a later sexual assault incident between 2002 and 2004.
The trial centered on conflicting accounts, with the case described as "word against word." The Complainant’s evidence was largely uncorroborated except for some supportive evidence from his wife relating to Count 8. The Appellant denied all allegations, suggesting fabrication motivated by resentment over the Appellant’s inability to officiate at the Complainant’s wedding.
The trial judge provided detailed directions to the jury, emphasizing the separate consideration required for each count and highlighting evidential timing issues relevant to some counts. The jury returned mixed verdicts, convicting on two counts and acquitting on the others.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the jury verdicts were inconsistent or repugnant to the extent that the appellate court should interfere with the convictions.
- Whether the acquittal on one count (Count 8) undermines the safety of the convictions on earlier counts involving the same complainant.
- The application of principles governing inconsistent verdicts as established in relevant case law, including the burden on the appellant to demonstrate such inconsistency.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The acquittal on Count 8, involving a recent incident with some corroboration, undermines the credibility of the convictions on earlier counts which are wholly uncorroborated.
- No rational basis exists for the jury to convict on Counts 2 and 3 while acquitting on Counts 5, 6, and 7, as the evidence of the complainant did not differentiate the nature of the alleged conduct across these counts.
- The reference to "at the goats" was not materially significant given the common ground that the complainant had visited the Long Lane residence on multiple occasions.
Appellee's Arguments
- Each count was specific as to the year and age of the complainant, and the jury was properly directed to consider each count separately, including the timing and nature of the alleged conduct.
- The complainant’s emphasis on "at the goats" was material to the jury’s assessment of when the alleged assaults occurred, distinguishing the counts relating to Long Lane from those relating to the Old Sweet Factory.
- There were evidential differences as to the detail and specificity of the allegations between counts, which justified the jury’s differentiated verdicts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Fanning, Kerner, Osianikovas and de Jesus [2016] EWCA Crim 550 |
Principles governing appellate interference in cases of alleged inconsistent jury verdicts; burden on appellant; jury not a precision instrument; separate treatment directions. |
The court applied these principles to affirm that inconsistent verdicts do not automatically require interference, particularly when the jury received proper directions. |
| Durante [1972] 3 All ER 962 |
Burden on appellant to show verdicts are so inconsistent that no reasonable jury could have reached them. |
Used as foundational authority confirming that the appellant must prove inconsistency beyond reasonable possibility. |
| Stone (1954) (unreported) |
Burden on appellant to establish that verdicts cannot stand together. |
Quoted with approval by Durante and applied in affirming burden on appellant. |
| Cilgram [1994] Crim LR 587 |
Permissibility of jury convicting on some counts and acquitting on others based on same complainant’s evidence. |
Supported the view that differing verdicts on counts involving the same complainant are not necessarily unsafe. |
| Segal [1976] Crim LR 324 |
Even logically inconsistent verdicts do not necessarily require appellate interference. |
Affirmed that verdicts must be so inconsistent as to demand interference, not just logically inconsistent. |
| McKenzie v R [1976] 190 CLR 348 (Australia) |
Similar principle to Segal regarding inconsistent verdicts. |
Applied to support restraint in appellate interference for inconsistent verdicts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reaffirming the well-established principle that an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that jury verdicts are so inconsistent that no reasonable jury could have reached them. It emphasized that the jury is not a precision instrument and that appellate courts must be cautious not to usurp the jury’s role.
The court noted that the jury had been properly directed with a separate treatment direction, requiring individual consideration of each count. This direction was unchallenged and legally significant in assessing the consistency of the verdicts.
The acquittal on Count 8, involving a later incident with some corroboration, did not necessarily undermine the convictions on earlier counts given the separate and self-contained nature of that count’s evidence. The court rejected the notion that the jury’s assessment of credibility on one count must apply uniformly across all counts.
The court further examined the timing and evidential details distinguishing the counts. For example, the presence of goats at the Long Lane residence only from late 1986 explained the acquittal on Count 1 and supported convictions on Counts 2 and 3. Similarly, the complainant’s absence in Cornwall during part of the period covered by Count 4 explained that acquittal.
Regarding the acquittals on Counts 5, 6, and 7, the court acknowledged that while the verdicts might appear surprising, this alone was insufficient to justify interference. The court found that the evidence was not undifferentiated between the two residences and that the jury could rationally have been persuaded by the greater evidential detail on Counts 2 and 3 but left in doubt on others.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the verdicts were not so inconsistent as to require appellate intervention and that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving otherwise.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeal against conviction.
The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the Appellant’s convictions on Counts 2 and 3. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court applied established principles regarding inconsistent verdicts and the appellate court’s limited role in interfering with jury decisions. The ruling reinforces the principle that juries may return mixed verdicts on counts involving the same complainant without necessarily rendering the convictions unsafe, provided proper directions are given and the verdicts are not irrational.