Factual and Procedural Background
Four applicants were convicted on separate occasions of possessing nitrous oxide with intent to supply, contrary to section 7 of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 ("the 2016 Act"). Two were convicted after trials and two pleaded guilty. None contended at trial that the nitrous oxide in their possession was an exempted substance, and it was agreed that it was not. The applications for permission to appeal were prompted by publicity surrounding other cases where trial judges accepted that nitrous oxide was a medicinal product and thus an exempted substance. The applicants now argued that the nitrous oxide they possessed was a "medicinal product" within the meaning of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 ("the 2012 Regulations"), which would mean their convictions under the 2016 Act were for offences not known in law. The court had to decide whether nitrous oxide is an exempted substance as a medicinal product under the relevant legislation.
The facts included that nitrous oxide is used medically as an anesthetic and analgesic, but also widely used in catering (e.g., in cream chargers). The applicants possessed large quantities of nitrous oxide canisters, often accompanied by balloons, with some asserting legitimate catering use and others denying personal possession or intent to supply for recreational use. The court noted the known adverse effects of nitrous oxide inhalation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether nitrous oxide is an "exempted substance" under the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 because it qualifies as a "medicinal product" within the meaning of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012.
- Whether the nitrous oxide possessed by the applicants, given its form and intended use, falls within the definition of a medicinal product under the relevant European Directive and domestic regulations.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Nitrous oxide is used for medical purposes and should be classified as a medicinal product irrespective of the purpose for which it was manufactured or used.
- Nitrous oxide is not a dangerous legal high targeted by the 2016 Act.
- Reliance on a scientific brief from an expert questioning whether nitrous oxide is psychoactive within the meaning of the 2016 Act and asserting flaws in prosecutions based on this substance.
Respondent's Arguments
- Nitrous oxide produced for catering purposes and intended for recreational use falls outside the definition of medicinal product under the Human Medicines Regulations and the Directive.
- Applying the definition in a case-by-case manner leads to the conclusion that the nitrous oxide in these cases was not a medicinal product because it lacked therapeutic or beneficial health effects in the circumstances.
- Opposed the admission of fresh expert evidence on appeal as it was not expedient or in the interests of justice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| D & G (C-358/13, C-181/14) |
Interpretation of "medicinal product" under Directive 2001/83/EC; substances must have beneficial health effects to qualify |
Guided the court to interpret the definition of medicinal product as excluding substances used solely for intoxication without therapeutic benefit, supporting that nitrous oxide in these cases was not medicinal. |
| HLH Warenvertriebs GmbH (C-211/03) |
Earlier interpretation of medicinal product under the Directive |
Referenced as part of the Luxembourg Court's jurisprudence confirming the case-by-case approach in defining medicinal products. |
| Upjohn (EU:C:1997:147) |
Definition of medicinal products under EU law |
Supported the principle that medicinal product status depends on intended use and beneficial health effects. |
| R v Pendlebury [2002] 1 WLR 72 HL |
Limits on appellate courts' fact-finding role and admission of fresh evidence on appeal |
Used to justify refusal to admit new expert evidence and reaffirm the appellate court's role as a court of review, not primary fact-finder. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by acknowledging that nitrous oxide is a psychoactive substance capable of producing effects on the central nervous system, a fact supported by expert evidence at trial. The central question was whether nitrous oxide qualifies as a "medicinal product" under the Human Medicines Regulations 2012, which incorporate the definition from Directive 2001/83/EC. The Directive defines medicinal products as substances presented as having properties for treating or preventing disease or used to restore, correct, or modify physiological functions by pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic action, with an emphasis on beneficial health effects.
The court relied heavily on the Luxembourg Court's interpretation in D & G, which held that substances consumed solely for intoxication without therapeutic benefit do not qualify as medicinal products. The court emphasized the case-by-case approach mandated by the Luxembourg Court, considering factors such as composition, pharmacological properties, intended use, distribution, consumer familiarity, and risks.
Applying these principles, the court found that the nitrous oxide in these cases was manufactured and distributed for catering purposes, not medical use, and was intended for recreational consumption, which carries health risks and no therapeutic benefits. Thus, it fell outside the definition of medicinal product and was not an exempted substance under the 2016 Act.
The court also considered but rejected a late application to admit fresh expert evidence challenging the psychoactivity of nitrous oxide. It held that the appellate court is a court of review, not a fact-finder, and that the new evidence did not undermine the existing expert opinion sufficiently to warrant reopening the issue.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the applications for permission to appeal against conviction.
The holding confirms that nitrous oxide, when possessed in the form and circumstances described (i.e., manufactured for catering and intended for recreational use), is not a medicinal product under the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 and therefore not an exempted substance under the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016. Consequently, possession with intent to supply such nitrous oxide is an offence under the 2016 Act. This decision upholds the convictions and clarifies the legal interpretation of "medicinal product" in this context. The court did not set new precedent beyond the application of existing EU law and domestic regulations, and the ruling directly affects the parties by affirming the validity of their convictions.