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Onowu, R (on the application of) v. First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (extension of time for appealing: principles) (IJR)
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application for judicial review of a decision by a First-tier Tribunal Judge extending time for the Secretary of State to apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The underlying appeal involved the First-tier Tribunal allowing the Applicant's appeal on human rights grounds against the Respondent's decision to remove him to Italy. The Secretary of State's application for permission to appeal was lodged significantly out of time. The First-tier Tribunal Judge granted an extension of time and permission to appeal, a decision which is now challenged by the Applicant through judicial review.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the correct approach for a Tribunal when considering an application for an extension of time to apply for permission to appeal?
- Whether the First-tier Tribunal Judge complied with the duty to provide adequate reasons when granting an extension of time and permission to appeal.
- Whether the established principles from recent Court of Appeal decisions on relief from sanctions and extensions of time apply equally in the context of immigration and asylum appeals.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The First-tier Tribunal Judge's decision to extend time and grant permission to appeal was inadequately reasoned and lacked the required analysis of relevant factors.
- The decision failed to demonstrate the application of the three-stage test for relief from sanctions as established by the Court of Appeal.
- The decision to extend time should be quashed for failure to comply with the duty to give reasons.
Interested Party's Arguments
- The Interested Party contended that there is no positive obligation under the 2014 First-tier Tribunal Rules to provide reasons when granting permission to appeal.
- The Interested Party relied on the absence of an explicit requirement in the procedural rules to justify the lack of detailed reasons.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 |
Approach to relief from sanctions and extensions of time in civil procedure. |
Commended as part of a three-stage test to assess seriousness of breach, explanation, and overall circumstances in extension of time applications. |
| Denton v White [2014] EWCA Civ 906 |
Further elaboration on relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9, emphasizing assessment of breach seriousness and reasons for default. |
Adopted to guide the Tribunal's assessment of extension of time applications, including consideration of all circumstances and promptness. |
| R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1663 |
Application of Mitchell and Denton principles in public law cases, with attention to public interest considerations. |
Recognized the relevance of public interest in extension of time decisions in immigration appeals. |
| BO and Others (Extension of time for appealing) Nigeria [2006] UKAIT 00035 |
Earlier test for extension of time involving "special circumstances" making it unjust not to extend time. |
Referenced but superseded by the approach in Mitchell, Denton, and Hysaj. |
| Eagil Trust Co Ltd v Pigott-Brown [1985] 2 All ER 119 |
Common law duty on judicial decision-makers to provide reasons for their decisions. |
Affirmed the requirement to provide reasons even when procedural rules do not explicitly impose such duty. |
| R (Tofik) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2003] EWCA Civ 1138 |
Duty to give reasons for refusal to extend time in immigration appeals. |
Confirmed that refusal to extend time is a matter of judgment requiring explanation, reinforcing the duty to give reasons. |
| English v Emery Reimbold and Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409 |
Principles governing judicial discretion and the obligation to provide reasons. |
Referenced to support the requirement for reasoned decisions in extension of time applications. |
| R (on the application of Weldegaber) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 00070 (IAC) |
Relevant case law concerning Dublin returns to Italy. |
Mentioned as potentially relevant to the substantive appeal but not central to the extension of time issue. |
| EM (Eritrea) [2014] UKSC 12 |
Case law relevant to human rights assessments in removal decisions. |
Cited by the First-tier Tribunal Judge in assessing arguability of grounds for appeal. |
| Tarakhel v Switzerland (Application No.29217/12 - 4 November 2014) |
European Court of Human Rights case relevant to Article 3 ECHR considerations. |
Cited as part of the legal context for the appeal's human rights issues. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court identified that the proper approach to applications for extension of time to seek permission to appeal is that established by the Court of Appeal in Mitchell, Denton, and Hysaj. This involves a three-stage test: (i) assessing the seriousness or significance of the delay or breach; (ii) considering whether there is a good reason for the delay; and (iii) evaluating all circumstances to deal justly with the application, including the need for efficient litigation and enforcement of rules.
The court noted that neither the 2014 First-tier Tribunal Rules nor the 2008 Upper Tribunal Rules prescribe a specific test for extension of time applications but that the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly aligns with the Court of Appeal’s approach.
The court rejected the Interested Party’s submission that no duty exists to provide reasons when granting permission to appeal, emphasizing the well-established common law obligation to give reasons, even if not explicitly set out in procedural rules.
Upon examining the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision, the court found it to be deficient. The decision consisted of only two sentences, lacking any analysis of the seriousness of the delay, the explanation for it, or the relevant circumstances. The judge did not demonstrate application of the three-stage test nor engage meaningfully with the arguments presented.
Consequently, the court concluded that the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision to extend time and grant permission to appeal was unreasoned and failed to meet the minimum duty to provide reasons. This warranted quashing the decision and the permission granted, leaving the Secretary of State’s applications pending before the First-tier Tribunal for proper determination.
Holding and Implications
The court QUASHED the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision to extend time for the Secretary of State to apply for permission to appeal and the related grant of permission to appeal.
The direct effect is that the Secretary of State’s applications for permission to appeal remain undetermined and must be reconsidered by the First-tier Tribunal with proper application of the legal principles and adequate reasoning. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court reinforced adherence to established principles regarding extensions of time and the duty to give reasons in judicial decisions.
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