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Jones, R v.

Smart Summary

Regina v Jones (Appellant) – [2002] UKHL 5

Factual and Procedural Background

On 18 August 1997 a post-office robbery in The City resulted in the theft of approximately £87,000. The Appellant was arrested shortly afterwards and later committed for trial on bail alongside a co-defendant. Both pleaded not guilty in January 1998. A trial date of 1 June 1998 was fixed, but neither defendant attended. Warrants issued for their arrest remained unexecuted when the case was re-listed on 5–6 October 1998 before Judge Holloway. By then all defence lawyers had withdrawn due to the defendants’ continued absence. After hearing submissions and reviewing authority, the judge exercised discretion to start the jury trial in the defendants’ absence.

On 9 October 1998 the jury unanimously convicted both defendants of conspiracy to rob; each received 13 years’ imprisonment. The Appellant was arrested 14 months later and, in January 2000, received a concurrent 12-month sentence for failing to surrender. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed his conviction appeal on 31 January 2001 but certified the question of principle now before the House of Lords.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Does an English trial judge possess a discretion to commence a criminal trial on indictment in the voluntary absence of the defendant who has absconded before the proceedings begin?
  2. If such discretion exists, was its exercise in the present case compatible with the right to a fair trial under article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The common-law discretion to begin a trial in a defendant’s absence should be overruled as contrary to Strasbourg jurisprudence, fundamental principle, and practical fairness.
  • Proceeding without the defendant or legal representation inevitably disadvantages the defence: no cross-examination, no defence witnesses and no jury address in mitigation.
  • The decision in R v Jones, Planter & Pengelly should be disapproved.

Respondent's Arguments (Crown)

  • The discretion is long-standing, applies both to continuing and to commencing trials, and is essential to prevent manipulation of justice by absconding defendants.
  • European case-law recognises the primacy of a defendant’s right to attend but does not prohibit trials in voluntary absence; no Strasbourg authority requires automatic adjournment.
  • The judge’s careful evaluation of fairness and the subsequent right of appeal ensured compliance with article 6.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v Tonner (1985) 80 Cr App R 170Illustrates arraignment without immediate trial.Cited to note that pleading not guilty does not preclude later absence.
R v Abrahams (1895) 21 VLR 343Early discussion of waiver and discretion to proceed.Historical foundation for judicial discretion.
R v Howson (1981) 74 Cr App R 172Continuation where defendant involuntarily absent.Showed discretion extends beyond voluntary absence.
R v Berry (1897) 104 LT Jo 110Misbehaviour preventing presence.Example of trial continuation without accused.
R v Browne (1906) 70 JP 472Misconduct removal and continuation.Supports discretionary power.
R v Jones (Robert) (No 2) [1972] 1 WLR 887Absconding during trial; discretion upheld.Cited as authoritative precedent.
R v Shaw (Elvis) [1980] 1 WLR 1526Voluntary absence during trial.Affirmed judicial discretion.
R v Jones, Planter & Pengelly [1991] Crim LR 856First explicit approval of starting trial in absence.Relied on and ultimately upheld.
R v Donnelly & Donnelly (CA, 12 Jun 1997)Challenge to starting trial in absence rejected.Cited as supportive authority.
European cases (Poitrimol, Pelladoah, Lala, Colozza, Brozicek, Ekbatani, Ensslin, Stanford, Delcourt, Van Geyseghem, Omar)Core article 6 principles: notification, presence, effective participation, representation.House reviewed to confirm no breach arises when absence is voluntary and rights were afforded.
Krombach v Bamberski (Case C-7/98)Right to defence as fundamental EU right.Accepted but distinguished on facts.
Pfeifer & Plankl v Austria (1992) 14 EHRR 692Unequivocal waiver requirement.Considered when analysing waiver debate.
Millar v Dickson 2002 SC (PC) 30Defines “clear and unqualified” waiver.Guided discussion on waiver standard.
Taylor v United States 414 US 19 (1973)Inferring knowledge of consequences of absence.Compared but distinguished on English facts.
Crosby v United States (1993) 506 US 255US Rule 43 prohibits trial commencement in absence.Distinguished as rule-specific, not persuasive in UK.
Government of the Virgin Islands v Brown 507 F2d 186 (1975)No principled line between pre- and mid-trial absence.Quoted to support English discretion.
R v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex p Caborn-Waterfield [1960] 2 QB 498Right can be declined by defendant.Used to illustrate defendant’s choice not to defend.
R v Bertrand (1867) LR 1 PC 520Public interest in trials free from miscarriage.Discussed regarding confidence in justice.
Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330Balancing defence rights with witness interests.Cited in support of judge’s balancing exercise.
Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817Public-interest balancing under article 6.Reinforced proportionality analysis.
Pullar v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 391Value of jury directions for fairness.Relied on when assessing summing-up.
Gregory v United Kingdom (1997) 25 EHRR 577Importance of tailored jury directions.Supported acceptance of judge’s instructions.
Montgomery v HM Advocate [2001] 2 WLR 779Assumption that juries follow directions.Cited when evaluating fairness.
Condron v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 1Appellate duty to examine article 6 compliance.Guided Court of Appeal’s approach.
R v Pendleton [2002] 1 WLR 72Appellate powers regarding fresh evidence.Referenced to show safeguards on appeal.
HM Advocate v Monson (1893) 1 Adam 114Scottish outlawry for absconders.Historical contrast with English practice.
Sweeney v HM Advocate (1893) 21 R (J) 44Example of Scottish fugitation procedure.Compared with English discretion model.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Bingham (for the majority) identified that English law has long conferred both a right and an obligation on a defendant to attend, while also recognising judicial discretion to continue when the defendant is absent. The House reasoned as follows:

  • No Strasbourg prohibition: European authorities stress the importance of presence, but none hold that a voluntarily absent defendant must halt proceedings. Voluntary absence distinguishes the case from Colozza v Italy and similar decisions involving non-notification.
  • Principle of parity: If courts may continue a trial after a mid-trial absence, no principled distinction prevents commencing a trial when the defendant absconds beforehand.
  • Practical justice: Without discretion, an absconding defendant could paralyse multi-party trials and cause hardship to victims and witnesses.
  • Fair-trial safeguards: The judge undertook a careful balancing exercise, warned the jury not to draw adverse inferences, and prosecuting counsel led evidence with heightened scrutiny. The appellate process provided an additional safeguard.
  • Waiver debate: Some members accepted the Court of Appeal’s finding that the Appellant waived his rights; others preferred to deem the issue unnecessary because the overall process remained fair even absent explicit waiver.
  • Guidance for future cases: The House endorsed, with minor caveats, the Court of Appeal’s checklist of factors for exercising the discretion and emphasised the desirability of continued legal representation where possible.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The House answered the certified question in the affirmative: English trial judges do possess—and in rare, carefully considered cases may exercise—the discretion to begin a criminal trial in the voluntary absence of a defendant.

Immediate effect: the Appellant’s conviction stands. Broader implications: the decision confirms and clarifies the common-law discretion, aligns it with Convention standards, and provides guidance (through the Court of Appeal checklist) for its cautious deployment in future cases; no new statutory rule was created.

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Jones, R v.

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Jones, R v.
(Feb 20, 2002)