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- LORD BLACKBURN
- LORD MORRIS
- LORD REID
- LORD HODSON
- LORD DENNING
- LORD CAIRNS
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- LORD GREENE
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- LORD UPJOHN
- LORD PENZANCE
- LORD CHIEF
- LORD SELBORNE
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R v. Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries ex p. Padfield
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns a statutory marketing arrangement for milk established under the Agricultural Marketing Act 1958. Under the scheme, producers are compelled to sell their milk exclusively to Company A, which fixes the farm-gate price on a regional basis. The differentials between regions were set many years ago and no longer reflected increased transport costs. Producers in The Region argued that they receive an unduly low price and repeatedly but unsuccessfully sought change through Company A.
Because arbitration was unsuitable, the producers invoked section 19 of the 1958 Act, requesting that the Respondent Minister refer their complaint to a statutorily created Committee of Investigation. The Minister refused, citing the breadth of the issues and the “normal democratic machinery” of the scheme. The producers (now “Appellants”) sought mandamus.
A Divisional Court ordered the Minister to reconsider, but the Court of Appeal (by majority) set that order aside. The Appellants appealed to the House of Lords, which delivered the present opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 19(3)(b) of the Agricultural Marketing Act 1958 grants the Minister an unfettered discretion to withhold referral of a complaint to the Committee of Investigation.
- Whether, on the facts, the Minister misdirected himself in law or took irrelevant considerations into account, thereby rendering his refusal unlawful and amenable to mandamus.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The Minister is obliged to refer every “genuine and substantial” complaint, or at least to exercise his discretion in a manner that promotes the policy and objects of the Act.
- By relying on considerations such as the width of the issues, possible political embarrassment and the self-governing nature of the scheme, the Minister took irrelevant factors into account and therefore failed to exercise his discretion lawfully.
- The refusal defeats the safeguard that Parliament intended to afford producers who may suffer from majority decisions of Company A.
Respondent's Arguments
- Section 19 uses permissive language, giving the Minister an absolute discretion either to refer or not to refer any complaint once he has considered it.
- The complaint raised broad pricing questions that should be resolved internally by Company A through the scheme’s own democratic processes.
- The Minister owed no duty to any particular region and was entitled to decline referral to avoid assuming responsibility for nationwide price structures.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, 5 App. Cas. 214 |
Distinction between a power coupled with a duty and an unfettered discretion; permissive words can create an obligation when necessary to effectuate a statutory purpose. |
The House used the case to show that statutory discretion must be exercised to further the policy and objects of the Act; it rejected the contention that ministerial discretion is either “all or nothing.” |
| Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1 KB 223 |
Principles governing judicial review of discretionary powers: decision is unlawful if based on irrelevant considerations, bad faith, or misdirection in law. |
Provided the analytical framework for testing whether the Minister had misdirected himself or taken irrelevant matters into account. |
| The King v. Mitchell, [1913] 1 KB 561 |
Permissive words construed as compulsory where necessary to secure a legal right. |
Cited to illustrate circumstances in which an apparently discretionary power becomes obligatory; distinguished on the facts. |
| R. v. Board of Education, [1910] 2 KB 165 |
Political or purely extraneous considerations vitiate the exercise of a statutory discretion. |
Referred to in discussing whether the Minister’s fear of parliamentary controversy was an irrelevant factor. |
| R. v. Steward of Havering Atte Bower, 5 B. & Ald. 691 |
Permissive statutory words may impose a duty. |
Used as additional authority for examining whether the Minister’s power was coupled with an obligation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Reid (with Judge Hodson and Judge Pearce concurring) held that although the Act confers discretion, it must be exercised to advance the statute’s policy of safeguarding persons compelled to comply with the marketing scheme. Examining the refusal letters, the Court found four legal errors:
- The Minister treated the breadth of the issues as a bar to referral, whereas section 19 expressly contemplates wide issues—even amendments or revocation of the scheme.
- The assertion that matters should be resolved solely within Company A ignored Parliament’s decision to provide an external safeguard against majority oppression.
- The Minister’s concern that a favourable report might oblige him to make an order was an impermissible, self-created barrier to exercising the statutory power.
- By describing his own discretion as “unfettered,” the Minister misapprehended the legal limits on that discretion.
The majority concluded that the Minister had therefore misdirected himself in law and taken irrelevant considerations into account. Because the discretion had never been exercised lawfully, the Court should compel reconsideration.
Judge Morris (dissenting) accepted that the discretion was broad and thought the Minister had considered all relevant factors; he would have dismissed the appeal.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; the matter is remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division with a direction to require the Minister to reconsider the complaint according to law.
Immediate effect: the Minister must re-evaluate the producers’ complaint under section 19 without relying on the irrelevant or misconceived factors identified by the House. Broader implication: executive discretion conferred by statute is subject to judicial review where its exercise frustrates the policy and objects of the legislation; ministerial discretion under regulatory schemes is not “unfettered.”
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