Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, an employee of the Defendant, sustained relatively minor back and hip strains in the course of his employment. These injuries, for which the Defendant’s liability was admitted, left the Plaintiff with intermittent weakness in his left leg. Several weeks later, while viewing a prospective tenancy in The City, the Plaintiff attempted to descend a steep, un-railed staircase while holding his young child’s hand. His left leg suddenly gave way, causing him to leap or fall down approximately ten steps and suffer a serious fracture to his right ankle and left heel.
The Plaintiff sought to recover damages for both the initial workplace accident and the subsequent stairway accident, contending that the second incident was a direct consequence of the first. The Lord Ordinary awarded £200 for the first accident but held the injuries from the second accident too remote. The Second Division of the Court of Session affirmed. The Plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords, which heard argument on 9 and 13 October 1969 and delivered its decision on 26 November 1969.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Defendant is legally responsible for the injuries the Plaintiff sustained in the second accident, given that those injuries occurred after the Plaintiff acted on a known weakness in his leg.
- Whether the Plaintiff’s conduct in attempting to descend the staircase constituted a novus actus interveniens—an unreasonable intervening act that breaks the chain of causation.
- To what extent foreseeability influences liability when a claimant’s subsequent conduct may be unreasonable.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The weakness in the Plaintiff’s left leg, caused by the initial workplace injury, directly precipitated the fall on the staircase.
- Because the second accident was a natural consequence of that weakness, the Defendant should bear full liability for the resulting damages.
Defendant's Arguments
- The second accident was not the direct, natural, or probable result of the first accident; instead, it stemmed from the Plaintiff’s own unreasonable actions.
- The Plaintiff knew his leg could give way and nonetheless chose to descend a steep staircase without assistance, thereby breaking the chain of causation.
- Even if the general possibility of a fall was foreseeable, the law does not impose liability for consequences brought about by a claimant’s unreasonable conduct.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Allan v. Barclay (1863) 2 M. 873 |
Damages are recoverable only for loss that naturally and directly arises from the wrong. |
Supported the view that liability is confined to consequences flowing naturally and directly from the Defendant’s negligence, not from the Plaintiff’s independent, unreasonable act. |
| The Oropose [1943] P. 32 |
An unreasonable or extraneous event constitutes a novus actus interveniens that breaks the causal chain. |
Cited to illustrate that the Plaintiff’s unreasonable conduct—if established—would sever causation between the first and second accidents. |
| ss. Baron Vernon v. ss. Metagama (1928) S.C. (42) 21 |
Liability extends to consequences that would flow in the ordinary course of things; reasonable human conduct is part of that course. |
Invoked to emphasise that only consequences arising from reasonable human conduct are recoverable; the Plaintiff’s conduct was found to be outside that range. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Delivering the principal opinion, Judge Reid stated that an injured person must act reasonably once aware of a disability. If subsequent harm occurs despite reasonable care, the original wrongdoer remains liable. Conversely, if the claimant behaves unreasonably, that conduct constitutes a novus actus interveniens and absolves the wrongdoer from further liability.
The Court found that the Plaintiff knew his leg could collapse without warning and recognised the risks posed by a steep, handrail-less staircase. Reasonable alternatives—descending slowly, sitting if necessary, or waiting for assistance—were available. By choosing instead to proceed unaided while holding a child, the Plaintiff placed himself in a situation where loss of control would likely lead to injury. This decision was deemed unreasonable and broke the causal chain.
The Court further clarified that foreseeability alone does not compel liability where the claimant’s own unreasonable act intervenes. Even if the Defendant could have foreseen that the Plaintiff might behave imprudently, the law does not impose liability for damage resulting from such conduct.
Addressing the Plaintiff’s leap once his leg failed, the Court held that split-second reactions in an emergency would not necessarily defeat a claim. Nevertheless, because the chain of causation had already been severed by the Plaintiff’s earlier decision to descend, the emergency response did not revive liability.
Concurring opinions by Judges Hodson, Guest, Dilhorne, and Upjohn agreed that the Plaintiff’s actions were unreasonable and that the appeal should be dismissed.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed; lower-court interlocutors affirmed. The Plaintiff must pay the Defendant’s costs of the appeal, subject to certification by the Clerk of Parliaments and any further order of the House.
Implications: The decision reinforces the principle that a claimant’s unreasonable conduct following an initial injury can break the chain of causation, limiting the defendant’s liability. While no new legal test was created, the House of Lords clarified the interaction between foreseeability and novus actus interveniens in personal-injury litigation.