| Earl v. Vass (1822) HL | A court must uphold a departmental objection to production where disclosure would injure the public interest. | Treated as direct House of Lords authority supporting ministerial conclusiveness. |
| Thomas v. The Queen (1874) | The Crown cannot be compelled to give discovery. | Illustrates the Crown’s special position regarding disclosure. |
| Deare v. Attorney-General (1835) | Equity could not compel a bill of discovery against the Crown. | Cited as historical confirmation of the same principle. |
| Attorney-General v. Newcastle-on-Tyne Corporation [1897] | Although the Crown cannot be compelled, it commonly volunteers discovery unless public interest forbids. | Supports the proposition that privilege is sparingly invoked. |
| Anderson v. Hamilton (1816) | Colonial Office correspondence protected from production. | Example of class-based protection. |
| William Young & Co. v. Commissioners of Excise (1817) | Official investigations and communications with Treasury protected. | Illustrative of long-standing practice. |
| Wyatt v. Gore (1816) | Colonial communications privileged. | Reinforces class-based approach. |
| Home v. Lord William Bentinck (1820) | Minutes of a military Court of Enquiry inadmissible on public-policy grounds. | Quoted extensively to justify exclusion where disclosure would deter candour. |
| Smith v. East India Co. (1841) | Unreserved communications between Company and Board of Control must remain confidential. | Supports class privilege rationale. |
| Wadeer v. East India Co. (1856) | Continuation of principle in Smith. | Same application. |
| H.M.S. “Bellerophon” [1874] | Commanding officer’s report after a collision protected. | Cited as naval analogue to present claim. |
| Hastings v. Chalmers (1890) | Police accident reports privileged. | Example where practice balances justice with public service. |
| Muir v. Edinburgh Tramways (1909) | Same principle as Hastings. | Reinforces police-report privilege. |
| Spigelmann v. Hooker (1932) | Trial judge inspected documents; illustrates divergent practice. | Used to contrast with the conclusive approach adopted here. |
| Beatson v. Skene [1860] | Minister’s sworn objection at trial is final; judge should not compel production. | Relied on as strong English authority. |
| Dickson v. Earl of Wilton (1845) | Effect of objection when made by subordinate without minister’s personal decision. | Distinguished; personal ministerial judgment required. |
| Hennessy v. Wright (1889) | Court may require affidavit showing minister has personally considered documents. | Cited in resolving proper procedural form. |
| Kain v. Farrer (1877) | Need for responsible minister’s oath when privilege claimed. | Same purpose as Hennessy. |
| Asiatic Petroleum v. Anglo-Persian Oil [1916] | Instance where judge looked at documents. | Treated as exceptional and not preferred. |
| Ankin v. L. & N.E. Ry. [1930] | Suggested Scottish practice differed. | House clarifies no real difference. |
| Robinson v. State of South Australia [1931] | Privy Council allowed judicial inspection under rule of court. | Expressly disapproved. |
| Marks v. Beyfus (1890) | Informer’s privilege in criminal context. | Used to illustrate analogous principle. |
| The “Zamora” [1916] | National security questions are for the Executive, not the courts. | Quoted for the maxim that responsible officials are sole judges of national security. |
| Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India [1895] | Court may itself raise public-interest objection even if parties do not. | Cited to show the rule is independent of party interests. |
| Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling Co. [1909] | Scottish authority treating ministerial objection as final. | Demonstrates uniformity between Scots and English law. |