Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd, United Kingdom House of Lords, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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LORD MACMILLAN
LORD UTHWATT
LORD TRAYNER
LORD PORTER
LORD MACKENZIE
LORD ESHER
LORD DUNEDIN

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Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff, a checker employed by Company C (forwarding agents), was injured at The Dock while a mobile crane was being used to load The Ship. The crane belonged to Company A (the harbour authority) and had been hired, together with its driver, to Company B (master stevedores) under written “Regulation 6.” The crane driver negligently moved the crane, trapping and injuring Plaintiff.

Plaintiff sued Company A and Company B in the alternative and obtained judgment for £247 and costs against Company A in The City Assizes. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Company A then appealed to the House of Lords, contending that liability should instead rest on Company B. At the outset of the appeal, Plaintiff was added as a respondent but took no active part, indicating willingness to accept whichever respondent was found liable.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, for the purposes of vicarious liability, the crane driver was at the material time the servant of Company A or of Company B.
What degree of “control” over the manner of performing the work is required to transfer vicarious liability from a general employer to a temporary hirer.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Company A)

Relied on Regulation 6, which states that drivers supplied with cranes “shall be the servants of the applicants,” arguing that this contractually shifted employment to Company B.
Invoked precedent such as Donovan v. Laing to contend that practical control lay with the stevedores, who directed the loading operation.
Submitted that because Company B determined what loads were to be moved and where, it bore responsibility for the driver’s negligence.

Respondent (Company B)

Maintained that only Company A engaged, paid and could dismiss the driver, and that Company B had no authority over how the crane was mechanically operated.
Cited testimony of its own officials confirming they could tell the driver what to lift but not how to manipulate the crane.
Argued that any contractual allocation between the companies could not displace Plaintiff’s right to hold the true employer liable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Quarman v. Burnett (1840) 6 M. & W. 499	Liability depends on who controls the manner of performing the work.	Used as historical authority to show that absence of control over how work is done leaves liability with the general employer.
Donovan v. Laing Construction Syndicate [1893] 1 Q.B. 629	Suggested test: the person “with the right at the moment to control the doing of the act” is the employer.	Discussed and distinguished; House considered that full control over how the crane was driven never passed to Company B.
McCartan v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners [1911] 2 I.R. 143	Approved earlier crane cases holding dock authorities liable when they retain control over operation.	Cited as strong support for affirming liability of Company A on similar facts.
Cairns v. Clyde Navigation Trustees [1898] 25 Rettie 1021	General employer of crane driver remained liable despite hiring out the crane.	Relied on as closely paralleling the present circumstances.
Ainslie v. Leith Dock Commissioners 1919 S.C. 676	Followed Cairns; dock authority liable.	Added weight to conclusion that Company A cannot shift liability.
Nicholas v. F. J. Sparkes & Son [1945] 1 K.B. 309 (note)	Proposed inquiry into whether negligent act was done under worker’s own discretion or under a specific order.	Court preferred a simpler “control of manner” test but noted that Newall acted under his own discretion granted by Company A.
Rourke v. White Moss Colliery (1877) 2 C.P.D. 205	Phrase “actually employed” used in assessing employment status.	Cited by Company A but not adopted as decisive.
Johnson v. Lindsay [1891] A.C. 371	Reference to men “working to a common end.”	Considered and found of limited assistance because driver continued ordinary work for Company A.
Century Insurance Co. v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board [1942] A.C. 509	Emphasised realistic assessment of control in vicarious liability.	Used by the House to reconcile and limit earlier dicta in Donovan.
Bain’s Case [1921] 2 A.C. 412	Effect of contractual terms on employment status.	Court held that contractual labels cannot override actual absence of control over the manner of work.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The House considered who possessed authority over the manner in which the crane was driven. Evidence from Employee Pullen and other stevedore staff showed that Company B could direct only what cargo to lift and where to place it; they expressly disclaimed any power to instruct the driver on braking, steering or other operational details. Company A alone selected, paid and could dismiss the driver, and retained responsibility for safe operation of its machinery.

Although Regulation 6 purported to deem drivers the servants of the hirer, the Lords held that vicarious liability cannot be altered by agreements between employers. The burden lay on Company A to prove an exceptional transfer of employment, a “heavy one” that can be discharged only where full control—including how the act is done—passes to the hirer. On the facts, that burden was not met.

The House reaffirmed the principle running through Quarman, Cairns and McCartan: control of the method of work is decisive. Any specific order from Company B as to how to drive, if it had been given and obeyed, might have made Company B a joint tort-feasor, but no such order existed. Accordingly, Company A remained the relevant “superior” under the maxim respondeat superior.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed with costs.

The judgment against Company A stands, and Plaintiff’s damages remain payable by that entity. The decision reinforces that a general employer can shift vicarious liability only in “quite exceptional circumstances” where the hirer acquires genuine control over the manner of performance. Contractual language alone is insufficient, thereby providing clearer guidance for industries that regularly hire out skilled operators with specialised equipment.