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Hellyer Bros Ltd v. Atkinson & Anor

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Company A appeals from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting in The City, which unanimously found that two employees, referred to as the Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, were dismissed by Company A for redundancy and were entitled to redundancy payments based on their continuous service. Plaintiff 1 was dismissed on 5 January 1984, with continuous service from 13 November 1977, and Plaintiff 2 was dismissed on 3 December 1983, with continuous service from 13 July 1950.

Both Plaintiffs served as trawlermen on fishing vessels operated by Company A. The events leading to their dismissal occurred in the early 1980s, but the litigation extended over many years, including prior related proceedings culminating in a Court of Appeal decision involving other employees of Company A, which rejected claims based on continuous contracts of employment rather than successive short-term contracts.

The Plaintiffs’ claims were stayed pending that earlier case but were later reheard by the Industrial Tribunal, which initially found in their favor in 1988. This decision was reversed in 1990 and remitted for rehearing, which led to the current appeal. The dispute arises from the decommissioning of Company A's trawler fleet and the question of whether the Plaintiffs were dismissed by the Company for redundancy.

Both Plaintiffs had signed successive crew agreements governed by the Merchant Shipping Act 1970 and related regulations, which prescribed a rigid, approved form of contract for seamen. The last crew agreements for each Plaintiff recorded specific dates of commencement and termination of employment, reasons for discharge noted as "mutual consent discharge," and included contractual clauses detailing terms of employment and termination.

The Tribunal found that the Plaintiffs’ contracts terminated when they signed off the crew agreements, but that signing off did not always equate to mutual consent termination. In particular, when the Company requested signing off due to ships not returning to sea shortly, the Tribunal found that the Company was terminating the contract. The Plaintiffs claimed redundancy payments under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, with the sole issue being whether the Company dismissed them within the meaning of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Plaintiffs were dismissed by Company A for redundancy within the meaning of section 81(1) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
  2. Whether the termination of the Plaintiffs’ crew agreements constituted dismissal by the employer under section 83(2)(a) of the 1978 Act.
  3. Whether the statutory form and provisions of the crew agreements precluded termination except by mutual consent or appropriate notice as specified in the contracts.
  4. Whether the Plaintiffs’ acts in signing off the crew agreements were voluntary terminations or terminations effected by the employer.
  5. Whether any waiver of contractual requirements, such as notice or witness to termination, was legally effective.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • In Plaintiff 2's case, the Company argued that there was no causative action by the Company in terminating the employment, as Plaintiff 2 signed off willingly before knowing about the decommissioning and in the expectation that the vessel would sail again.
  • It was submitted that the only modes of termination permitted under the crew agreements were mutual consent or appropriate notice (24 hours), neither of which had been complied with, thus the termination was by mutual consent and did not amount to dismissal by the employer.
  • The statutory form of the crew agreement, approved under the Merchant Shipping Act 1970, was argued to prohibit any waiver or variation of its terms, including termination procedures.
  • Reliance was placed on Birch v Liverpool University to support the proposition that where an employee voluntarily terminates employment without threat or coercion, such termination cannot be attributed to the employer.
  • It was contended that the telephone call to Plaintiff 1 was not an offer to terminate but an ineffective attempt to vary the contract, amounting to an offer to terminate by mutual consent rather than unilateral termination by the employer.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Plaintiffs contended that the Company terminated the contracts by requesting them to sign off when the vessels were not going to sail, constituting dismissal by the employer.
  • It was argued that the signing off was not a voluntary resignation but acceptance of an accomplished fact communicated by the Company, and thus the termination was not by mutual consent but by employer action.
  • The statutory form and rigid requirements of the crew agreements did not preclude waiver of procedural formalities such as the presence of a witness to notice of termination.
  • The factual context and oral communication meant that the termination was a matter of fact for the Tribunal to decide, distinguishing the case from Birch v Liverpool University, which involved formal written exchanges.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hellyer Brothers Ltd v McLeod [1987] ICR 526 Interpretation of continuous contracts in the seafaring context and the statutory form of crew agreements. Referenced as prior authority on the nature of crew agreements and the statutory requirements under the Merchant Shipping Act 1970.
Birch v Liverpool University [1985] ICR 470 Distinction between dismissal by employer and voluntary termination by employee; consensual termination not amounting to dismissal. Considered and distinguished; the Court found the facts here involved oral requests and factual context, unlike the consensual written exchanges in Birch.
Martin v Glynwed Distribution Ltd [1983] ICR 511 Determination of who terminated the contract of employment and the role of employer pressure in constructive dismissal. Applied to emphasize the factual inquiry into whether termination was by employer or employee and the relevance of pressure or threat.
Sheffield v Oxford Controls Ltd [1979] ICR 396 Principle that resignation induced by employer threat amounts to dismissal. Discussed to clarify that absence of threat or coercion distinguishes voluntary resignation from dismissal.
Wood v Cunard Line [1989] IRLR 431 Variations from written crew agreements and the adequacy of written terms in reflecting actual employment contracts. Not treated as authority for informal variation of crew agreements; statutory form must be rigidly followed.
Latchford Premier Cinema Ltd v Ennion [1931] 2 Ch. 409 Validity of oral resignation notwithstanding written contract requirements. Distinguished on facts; oral statements here were not offers to terminate but announcements of fact.
Burton, Allton & Johnson Ltd v Peck [1975] ICR 193 Voluntary resignation does not preclude dismissal if resignation is induced by employer's conduct. Quoted to illustrate the distinction between voluntary termination and dismissal induced by employer.
Goss v Lord Nugent (1983) 5 B & Ad. 58 Contractual waiver may be oral or written or inferred from conduct even if contract requires writing. Used to reject the argument that waiver of written contract terms must be in writing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on the statutory framework under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, particularly section 83(2)(a), which defines dismissal as termination of the contract by the employer. It was undisputed that redundancy was the reason for dismissal if dismissal occurred and that the Plaintiffs met the requisite employment periods.

The Tribunal found that signing off a crew agreement generally terminated the contract, but that signing off at the Company’s request, when the vessel was not returning to sea shortly, was a termination by the employer rather than a mutual consent or voluntary resignation. The Court accepted this finding as a question of fact within the Tribunal’s province.

The Court rejected the Company's argument that the statutory form of the crew agreement precluded any termination other than by mutual consent or appropriate notice, noting that the absence of a witness to notice did not affect the essential nature of termination and that waiver of formal requirements was possible. The Court also found no statutory or legal impediment to oral waiver of contract terms.

In distinguishing Birch v Liverpool University, the Court emphasized that the present case involved oral communication and factual context rather than formal written offers and acceptances, making the question of termination a factual one for the Tribunal. The Court also rejected the submission that only duress or threat could negate voluntariness, recognizing that the factual circumstances could lead to termination by employer despite the employee’s compliance.

The Court further dismissed the argument that the telephone call to Plaintiff 1 was an ineffective offer to terminate, holding that it was a statement of fact amounting to termination by the employer.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the appeals by Company A, affirming the Industrial Tribunal’s decision that both Plaintiffs were dismissed by the employer for redundancy and entitled to redundancy payments.

The decision confirms that in the context of statutory crew agreements, termination may be effected by employer action even where formal notice requirements are not strictly observed, and that the factual context and manner of termination are critical in determining whether dismissal occurred. No new legal precedent beyond the facts of this case was established.

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Hellyer Bros Ltd v Atkinson & Anor

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Hellyer Bros Ltd v Atkinson & Anor
(Mar 31, 1992)