Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Advocates
- MR RICHARD HIGNETT (of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Ashby Cohen Solicitors Ltd 18 Hanover Street London W1S 1YN
- MRS LOUISE PURCELL (A Representative) Messrs Irwin Mitchell Solicitors 150 Holborn London EC1N 2NS
Judges
- THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BURTON PRESIDENT
- MR A J HARRIS
- MR G M WORTHINGTON
See more information ...
Click here to read the full judgment
Shergold v. Fieldway Medical Centre
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a decision by the Employment Tribunal at London (South) dismissing the Claimant's claim for constructive unfair dismissal on the basis that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. The dispute centers on the application of section 32 of the Employment Act 2002, Schedule 2 to that Act, and the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004 ("the 2004 Regulations"). The Claimant did not attend the original Tribunal hearing due to a failure by her solicitor's office to note the hearing date. After the Tribunal dismissed the claim, the Claimant’s solicitors requested a review, which was refused on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of varying the decision. The Claimant subsequently appealed against both the original decision and the refusal of review, but the Appeal Tribunal treated the appeal as directed solely against the original decision.
The Claimant had been employed by the Respondent, a medical practice, as an Audit Clerk from July 1987 until 24 December 2004, when her employment ended following a resignation letter dated 31 October 2004. The letter expressed her inability to continue working under the management of a particular individual and set out grievances regarding changes in workplace conditions and treatment. The Respondent responded by inviting the Claimant to a meeting to discuss her concerns, which took place on 19 November 2004. The meeting minutes reflect the Claimant’s dissatisfaction and her statement that she had already resigned and would not return to work.
The Claimant submitted a claim to the Employment Tribunal within the statutory time limit, alleging constructive dismissal based on ongoing grievances about workplace treatment, including specific incidents involving herself and her daughter, who was also employed by the Respondent. The Respondent denied that the Claimant had complied with the statutory grievance procedures prior to commencing Tribunal proceedings. The Tribunal dismissed the claim on the basis that the Claimant had not complied with the statutory grievance requirements under section 32 and Schedule 2 of the Employment Act 2002, and that the limitation period had expired, preventing recommencement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Claimant complied with the statutory grievance procedures set out in section 32 of the Employment Act 2002 and Schedule 2 to that Act before presenting a claim for constructive unfair dismissal.
- Whether the Claimant’s letter of resignation dated 31 October 2004 constituted a written grievance under the Standard Procedure of Schedule 2.
- Whether the Tribunal erred in law by concluding that the Claimant had not set out a grievance in writing and therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim.
- The interpretation and application of the statutory grievance procedure requirements under the Employment Act 2002 and the 2004 Regulations, including the extent of detail required in a written grievance.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Claimant’s letter of resignation also set out a grievance in writing, fulfilling the minimal statutory requirement under paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Act 2002.
- The statutory grievance procedure does not require technical detail or an explicit invocation of a grievance procedure in the writing.
- The letter was sufficient to inform the Respondent of the general nature of the complaint, enabling the Respondent to understand and respond accordingly.
- The Tribunal’s finding that specific incidents were not included in the letter was either incorrect or legally irrelevant to compliance with the statutory procedure.
- The Respondent held a meeting to discuss the complaints, indicating awareness of the grievance, fulfilling the purpose of the statutory procedure.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Claimant’s letter of resignation was not a written grievance under the statutory procedure.
- The grievance must specifically identify the incidents leading to the constructive dismissal claim, which the letter failed to do.
- The Respondent was not given the opportunity to respond to the specific allegations before proceedings were issued.
- Compliance with the statutory grievance procedure requires more than a general complaint; it requires sufficient detail to allow the employer to respond effectively.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Noskiw v Royal Mail Group Plc (Employment Tribunal, Nottingham, 7 March 2005) |
Illustrated issues with statutory grievance compliance and the need for grievance to relate to the claim. |
Referenced as background to confirm that grievance must relate to the claim but exact identity of incidents need not be identical. |
| Thorpe v Poat and Lake EAT 0503/05/SM (18 October 2005) |
Confirmed that a lengthy letter chronicling complaints can amount to a grievance under the statutory procedure. |
Supported the view that the Claimant’s letter constituted a written grievance under the statutory procedure. |
| Galaxy Showers Ltd v Wilson EAT 0525/05/CK (10 November 2005) |
Held that the statutory definition of grievance requires only a complaint in writing; no formalities or indication of further steps required. |
Supported the minimal requirements for a written grievance and rejected the need for a meeting to have taken place before compliance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by emphasizing the minimal statutory requirements for a grievance under paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 of the Employment Act 2002, which requires only that the employee set out the grievance in writing and send it to the employer. The court rejected the Tribunal’s interpretation that the letter of resignation was not a grievance or that it failed because it did not detail the specific incidents leading to the constructive dismissal claim. The court distinguished between the initial written grievance and subsequent steps in the grievance procedure, noting that the basis for the grievance need not be set out at the first stage under the Standard Procedure.
The court also noted that the letter of resignation, although serving a dual purpose, was sufficient to constitute a grievance in writing. It highlighted that the Respondent responded by holding a meeting to discuss the complaints, indicating that the Respondent understood the letter as a grievance, even if not formally acknowledged as such. The court found the Tribunal’s requirement for more detailed specificity and invocation of the grievance procedure to be an inappropriate and overly technical gloss on the statute, which was intended to encourage resolution and conciliation rather than procedural complexity.
The court further addressed the Respondent's argument that the grievance must precisely match the claim, concluding that the grievance and claim must relate to the same general matters but need not be identical in detail. The Tribunal’s finding that the letter did not refer to certain incidents was either incorrect or irrelevant to compliance. The court concluded that the Claimant had complied with the statutory grievance procedure, and therefore the Tribunal erred in dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed.
The court’s ruling establishes that a written grievance under the statutory procedure requires only a general written complaint sent to the employer, without technical formality or detailed invocation of a grievance process. A letter of resignation can simultaneously serve as a written grievance if it sets out complaints related to the dismissal claim. The decision clarifies that the statutory grievance procedure’s purpose is to facilitate early resolution and should not be applied in an overly technical or restrictive manner that bars claims on procedural grounds. The direct effect is that the Claimant’s constructive dismissal claim should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to alleged non-compliance with grievance procedures. No new precedent beyond the interpretation of statutory grievance requirements is established.
Click here to read the full judgment