Factual and Procedural Background
The Second Respondent, acting as the local planning authority for the county of Cornwall, issued an enforcement notice on 27 April 2012 concerning land at Brickworks Hill, St Day near Redruth, referred to as the appeal site. The appeal site was divided into four distinct areas: A, B, C, and D. The 2012 notice alleged breaches of planning control involving unauthorized material changes of use relating to commercial and non-commercial storage and processing of vehicles and caravans on areas A, C, and D, requiring cessation of those uses and removal of vehicles, parts, and caravans.
Most of the appeal site land was owned by the First Appellant, with a dwelling house known as Cassita in area D jointly owned by both Appellants. The Appellants appealed the 2012 enforcement notice to the First Respondent, who appointed an inspector. The inspector dismissed the appeal but corrected and varied the notice.
The planning history relevant to the appeal includes a 2008 enforcement notice on area D alleging unauthorized change of use from domestic curtilage to mixed use including storage of vehicles. The Appellants complied with this notice. Subsequently, the First Appellant applied for a certificate of lawfulness for the mixed use of area D, which was refused, and a 2009 enforcement notice was issued alleging breach of planning control on area D. The First Appellant successfully appealed against the 2009 notice, which was quashed by an inspector who found the correct planning unit to be more extensive than area D alone.
By 2011, areas B, C, and D were used together for vehicle storage and processing activities. Area A, originally scrub/agricultural land, was later used for similar commercial purposes and was subject to an extant enforcement notice. Area B had planning permission for commercial yard use and was used accordingly. The 2012 notice treated areas A, B, C, and D as a single planning unit, with requirements applying to areas A, C, and D only.
The Appellants appealed under grounds specified in Section 174(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, relying on grounds (b), (c), and (f), with ground (c) confined to area D. The inspector concluded areas A, B, C, and part of D formed a single planning unit, found breaches of planning control, and rejected the Appellants’ claims regarding area D’s lawful use rights, determining that a material change of use had occurred and that rights to revert to previous lawful use had been lost.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether areas A, B, C, and D constituted a single planning unit or multiple planning units for the purposes of assessing breach of planning control.
- Whether the Appellants had lawfully established planning permission for the mixed use of area D following compliance with the 2008 enforcement notice.
- Whether the creation of new planning units or material changes of use resulted in the loss of any existing lawful use rights in respect of area D.
- The applicability and interpretation of section 57(4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 concerning the right to revert to previous lawful uses after enforcement action.
- Whether the inspector provided adequate reasons for his conclusions on the planning units and loss of lawful use rights.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The inspector failed to adequately explain how he concluded that planning permission to use area D for mixed residential and vehicle storage purposes was extinguished.
- The inspector should have amended the enforcement notice to preserve the Appellants’ right to revert to the lawful mixed use of area D (storage of non-scrap vehicles and residential use).
- Compliance with the 2008 notice effectively granted planning permission under sections 173(11) and 73A of the 1990 Act for the storage of non-scrap vehicles on area D, which had never been lost.
- The Appellants were entitled to rely on section 57(4) of the 1990 Act to revert to the previous lawful use of area D.
Respondent's Arguments
- The inspector correctly concluded that the Appellants were not entitled to use area D for residential and vehicle storage purposes due to subdivision of area D into two planning units, one being Cassita with residual residential curtilage and the other subsumed into a larger commercial planning unit.
- The changes constituted material changes of use resulting in loss of the rights granted by the prior planning permission.
- The inspector’s reasoning was clear and adequately explained in the decision letter.
- Section 57(4) of the 1990 Act did not apply in these circumstances, and the Appellants had not advanced this argument before the inspector in relation to their appeal grounds.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Burdle v Secretary of State for the Environment [1972] 1 WLR 1207 |
Criteria for determining planning units and material change of use; distinction between single planning unit and multiple units. |
The court relied on Burdle to affirm the inspector’s approach to identifying two new planning units within the appeal site based on factual and functional considerations. |
| Jennings Motors Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1982] 1 QB 543 |
Effect of physical changes and new planning units on planning history and use rights. |
Used to support the principle that creation of new planning units can extinguish prior use rights; the court applied this to uphold the inspector’s findings. |
| Young v Secretary of State for the Environment (1984) 47 P.&C.R. 165; [1983] 2 AC 662 |
Interpretation of section 23(9) of the 1971 Act (equivalent to section 57(4) of 1990 Act); effect of material change of use on lawful use rights. |
The court applied Young to conclude that use rights can be lost when supplanted by a new use, and section 57(4) only preserves lawful prior uses immediately before the breach. |
| Cynon Valley Borough Council v Secretary of State for Wales [1987] 53 P&CR 68 |
Clarification of extinguishment of planning permissions by new developments and material changes of use. |
Cited to confirm that lawful use rights can be lost upon creation of new planning units or material changes of use; binding on the court in this case. |
| Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] 1 AC 132 |
Whether planning permission can be extinguished by abandonment; exceptions involving new planning units and conflicting permissions. |
Considered in context but distinguished by subsequent cases; court recognized exceptions but found no abandonment in instant case. |
| South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 |
Requirements for adequacy and intelligibility of reasons in planning decisions. |
The court applied the principles to assess whether the inspector provided adequate reasons for his conclusions, finding the explanation sufficient. |
| Mansi v Elstree Rural District Council (1965) 16 P&CR 153 |
Interpretation of enforcement notices and their effect on existing lawful use rights. |
Referenced to note that enforcement notices are interpreted as not interfering with lawful rights unless explicitly stated; however, found academic here since section 57(4) did not apply. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the factual matrix and planning history, focusing on the inspector’s findings regarding the planning units and material changes of use. It accepted the inspector’s conclusion that areas A, B, C, and part of area D formed a single planning unit, while Cassita and its residual residential curtilage formed a separate planning unit. This subdivision was supported by physical and functional evidence on the ground and was consistent with established legal principles regarding planning units as set out in Burdle and subsequent case law.
The court analysed the effect of compliance with the 2008 enforcement notice, which gave rise to deemed planning permission under sections 173(11) and 73A of the 1990 Act for the mixed use of area D. However, it agreed with the inspector that this permission was superseded by the creation of new planning units and material changes of use, resulting in the loss of those prior use rights.
The court rejected the Appellants’ argument that section 57(4) of the 1990 Act allowed them to revert to the previous lawful use of area D. It reasoned that section 57(4) protects the use of land as it existed immediately before the breach but only in relation to the land subject to the enforcement notice. Since the planning permission related to the whole of area D and the 2012 notice covered a larger combined area including A, B, and C, the prior permission did not apply to the land as now defined.
Regarding the adequacy of reasons, the court found that the inspector provided intelligible and adequate explanations for his conclusions about the new planning units and loss of lawful use rights, in line with the standards established in South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2).
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the Appellants’ appeal, upholding the inspector’s decision and the enforcement notice as varied and corrected.
The direct effect of this decision is that the Appellants are required to comply with the enforcement notice as it applies to areas A, C, and D, including cessation of unauthorized uses and removal of vehicles and caravans. The ruling confirms that the creation of new planning units and material changes of use can extinguish prior lawful use rights, reinforcing established planning law principles. No new precedent was established beyond the application of settled law to the facts of this case.