Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal concerns whether an application for registration under the Land Registration Act 2002 ("LRA") as proprietor of registered land by adverse possession is valid when part of the possession period involved occupation of a residential building in breach of section 144 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 ("LASPOA"), which criminalises squatting in residential buildings.
The property at issue is a residential house registered at HM Land Registry, owned by a deceased registered proprietor. The Appellee ("Mr Best") applied to be registered as proprietor on the basis of adverse possession exceeding ten years. His application was rejected by the Appellant ("the Registrar") on the ground that part of the possession involved criminal trespass under section 144 LASPOA.
The Registrar argued that reliance on criminal conduct should invalidate the adverse possession claim. The High Court, however, ruled that section 144 did not affect the operation of adverse possession under the LRA. The Registrar appealed this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the commission of a criminal offence under section 144 of LASPOA during a period of adverse possession bars an application to be registered as proprietor under the LRA.
- How the public policy considerations underlying the criminalisation of squatting interact with the established public policy rationale for adverse possession.
- Whether the principle of illegality (ex turpi causa) applies to prevent acquisition of title by adverse possession involving criminal trespass under section 144 LASPOA.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The criminalisation of squatting under section 144 LASPOA alters the balance of public policy to prevent a trespasser benefiting from criminal conduct.
- Reliance on conduct constituting a criminal offence should render an application for adverse possession invalid, as it would otherwise reward illegal behaviour.
- The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 supports depriving persons of property obtained through unlawful conduct, reinforcing the position that criminal acts should bar adverse possession claims.
- Authority from R (Smith) v Land Registry supports the proposition that criminal conduct may prevent adverse possession claims.
Appellee's Arguments
- The law of adverse possession traditionally allows acquisition of title despite the tortious nature of trespass; criminalisation under section 144 does not change this.
- Public policy underlying adverse possession, including certainty and land marketability, outweighs the policy underlying section 144 in this context.
- There is no explicit statutory provision excluding criminal conduct under section 144 from counting towards adverse possession.
- Precedent shows criminal acts collateral to adverse possession do not invalidate it, and there is no reason to treat section 144 differently.
- The Proceeds of Crime Act operates independently and does not affect the LRA regime.
- Alternative arguments include reliance on other acts of adverse possession not involving section 144 offences and human rights considerations, though these were not necessary to decide the appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Bakewell Management Ltd v Brandwood [2004] UKHL 14 |
Criminal conduct does not necessarily prevent acquisition of rights by prescription or lost modern grant where owner could have consented. |
Supported the conclusion that criminal trespass under section 144 does not bar adverse possession claims under the LRA. |
| R (Smith) v Land Registry [2009] EWHC 328 (Admin) |
Suggested criminal obstruction prevents adverse possession of highways. |
Distinguished as not authoritative for section 144 LASPOA; first instance decision not endorsed on appeal. |
| Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc. [2014] UKSC 55 |
Illegality defence (ex turpi causa) is based on public policy and must be contextually applied. |
Used to analyse whether criminal acts under section 144 should bar adverse possession; court found no automatic bar. |
| Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 47 |
Balancing competing public policies when applying the illegality defence. |
Adopted as analytical framework for weighing policies behind adverse possession and section 144. |
| Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2007] EWCA Civ 763; [2008] UKHL 43 |
Public policy may limit statutory rights if unlawful discrimination found. |
Referenced to illustrate public policy balancing but no breach found here to bar adverse possession. |
| Hipperson v Newbury District Electoral Registration Officer [1985] 1 QB 1060 |
Illegal residence does not necessarily disqualify registration rights. |
Supported view that criminal illegality collateral to claim does not bar rights such as adverse possession. |
| R v Oxfordshire County Council, ex p. Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 AC 335 |
Prescription and limitation protect long-standing enjoyment and create legal certainty. |
Used to support the rationale behind adverse possession and its balance with criminal law. |
| Collis v Amphlett (1917) 62 The Solicitors' Journal 37 |
Illegality defence must be carefully applied and is not always absolute. |
Referenced in submissions but noted as sparse authority on the issue. |
| Chadwick v Collinson [2014] EWHC 3055 (Ch) |
Parliament can create exceptions to the ex turpi causa principle. |
Used to demonstrate that Parliament can allow benefits despite criminal conduct; no such exception here but no bar either. |
| A & ors v SA [2013] EWHC 426 (Fam) |
Courts may grant relief despite unlawful acts where Parliament has allowed. |
Illustrated varying parliamentary approaches to illegality; supports no implied bar in LRA. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the interplay between the law of adverse possession under the LRA and the criminal offence of squatting under section 144 LASPOA. It recognised that adverse possession necessarily involves unlawful trespass but has long been accepted as a means of acquiring title, reflecting strong public policy interests in land use, certainty, and marketability.
The Registrar's argument that criminalisation under section 144 should bar adverse possession was considered in light of the ex turpi causa principle, which prevents benefit from one's own wrongdoing. The court applied the framework from Hounga v Allen, balancing competing public policies rather than applying an absolute bar.
Key to the reasoning was that section 144 was enacted to assist property owners practically in removing squatters, not to affect the law of adverse possession. The absence of any explicit statutory provision linking section 144 to adverse possession was significant. The court found that Parliament did not intend section 144 to disrupt the carefully balanced adverse possession regime.
The court noted the arbitrary and disruptive consequences that would follow if section 144 barred adverse possession, such as distinctions between living in a property and other forms of possession, or between parts of a property (house vs. garden). It also referred to Bakewell Management Ltd v Brandwood, which held that criminal conduct does not necessarily prevent acquisition of rights by prescription where the landowner could have consented.
The Proceeds of Crime Act was deemed irrelevant to the interpretation of section 144's effect on the LRA, as it establishes a separate regime with distinct procedures.
Ultimately, the court concluded that criminal offences under section 144 are collateral to adverse possession claims and do not prevent the acquisition of title by adverse possession under the LRA.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court held that the commission of an offence under section 144 of LASPOA does not bar an application for registration as proprietor by adverse possession under the LRA. This preserves the established balance of public policy favouring certainty and marketability of land titles through adverse possession, despite the criminalisation of squatting in residential buildings.
The decision means that adverse possessors who may have committed offences under section 144 during their possession can still acquire title, provided the other requirements of adverse possession are met. The ruling avoids the arbitrary and disruptive effects that would arise from excluding criminal conduct under section 144 from adverse possession claims.
No new precedent altering the law of adverse possession was set; rather, the court affirmed the continued operation of the LRA regime independently of section 144 LASPOA.