Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal and cross-appeal arise from a decision by Judge Teare concerning jurisdictional issues in ongoing litigation between Company A ("the Bank") and its former Chairman, referred to as Defendant A, along with his associates. The present claim involves the Bank suing Defendant A's son-in-law, Defendant B, for conspiracy to injure the Bank by unlawful means. The Bank alleges that Defendant B conspired with Defendant A to conceal or dissipate Defendant A’s assets in violation of a worldwide freezing order and a receivership order against Defendant A.
Defendant A resided in England from February 2009 until fleeing the jurisdiction in February 2012 to avoid imprisonment for contempt of court. Defendant B lives in Switzerland. The Bank initiated proceedings in England against both defendants in July 2015, and the judge had to determine whether jurisdiction existed under the Lugano Convention.
The judge found that the Bank had a good arguable case against Defendant B for conspiracy based on breaches of the freezing and receivership orders, which qualified as unlawful means. However, the judge rejected the Bank’s claim that Defendant A was domiciled in England at the relevant time to establish jurisdiction under Article 6 of the Convention. The judge also rejected the Bank’s argument that jurisdiction could be founded on the place where damage occurred (limb (a) of Article 5(3)) but held jurisdiction was proper under the alternative limb (b) of Article 5(3) concerning the place of the event giving rise to the damage, limited to the period before Defendant A fled England in February 2012.
Both Defendant B and the Bank appealed different aspects of the ruling. Defendant B challenged the legal basis for unlawful means and the jurisdictional basis under limb (b) of Article 5(3). The Bank challenged the rejection of jurisdiction under limb (a) and Article 6, and sought to expand the temporal scope of jurisdiction under limb (b). The Bank also sought to introduce a new argument regarding conspiracy by lawful means but was refused permission.
Background facts include Defendant A’s chairmanship of the Bank from 2005, his removal and flight to London in 2009, the imposition of a worldwide freezing order and receivership order in England, and evidence that Defendant B assisted Defendant A in concealing assets located in Switzerland, Belize, and Russia. Defendant A obtained asylum in the UK in 2011 but fled in 2012 to avoid imprisonment for contempt. The Bank holds judgments exceeding US$4.6 billion against Defendant A.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether breaches of a court order can qualify as unlawful means for the tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.
- Whether the English courts have jurisdiction over Defendant B under the Lugano Convention, specifically under Article 6 and Article 5(3) limbs (a) and (b).
- Whether the place of the event giving rise to damage under limb (b) of Article 5(3) is England for the entire period claimed by the Bank or only until Defendant A fled England.
- Whether permission should be granted to the Bank to raise a new argument based on conspiracy by lawful means.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant B's Arguments
- The judge erred in law by holding that breaches of a court order can constitute unlawful means for conspiracy.
- The judge was wrong to find jurisdiction under limb (b) of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention.
- Defendant B did not deny assisting Defendant A in breaching the freezing and receivership orders but challenged the legal characterization of those breaches as unlawful means.
Bank's Arguments
- The judge erred in rejecting jurisdiction under limb (a) of Article 5(3) because the Bank suffered direct damage in England through diminution of its cause of action and judgments.
- The judge wrongly limited jurisdiction under limb (b) to the period before Defendant A fled England; the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy continued beyond that date.
- The judge was wrong to reject jurisdiction under Article 6 based on Defendant A’s domicile.
- The Bank contended that a cause of action in damages arises from breach of a court order, supporting the classification of breaches as unlawful means.
- The Bank sought to raise a new argument based on conspiracy by lawful means but permission was refused.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A. [1978] QB 708 |
Interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention concerning place where damage occurred and place of event giving rise to damage. |
Used to distinguish jurisdiction under limbs (a) and (b) of Article 5(3); court accepted jurisdiction under limb (b) but rejected limb (a). |
| Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 |
Definition of conspiracy by lawful means requiring predominant intention to injure claimant. |
Rejected as a basis for the Bank’s claim due to lack of pleaded predominant intention to injure. |
| Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435 |
Clarification on predominant intention in conspiracy claims. |
Referenced to show that predominant intention was not pleaded by Bank. |
| Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd (No. 2) [1982] AC 173 |
Further authority on conspiracy and intention. |
Supported the court’s view on intention requirements. |
| Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19; [2008] 1 AC 1174 |
Scope of unlawful means in conspiracy to injure by unlawful means; inclusion of crimes and torts. |
Key authority confirming breaches of court orders can be unlawful means; guided court’s reasoning. |
| Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28; [2007] 1 AC 181 |
Whether breach of a court order creates a private law cause of action. |
Held that simple breach of court order does not create cause of action in damages; court relied on this to reject direct claims for breach but accepted breaches as unlawful means in conspiracy tort. |
| In re Hudson [1966] Ch 209 |
Whether breach of court order constitutes cause of action. |
Supported the view that breach of court order does not itself create cause of action. |
| Chapman v Honig [1963] 2 QB 502 |
Relationship between contempt of court and civil liability. |
Distinguished cases where breach of court order does not give rise to damages; court found it consistent with general principles. |
| Acrow (Automation) Ltd v Rex Chainbelt Inc. [1971] 1 WLR 1676 |
Whether aiding breach of court order can constitute unlawful means. |
Held that aiding breach can be unlawful means; supported court’s conclusion that breaches qualify. |
| Parker v Rasalingham [2000] All ER (D) 912 |
Jurisdiction to award damages for breach of injunction embodied in consent order. |
Used to show no absolute bar to damages for breach of court order if underlying cause of action exists. |
| Law Debenture Trust Corporation v Ural Caspian Oil Corporation Ltd [1995] Ch 152 |
Recognition of breaches of court orders as unlawful means. |
Supported the position that breaches can be unlawful means in conspiracy tort. |
| Surzur Overseas Ltd v Koros [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 611 |
Conspiracy to injure by unlawful means involving abuse of court process. |
Confirmed that unlawful means need not be actionable by claimant; aiding breach of court order can be unlawful means. |
| Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch) |
Scope of unlawful means in conspiracy tort; distinction between criminal and non-criminal unlawful acts. |
Distinguished non-criminal regulatory breaches; did not affect the court’s conclusion on breaches of court orders. |
| Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280 |
Civil contempt as injury to private rights. |
Supported view that breaches of court orders can be relevant to private causes of action. |
| R v Barnet London Borough Council, ex p. Shah [1983] 2 AC 309 |
Interpretation of residence and domicile in statutory context. |
Rejected by court as inapplicable to domicile determination under Lugano Convention. |
| AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier [2015] QB 699 |
Interpretation of "place where damage occurred" under Article 5(3) of Lugano Convention. |
Guided the court’s analysis distinguishing limbs (a) and (b) of Article 5(3). |
| Domicrest Ltd v Swiss Bank Corporation [1999] QB 548 |
Identification of harmful event for jurisdictional purposes. |
Supported court’s approach to limb (b) focusing on place of wrongful act initiating liability. |
| ABCI v Banque Franco-Tunisienne [2003] EWCA Civ 205 |
Approval of approach to harmful event in jurisdictional analysis. |
Supported court’s reasoning on limb (b). |
| Shevill v Presse Alliance [1995] 2 AC 18 |
Place of event giving rise to damage in defamation for jurisdictional purposes. |
Supported court’s interpretation of limb (b) as place where wrongful act originated. |
| R (Best) v Chief Land Registrar [2015] EWCA Civ 17; [2016] QB 23 |
Statutory interpretation principles. |
Supported rejection of implied qualification to domicile rules. |
| Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057 |
Statutory duty does not create common law duty of care. |
Used to support argument that court order does not create private law duties. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first addressed the Bank’s attempt to introduce a new argument based on conspiracy by lawful means as established in Quinn v Leathem, refusing permission since the Bank had expressly disavowed reliance on this form at first instance and had not pleaded predominant intent to injure.
Regarding the tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, the court analyzed whether breaches of court orders can constitute unlawful means. It distinguished between simple breach of a court order, which does not itself give rise to a private law cause of action for damages (as per Barclays Bank and related authorities), and breaches that form part of a conspiracy aimed at injuring the claimant. The court rejected the argument that damages can never be awarded where breach of a court order is involved, finding no positive rule of law to that effect.
The court relied heavily on Total Network, which confirmed that unlawful means include crimes (even if not independently actionable) and torts, and held that civil contempt of court by breaching court orders qualifies as unlawful means for the tort of conspiracy. The court also cited Acrow (Automation) and Surzur Overseas as supporting authorities for this position.
The court rejected concerns about floodgates, noting that liability for co-conspirators not subject to the court order would be narrowly imposed only where they knowingly assisted in breach. It also distinguished the position of persons protected by the Babanaft proviso, who may be exempt from penal sanctions but not civil liability.
On jurisdiction under the Lugano Convention, the court upheld the judge’s rejection of jurisdiction under Article 6 based on Defendant A’s domicile, finding no basis to disqualify the statutory test by reference to Defendant A’s unlawful departure from England.
Under Article 5(3), the court accepted the judge’s rejection of jurisdiction under limb (a) (place where damage occurred), holding that the closest causal damage occurred in foreign jurisdictions where the assets were located and lost to execution, not in England.
However, the court disagreed with the judge’s limitation of jurisdiction under limb (b) (place of event giving rise to damage) to the period before Defendant A fled England. The court held that the relevant event giving rise to liability as to Defendant B was the making of the original agreement in England in about 2009 to defeat the freezing order, which was the principal legal foundation of the claim. Subsequent instructions were not determinative for jurisdiction. This interpretation aligns with the autonomous interpretation of Article 5(3) by the ECJ and avoids multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent judgments.
Holding and Implications
The court’s final decisions are as follows:
- The appeal by Defendant B regarding the existence of a good arguable cause of action for conspiracy to injure by unlawful means is dismissed.
- The Bank’s appeal based on Article 6 of the Lugano Convention is dismissed.
- The Bank’s appeal regarding limb (a) of Article 5(3) is dismissed.
- The Bank’s appeal regarding limb (b) of Article 5(3) is allowed, establishing jurisdiction in England on this basis for the entire relevant period.
The refusal to allow the Bank to raise a new argument based on conspiracy by lawful means limits the scope of claims to those pleaded. The recognition that breaches of court orders can constitute unlawful means for conspiracy tort purposes affirms the court’s willingness to impose civil liability on conspirators who deliberately breach court orders to harm claimants. The jurisdictional ruling under limb (b) enhances procedural efficiency by permitting the Bank to sue in England for the entire conspiracy rather than fragmenting proceedings across jurisdictions.
No new precedent is created beyond the application and confirmation of existing principles regarding unlawful means and jurisdiction under the Lugano Convention.