Maxwell, R v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant and the Appellant’s brother (“Co-Defendant”) were convicted of murder and two robberies at The Crown Court on 27 February 1998. The convictions relied heavily on testimony from a professional criminal turned informant (“Witness A”). In 2009, after an extensive investigation by the Investigating Police Force prompted by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (“CCRC”), the Court of Appeal discovered that officers of the original investigating force (“The Police”) had systematically supplied undisclosed inducements to Witness A and had misled prosecutors, defence counsel, and the courts.

On 1 December 2009 the Court of Appeal quashed the convictions but, invoking section 7(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, ordered a retrial. The Appellant appealed that order to the Supreme Court, arguing that a retrial would undermine the integrity of the justice system given the scale of police misconduct.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Court of Appeal may order a retrial after quashing convictions tainted by serious police misconduct.
2. If so, what considerations govern the exercise of that discretion under section 7(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The police misconduct—lying, concealing benefits, and facilitating perjury—was so egregious that any further prosecution would affront the integrity of the justice system.
• The only proposed evidence at any retrial consisted of the Appellant’s post-conviction admissions, which themselves would not exist “but for” the tainted conviction; relying on such “fruit of the poisoned tree” is unconscionable.
• The Court of Appeal failed to give adequate weight to the misconduct and thus reached a decision no reasonable court could reach.

Respondent's (Prosecution) Arguments

• Section 7(1) confers a broad discretion; the Court of Appeal considered all relevant factors and its decision should be disturbed only if plainly wrong.
• The new evidence—voluntary admissions made by the Appellant—is clear, compelling, and untainted in the sense that it was not procured by police pressure or inducement.
• There is a strong public interest in retrying grave crimes such as murder when admissible, credible evidence exists.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

A majority of the Supreme Court (Judges Dyson, Rodger, and Mance) held that the Court of Appeal had applied the correct legal test and had not acted irrationally in concluding that the interests of justice required a retrial. Their key points included:

• Section 7(1) grants a broad discretionary power; appellate interference is warranted only if the decision was plainly wrong.
• The Court of Appeal expressly weighed six factors militating against a retrial—most notably the severity of police misconduct and the “but-for” origin of the admissions—but found that the public interest in prosecuting a shocking murder on the basis of clear, voluntary admissions outweighed those factors.
• The admissions were voluntary and not themselves the product of police pressure; the mere historical connection between misconduct and the circumstances in which they were made did not taint their admissibility.
• Refusing a retrial would not meaningfully deter future misconduct, whereas failing to prosecute an admitted murderer could erode public confidence.

A minority (Judges Brown and Collins) would have allowed the appeal, reasoning that the case fell within a “but-for” category akin to wrongful extradition: without the misconduct, the Appellant would never have made the admissions now relied upon. Permitting reliance on those admissions would, in their view, signal judicial tolerance of egregious police behavior and compromise the integrity of the justice system.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeal’s order for a retrial stands. The decision confirms that, even after grave police misconduct, a retrial may be ordered where:

• New evidence is both compelling and voluntarily obtained; and
• The appellate court has conscientiously balanced misconduct against the public interest in prosecuting serious crime.

While the ruling offers guidance on the discretionary factors under section 7(1), it sets no absolute bar; future courts must engage in fact-sensitive balancing. No new precedent was created on evidentiary admissibility, but the case underscores the judiciary’s reluctance to foreclose prosecution when a fair retrial remains feasible.