Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant surrendered a tenancy of a single-person hostel room on 25 October 2011 because of odours in the building. She then occupied a series of temporary accommodations but was required to leave each of them. On 24 November 2011 she applied to the Respondent Authority for housing assistance under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Interim accommodation was provided until the Authority’s substantive decision.

The Appellant gave birth on 15 February 2012; the original hostel would not have permitted her and the baby to remain. On 1 August 2012 the Authority decided she was homeless, eligible and in priority need, but that she had become homeless intentionally because she had surrendered the hostel tenancy. A review under section 202 upheld that conclusion on 31 January 2013. The County Court and Court of Appeal dismissed further challenges. The present judgment concerns the Appellant’s appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, for the purposes of sections 191 and 193 of the Housing Act 1996, the Respondent Authority was entitled to conclude that the Appellant “became homeless intentionally” when she surrendered the hostel tenancy.
2. Whether the birth of the Appellant’s child constituted an intervening event that broke the causal link between the surrender of the tenancy and her homelessness at the time of the review.
3. Whether, and if so how, the House of Lords’ decision in Din v Wandsworth LBC [1983] 1 AC 657 should be applied or distinguished.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The causal connection required by section 193(1) did not exist because the birth of the baby would have rendered her homeless in any event; therefore she did not “become” homeless intentionally as at the review date.
• The purpose of the intentional homelessness provisions is to prevent queue-jumping, not to penalise applicants whose later involuntary circumstances would have produced homelessness regardless of earlier choices.
• If necessary, the Court should depart from Din to reflect developments in statute and case-law concerning causation.

Respondent Authority’s Arguments

• The decision precisely follows the majority reasoning in Din: once an applicant has intentionally surrendered reasonable accommodation, intentional homelessness persists until settled accommodation is later obtained.
• No later event actually caused loss of accommodation; the baby’s birth was merely hypothetical because by that date the Appellant had already vacated the hostel.
• To allow the appeal would undermine the statutory scheme by permitting applicants to avoid the consequences of intentional acts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The majority (Judge Reed, Judge Neuberger, Lady Hale and Judge Clarke) undertook a detailed examination of the statutory scheme:

• The Housing Act 1996 distinguishes two causal inquiries: (a) under section 191(1) – did the applicant cease to occupy reasonable accommodation because of a deliberate act; and (b) under section 193(1) – is the current homelessness caused by that earlier act.
• The policy objective is to prevent applicants from “queue-jumping,” not to punish them for any past intentional homelessness unrelated to their present need.
• Applying a “but for” analysis drawn from Dyson, the Court asked whether, absent the surrender of the hostel room, the Appellant would still have been homeless at the review date. Because the hostel prohibited mothers with babies, she would have lost that accommodation upon giving birth even if she had never left.
• The birth therefore constituted a genuine intervening event that severed the causal chain; intentionality did not persist once that event occurred.
• Din remains good law on the temporal focus of section 191(1), but it concerned a situation with no actual intervening event—only a hypothetical future eviction. The present facts are materially different, so no departure from Din was necessary.
• Judge Carnwath dissented, emphasising fidelity to the majority reasoning in Din and warning against re-opening a long-settled interpretation.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Appellant was not intentionally homeless for the purposes of section 193(1); the Respondent Authority must secure accommodation for her.

Implications: The decision clarifies that an actual, involuntary event occurring after an applicant’s deliberate act—here, the birth of a child rendering previous accommodation unavailable—can break the causal link required to establish intentional homelessness. While affirming the core principles of Din, the Court limits its reach, emphasising a purposive “operative cause” test aligned with the statutory objective of preventing queue-jumping rather than imposing perpetual penalties for past conduct.