Factual and Procedural Background
Two claimants, hereafter referred to as Claimant A and Claimant B, were convicted of serious criminal offences and had their initial appeals against conviction dismissed. Their cases were subsequently referred to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division ("CACD") by the Criminal Cases Review Commission ("CCRC"), where their appeals were allowed. Although unrelated, their cases were consolidated for hearing due to a common legal issue concerning the refusal by the Secretary of State for Justice to award compensation under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act"), as amended by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 ("the 2014 Act"). The statutory provision defines "miscarriage of justice" as occurring only if a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence.
Claimant A was convicted of murder in 2004 based primarily on identification evidence and an allegedly fabricated alibi. His conviction was quashed by the CACD in 2012 due to new evidence undermining the safety of the conviction. The Secretary of State refused compensation, finding the new evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Claimant A did not commit the offence.
Claimant B was convicted of attempted rape in 1997, with conviction resting on identification evidence. New DNA evidence emerged in 2012 excluding Claimant B as the source of some DNA found on the victim's clothing. The CACD quashed the conviction in 2014 but the Secretary of State refused compensation, concluding the new evidence did not conclusively prove Claimant B's innocence beyond reasonable doubt.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 133(1ZA) of the 1988 Act, as amended, is incompatible with Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") due to alleged violation of the presumption of innocence.
- Whether a declaration of incompatibility should be made pursuant to section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
- Whether the Secretary of State's refusal to pay compensation in Claimant B's case was vitiated by error of law on ordinary public law principles.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimants' Arguments
- Section 133(1ZA) is incompatible with Article 6(2) ECHR because it violates the presumption of innocence.
- Following a declaration of incompatibility, some form of declaratory relief should be issued to mark that the Secretary of State's decision conflicted with Article 6(2).
- In Claimant B's case, the refusal to pay compensation was legally flawed on public law grounds.
Secretary of State's Arguments
- The Supreme Court decision in R (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice is binding authority that Article 6(2) ECHR has no bearing on section 133 of the 1988 Act, including as amended.
- The Grand Chamber decision in Allen v United Kingdom is not binding domestic authority and its conclusion on Article 6(2)'s applicability is erroneous.
- Even if Article 6(2) applies, section 133(1ZA) is not incompatible with it, and there is no violation of the presumption of innocence in these cases.
- The Secretary of State lawfully applied the statutory test in refusing compensation, including in Claimant B's case, where no error of law was made.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] 1 AC 48 |
Article 6(2) ECHR has no bearing on section 133 of the 1988 Act; the refusal of compensation based on statutory test does not infringe the presumption of innocence. |
The court held this Supreme Court decision binding, concluding that the presumption of innocence does not affect the interpretation or application of section 133, including after amendment. |
| R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 AC 1 |
Considered the meaning of "miscarriage of justice" under section 133, including whether it extends beyond proven innocence. |
Used to analyse the scope of section 133 and its interaction with Article 6(2), with differing views noted but no definitive impact on current statutory interpretation. |
| Allen v United Kingdom (2013) 36 BHRC 1 |
Article 6(2) ECHR is applicable to compensation decisions under section 133; concerns about presumption of innocence in post-acquittal compensation proceedings. |
The court acknowledged the Strasbourg Grand Chamber's differing view but found no incompatibility with the presumption of innocence in the statutory scheme as applied. |
| Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] 2 AC 465 |
Rules of precedent and binding nature of ratio decidendi. |
The court reaffirmed adherence to binding precedent despite conflicting Strasbourg jurisprudence, emphasizing the necessity of following domestic appellate authority. |
| CREEDNZ Inc v Governor General [1981] NZLR 172 |
Principles governing relevant and irrelevant considerations in administrative decisions subject to Wednesbury review. |
Applied to assess the Secretary of State's consideration of expert evidence and evaluation of facts in the refusal of compensation. |
| R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66 |
Effect of fresh evidence on safety of conviction and potential for acquittal. |
Referenced in the context of the CACD's reasoning regarding new DNA evidence undermining the safety of Claimant B's conviction. |
| Chaplin v Boyes [1971] AC 356 |
Binding effect of legal propositions where multiple rationales exist among judges. |
Used as an example supporting the court's approach to binding precedent despite differing judicial reasoning. |
| Leutscher v The Netherlands (24 EHRR 181) |
Interaction between Article 6(2) and compensation claims post-acquittal. |
Referenced in the discussion of Strasbourg jurisprudence on presumption of innocence in subsequent proceedings. |
| Sekanina v Austria (1993) 17 EHRR 221 |
Distinction between discontinued cases and acquittals regarding presumption of innocence. |
Used to illustrate the Strasbourg Court's approach to the presumption of innocence in post-criminal proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by examining the statutory framework of section 133 of the 1988 Act, particularly the amendment introduced by the 2014 Act defining "miscarriage of justice" as requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt that the convicted person did not commit the offence. The claimants contended that this statutory test conflicts with the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) ECHR, inviting a declaration of incompatibility.
The court reviewed the facts of both claimants’ cases, noting that in each, the new evidence led to quashed convictions but did not conclusively prove innocence beyond reasonable doubt. The Secretary of State's refusals to award compensation were based on this statutory test.
Turning to legal authority, the court emphasized the binding nature of the Supreme Court's decision in Adams, which held that Article 6(2) has no bearing on section 133 and that the refusal of compensation under the statutory test does not infringe the presumption of innocence. The court acknowledged the divergent view of the Strasbourg Grand Chamber in Allen, which found Article 6(2) applicable to compensation decisions under section 133 but did not find incompatibility with the presumption of innocence in the statutory scheme.
The court explained that it is bound by domestic precedent and must follow Adams despite Strasbourg's differing interpretation. It rejected the claimants’ submission that the minority reasoning in Mullen or the Strasbourg Court's approach in Allen should displace the binding domestic authority.
The court analyzed the statutory language, concluding that section 133 requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that a new fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence, rather than requiring the claimant to prove general innocence. This distinction preserves the presumption of innocence.
Regarding Claimant B’s public law challenge, the court found no error in the Secretary of State’s consideration of expert evidence or application of the statutory test. The Secretary of State was not required to independently re-evaluate the evidence or apply a different standard of proof.
Accordingly, the court found no basis to declare section 133(1ZA) incompatible with Article 6(2) ECHR, nor to quash the Secretary of State’s decisions refusing compensation.
Holding and Implications
The court granted permission to apply for judicial review but dismissed the claims.
The direct effect is that the Secretary of State’s refusals to award compensation under section 133 of the 1988 Act, as amended, stand. The court reaffirmed the binding authority of the Supreme Court in Adams that Article 6(2) ECHR does not impact the statutory compensation scheme and that no declaration of incompatibility is warranted. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing authority to the facts of these cases.