Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff is awaiting trial in the Crown Court charged with an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The prosecution alleges that on 21st March 2002, the Plaintiff, acting with a co-accused, assaulted a victim. The Plaintiff sought judicial review of decisions by His Hon Judge Norris refusing to: direct disclosure of material, adjourn the application to call oral evidence, consider material outside the prosecution's witness statements, and dismiss the charge under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
The Plaintiff appeared before a magistrates' court and was sent forthwith to the Crown Court for trial pursuant to section 51 of the 1998 Act. The prosecution case relies solely on the evidence of the victim, who had made inconsistent statements and was noted in police crime reports to possibly suffer from mental illness. The Plaintiff applied to dismiss the charge on grounds of insufficient and unreliable evidence, relying on unused material disclosed by the police. The application was refused by the Crown Court Judge, who held there was a prima facie case to answer and that concerns about the victim's evidence were matters for trial.
The Plaintiff challenges the Judge's refusal to dismiss the charge, particularly his limitation to prosecution witness statements, refusal to consider crime report material for adjournment, and denial of oral psychiatric evidence. The Crown Prosecution Service seeks to uphold the Judge's decisions, arguing primarily that judicial review is barred by section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
The trial remains adjourned pending the outcome of the judicial review claim.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Judge's decisions refusing dismissal of the charge are matters relating to trial on indictment for the purposes of section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, thus barring judicial review ("the jurisdiction issue").
- Alternatively, whether the Judge erred in law or exercised his discretion improperly by confining his consideration to prosecution witness statements, failing to consider relevant crime report material, and refusing to allow oral psychiatric evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Crown Court Judge's dismissal decision is analogous to a magistrates' function and not a matter relating to trial on indictment, thus judicial review should be available.
- The "sending" procedure under section 51 of the 1998 Act was not envisaged when section 29(3) was enacted, and earlier authorities concerning abuse of process applications do not apply.
- Reliance on the decision in Asil Nadir supports that dismissal applications under similar provisions are judicially reviewable.
- The Judge should have considered crime report material and allowed oral psychiatric evidence, as the Rules permit reliance on "material" beyond strict admissible evidence.
- Failure to do so breaches natural justice and the principle of equality of arms under Article 6 ECHR.
- The dismissal decision requires an assessment of evidence sufficiency before arraignment, which cannot be adequately remedied by the trial process.
Respondent's Arguments
- Section 29(3) bars judicial review of decisions relating to trial on indictment to avoid delay in criminal proceedings.
- The dismissal decision is an integral part of the trial process, affects the conduct of the trial, and arises from the issue formulated by the indictment.
- The Judge correctly confined consideration to admissible prosecution evidence; crime reports are hearsay and not properly relied upon to decide sufficiency of evidence.
- The Plaintiff has adequate remedies in the trial process, including cross-examination and submission of no case to answer, and on appeal if convicted.
- The Asil Nadir decision was wrongly decided and has been overtaken by later House of Lords authority.
- Allowing judicial review would cause unacceptable delay and uncertainty, contrary to the purpose of the 1998 Act procedural reforms.
- The Plaintiff's argument that the Judge acts as a committing magistrate is incorrect; the Crown Court is seized of the matter and decisions relate to trial on indictment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124 |
Test for sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury |
Referenced by the Plaintiff's counsel in submissions on dismissal application |
| R v Shippey [1988] Crim LR 767 |
Test for assessing evidence sufficiency |
Referenced by the Plaintiff's counsel in submissions on dismissal application |
| Re Smalley [1985] AC 622 |
Definition of "matters relating to trial on indictment" for section 29(3) of 1981 Act excluding judicial review |
Used to establish that decisions affecting conduct of trial are excluded from judicial review |
| Re Sampson [1987] 1 WLR 194 |
Orders integral to trial process are excluded from judicial review |
Confirmed that certain trial-related orders fall within section 29(3) exclusion |
| R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] 1 WLR 949 (Asil Nadir) |
Judicial reviewability of dismissal applications under section 6 of the 1987 Act |
Considered but found to be overtaken and inconsistent with later House of Lords decisions |
| Re Ashton [1994] 1 AC 9 |
Stay of proceedings for abuse of process is matter relating to trial on indictment and not judicially reviewable |
Held that such orders affect conduct of trial and are excluded from judicial review under section 29(3) |
| R v Manchester Crown Court, Ex Parte Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] 1 WLR 1524 |
Decision to quash indictment is matter relating to trial on indictment and excluded from judicial review |
Confirmed broad exclusion of judicial review for trial-related Crown Court decisions |
| R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 |
Decision to prosecute not amenable to judicial review to avoid delay |
Supported the policy of avoiding delay in criminal proceedings by restricting judicial review |
| R (Salubi and others) v Bow Street Magistrates' Court [2002] 2 Cr App R 40 |
Application of section 29(3) exclusion to refusal to stay proceedings sent to Crown Court |
Confirmed that such decisions are excluded from judicial review under section 29(3) |
| R v Haye [2003] Crim LR 287 |
Judicial reviewability of mode of trial decisions by Crown Court |
Referenced in relation to judicial review of Crown Court decisions on trial mode |
| Neill v North Antrim Magistrates' Court [1992] 1 WLR 1220 |
Judicial reviewability of committal proceedings by magistrates |
Distinguished as not applying to Crown Court dismissal decisions under 1998 Act |
| R v Bedwellty Justices, Ex Parte Williams [1997] AC 225 |
Judicial review of committal for trial quashing where no admissible evidence |
Distinguished; insufficiency of evidence is a matter for trial, not judicial review |
| R (IRC) v Kingston Crown Court [2001] 4 All ER 721 |
Consideration of evidence context in dismissal applications |
Referenced for the proposition that evidence should be considered in context but not to admit inadmissible material |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first addressed the jurisdictional issue under section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, which excludes judicial review of decisions "in matters relating to trial on indictment" to avoid delay in criminal proceedings. The Court examined prior House of Lords authorities, notably Re Smalley and Re Sampson, which established that decisions affecting the conduct of the trial or integral to the trial process fall within this exclusion.
The Court considered the procedural framework of the 1998 Act, which replaced committal proceedings with a system sending indictable-only cases directly to the Crown Court for trial, with early disclosure and case management. The dismissal procedure under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the 1998 Act requires the Crown Court Judge to determine whether the evidence is sufficient for a jury properly to convict, a decision directly affecting the conduct of the trial.
Applying the three "pointers" from the House of Lords, the Court found that the dismissal decision: (i) affects the conduct of the trial; (ii) is an integral part of the trial process; and (iii) arises from the issue formulated by the indictment between the Crown and the accused. Therefore, it is a matter relating to trial on indictment and not amenable to judicial review.
The Court rejected the Plaintiff's analogy to magistrates' committing proceedings and reliance on the Asil Nadir decision, which was found to be overtaken and inconsistent with later authorities. The Court emphasized the policy of avoiding delay and uncertainty in criminal trials, noting that the Plaintiff's remedies lie in the trial process and appeal.
On the merits, the Court found no procedural irregularity or breach of natural justice in the Judge's refusal to dismiss. The Judge properly confined consideration to admissible prosecution evidence and exercised discretion reasonably in declining to admit or rely on crime report material or to grant an adjournment for psychiatric evidence. The Court noted that concerns about the victim's reliability were matters for trial, where cross-examination and submissions could adequately test the evidence.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The Court held that the Crown Court Judge's decision refusing to dismiss the charge under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is a matter relating to trial on indictment within the meaning of section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and is therefore not amenable to judicial review. Consequently, the Plaintiff's claim for judicial review was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
On the merits, had the Court considered them, the dismissal would also have been refused as the Judge acted lawfully and reasonably. The decision reinforces the principle that procedural decisions by the Crown Court affecting the conduct of trial are insulated from judicial review to prevent delay and ensure efficient administration of justice. The Plaintiff's appropriate remedies lie in the trial process and appeal, not in interlocutory judicial review.