Factual and Procedural Background
The Claimants, as trustees, own Burntbarrow Plantation, a 100-acre woodland on the outskirts of the village of Storth in Cumbria, part of the Dallam Tower Estate. The definitive rights of way map, maintained by Cumbria County Council under section 53 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, showed a footpath running west to east through the northern part of the plantation. Members of the public claimed to have used other footpaths through the woods as of right for twenty years ending in 2007, entering through three points (A, G, and F) leading into the southern woods, converging at point C, then continuing north and forking at D to meet the northern footpath at points E and I. In 2007, the Claimants substantially blocked these three entry points.
Cumbria County Council received thirty-eight User Evidence Forms (UEFs) from members of the public supporting the claim of public use and considered objections from the Claimants. The Council concluded the evidence reasonably alleged rights of way not shown on the definitive map, satisfying the statutory test under the 1981 Act. In June 2013, the Council made a Definitive Map Modification Order (the Order) to show the claimed paths as public footpaths.
The Claimants objected, so the Order was submitted for confirmation to the Defendant Secretary of State. A public local Inquiry was held in March 2015 before an Inspector. The applicants relied primarily on the statutory presumption under section 31 of the Highways Act 1980, which deems a highway dedicated if used by the public as of right and without interruption for twenty years, calculated retrospectively from when use was brought into question (here, summer 2007, so the relevant period was 1987–2007).
The Inspector heard oral evidence from eight witnesses, considered the UEFs and the Estate’s objections, and issued an Interim Decision in May 2015 confirming the Order but excluding the paths from G and F to C. The Claimants challenged this decision under paragraph 12 of Schedule 15 to the 1981 Act and Part 8 CPR, focusing on the lawfulness of the Inspector’s reasoning about user evidence in the early years (1987–1990) of the twenty-year period.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Inspector lawfully and rationally concluded there was sufficient evidence of public user "as of right" throughout the entire twenty-year period (1987–2007) for the footpath from A to C, particularly focusing on the early years (1987–1990).
- Whether the Inspector properly evaluated the User Evidence Forms and oral evidence in assessing sufficiency and continuity of public use.
- Whether the Inspector erred in his treatment of evidence relating to interruptions, intention to dedicate, and the character of the paths in question.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimants' Arguments
- The Inspector was required to be satisfied that evidence of public user "as of right" existed throughout the entire twenty-year period, including the early years (1987–1990), as a statutory pre-condition to confirming the Order.
- The Inspector relied exclusively on oral evidence from eight witnesses but gave no weight to the thirty-eight User Evidence Forms, which was a rational approach but problematic given the insufficiency of oral evidence covering the early years.
- Only two witnesses gave evidence covering the early years for route A-C, and the Inspector wrongly treated the evidence of four witnesses as uniform over the whole period without separately analysing the early years, leading to legally inadequate reasoning.
- The character of the route A-C, its natural obstructions, and the availability of a more commodious nearby route F-C (which was blocked) suggested insufficient user in the early years.
- The Estate’s failure to obstruct route A-C, despite blocking other entry points, indicated that user of A-C was insufficient in the early years and that the Inspector should have considered this in his analysis.
Defendant Secretary of State's Arguments
- The challenge was narrowly based and distinct from the broader objections considered by the Inspector, which focused on whether use was as of right and whether there was interruption or lack of intention to dedicate, not on sufficiency of use.
- The Estate’s case did not contest the quantity or quality of use but rather contended that use was contentious and interrupted, and that there was no intention to dedicate.
- The Inspector’s reliance on oral evidence was rational, and the User Evidence Forms, though considered, were not weighted heavily due to common issues with such forms.
- The Inspector was entitled to conclude that from about 1990 onwards there was sufficient user, and the evidence suggested use began well before that time.
- The Inspector’s conclusions were consistent with the evidence and the way the case was presented, and no material error was made in relation to the early years.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Mann v Brodie (1885) 10 App. Cas. 378 |
Use must be by a sufficient number of people to show public use; the number required may vary case by case. |
The court accepted this as establishing the requirement for sufficient public user to infer dedication. |
| R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2010] UKSC 11, [2010] 2 AC 70 |
Quality of user must be sufficient to bring home to a reasonable landowner that the public asserts a continuous right to use the route; use need not be by the same individuals throughout the period. |
The court applied this principle to assess whether the user was sufficient to establish dedication over the entire twenty-year period. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the Inspector’s Interim Decision focusing on whether the evidence supported a conclusion that the public had used the footpath from A to C "as of right" and without interruption throughout the entire twenty-year period (1987–2007), including the early years (1987–1990).
The Inspector relied primarily on oral evidence from eight witnesses, giving little or no weight to the User Evidence Forms due to their inconsistencies and the general problems associated with such evidence. The court found this approach rational.
Among the witnesses, only two provided evidence covering the early years. The Claimants contended the Inspector treated the evidence of all four witnesses as uniform over the entire period, which was legally inadequate. However, the court found that the oral evidence of these two witnesses, supplemented by indirect evidence from other witnesses and the character of the route, provided a rational basis to conclude that use was sufficient during the early years.
The court noted that the Estate’s case focused on interruptions and lack of intention to dedicate rather than sufficiency of use. There was no specific challenge to the sufficiency of use of route A-C or to the early years as a distinct period during the Inquiry.
Evidence showed that the Estate blocked other entry points (F and G) but not A, suggesting the Estate was aware of use at A-C, reinforcing the conclusion of sufficient user.
The court acknowledged that the Inspector’s reasoning did not extensively address the early years separately, but given the evidence presented and the case focus, this was not an error warranting quashing of the Order.
The court also considered procedural concerns about the late introduction of the User Evidence Forms before it but found no necessity to rule on admissibility as the Inspector’s conclusions were supported independently of these forms.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the Claimants’ challenge to the Inspector’s Interim Decision confirming the Definitive Map Modification Order in relation to the footpath from A to C.
The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the confirmation of public rights of way over the specified footpaths shown on the definitive map with the modifications ordered by the Inspector. No new legal precedent was established, and the decision primarily affirms the reasonableness of the Inspector’s evaluation of evidence and application of statutory principles in this specific factual context.