Jolie v The Crown, England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Ms Natalie Sherborn for the Appellant
Ms Hanna Llewellyn-Waters for the Crown

Judges

MR JUSTICE HUNT
MR JUSTICE PITCHERS
LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY

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Jolie v. The Crown

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 24th August 2002, the Appellant was driving a car in East London when stopped by police due to speeding. The car belonged to a third party. Police officers observed the Appellant appearing to reach under the driver's seat. Upon searching the vehicle, they found scissors on the driver's seat and a kitchen knife under the driver's seat. The Appellant initially denied knowledge of the knife but admitted ownership when confronted. He was arrested and later interviewed, explaining that the car keys were lost and that the knife and scissors were used to start the car's ignition. At trial, the Appellant testified that the knife had been lost prior to the journey and that the scissors were used to start the car on the night he was stopped. The jury convicted the Appellant of an offence under section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for possession of a knife in a public place without good reason. The Appellant appealed on the ground that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the law on "knowingly has with him" and the burden and standard of proof, rendering the conviction unsafe. The appeal was allowed and the Appellant discharged after the Crown declined a re-hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Appellant "knowingly had with him" the knife in a public place contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
Whether the Appellant had proven, on the balance of probabilities, that he had a good reason for having the knife with him in that public place, pursuant to section 139(4) of the Act.
Whether the trial judge correctly directed the jury on the burden and standard of proof relating to possession and the statutory defence of good reason.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
McCalla [1988] 87 CR App R 372	Clarification that possession under section 139 requires "knowingly has with him" to avoid innocent liability.	Used to establish that the jury must be carefully directed on the issue of possession and knowledge.
Cugullere [1961] 45 Cr App R 108	Statutory phrase "has with him" means knowingly has with him.	Supported the requirement for jury direction on knowledge element of possession.
Buswell [1972] 1 WLR 64	Possession continues even if the possessor forgets about the item; possession does not depend on memory.	Considered in defining possession as continuing despite forgetfulness.
Martindale [1986] 84 Cr App R 31	Possession is independent of memory; forgetfulness does not negate possession.	Reinforced the principle that possession is continuous regardless of memory lapses.
Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854	Ordinary words in statutes should be given their natural meaning without judicial gloss.	Applied to interpret "good reason" in section 139(4) as an ordinary phrase for the jury to assess.
DPP v Gregson [1993] 96 Cr App R 240	Forgetfulness alone is not a "good reason" defence under section 139(4); possession must be contemporaneous with the offence.	Cited and critically examined; the court found the reasoning not entirely persuasive and emphasized context.
Manning [1997] EWCA Crim 2562	Forgetfulness alone is insufficient for good reason, but forgetfulness combined with another reason may suffice.	Approved as authority clarifying the meaning of "good reason" and jury directions.
Glidewell [1999] EWCA Crim 1221	Forgetfulness may be relevant to reasonable excuse depending on circumstances; jury must assess context.	Supported the view that forgetfulness can be part of a good reason and must be considered by the jury.
Hargreaves [1999] EWCA Crim 2150	Forgetfulness alone cannot constitute a good reason or reasonable excuse under section 139(4).	Confirmed the legal position on forgetfulness as insufficient defence alone.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory offence under section 139(1) and the defence under section 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It emphasised that possession requires knowledge, referencing established case law to clarify that "has with him" means "knowingly has with him." The court noted that possession continues despite forgetfulness, but forgetfulness alone cannot constitute a good reason for possession.

The court highlighted factual ambiguities in the Appellant's account regarding when the knife was lost and whether he knowingly had it during the journey. It stressed that clear jury directions were essential to address these issues, particularly distinguishing between actual knowledge of possession and responsibility for placing the knife in the car.

Regarding the statutory defence of good reason, the court surveyed relevant authorities, noting the tension between cases like Gregson, which rejected forgetfulness as a good reason, and Glidewell and Manning, which allowed forgetfulness combined with other factors to be considered. The court concluded that the statutory phrase "good reason" requires no special legal gloss and should be left to the jury's common understanding and assessment of facts.

The court found that the trial judge's directions were legally muddled and at times incorrect, particularly in relation to the burden of proof and the treatment of forgetfulness as never constituting a good reason. These errors deprived the jury of the proper legal framework necessary to decide safely on possession and good reason.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and ordered the Appellant's conviction to be quashed and the Appellant discharged, as the conviction was deemed unsafe due to misdirection on key legal issues.

The decision directly affected the parties by overturning the conviction without ordering a retrial, as the prosecution did not seek one. The court did not establish new precedent but reaffirmed existing principles on possession and the statutory defence of good reason under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, emphasizing the necessity of accurate jury directions in such cases.