Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns a renewed application for permission to appeal against an order made by HHJ Kaye QC on 23 October 2007 under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, as amended. The application relates to the estate of the late deceased, who died on 27 March 2005 leaving a will dated 24 January 1996, with probate granted on 18 October 2005. The net estate was valued at £2.2 million. The claimant, who had been the deceased's partner for approximately eight years before his death, made a claim under the 1975 Act.
The trial judge ordered the transfer of a flat and garage to the claimant and directed the executors (defendants) to discharge secured debts or provide funds for the claimant to do so. Additionally, a payment of £240,000 was ordered to the claimant (comprising £200,000 for capitalised income needs and £40,000 to cover an expected landlord claim). The judge dismissed the executors' possession action and found that the claimant had no beneficial interest in the flat by proprietary estoppel or constructive trust. Costs orders were also made.
The executors sought permission to appeal, contending that the order was overly generous and legally incorrect. Permission was initially refused by Rimer LJ on 11 January 2008, who held that the trial judge had correctly applied the law and exercised his discretion reasonably. The executors renewed their application for permission to appeal, which is the subject of this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge erred in law in his approach to the concept of "maintenance" under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 when making financial provision for the claimant.
- Whether the judge was wrong to take into account the claimant's and deceased's allegedly extravagant lifestyle in determining what constituted reasonable maintenance.
- Whether there was a real prospect of succeeding on appeal against the judge’s valuation and exercise of discretion in awarding financial provision.
Arguments of the Parties
Executors' Arguments
- The award was excessive and legally flawed for several reasons.
- The judge erred in law by considering the claimant's and deceased's extravagant lifestyle in determining maintenance.
- The claim under the Act should be limited to reasonable needs rather than providing for an extravagant lifestyle.
- There was a need for clarification from the court on the concept of maintenance in cases involving extravagant lifestyles.
- No challenge was made to the judge’s factual findings, but further evidence might be adduced if permission to appeal were granted.
Court's Response to Arguments
- The judge correctly applied the law and made value judgments within the wide discretion allowed.
- The concept of maintenance must be assessed in light of the claimant’s lifestyle with the deceased, including where that lifestyle was lavish.
- The judge’s assumption about the claimant’s financial needs was reasonable given the evidence before him.
- The application to appeal was effectively an attempt to re-argue the facts, which is insufficient for permission to appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| In Re Coventry [1980] Ch 461 |
Definition and interpretation of "maintenance" under the 1975 Act; maintenance is a limited concept, assessed in all circumstances. |
The court relied on Goff LJ’s explanation that maintenance depends on the facts and circumstances and is not a broad term; the judge correctly applied this principle. |
| Re Dennis [1981] 2 All ER 140 |
Maintenance relates to payments enabling the applicant to meet daily living costs at an appropriate standard. |
The court endorsed Browne-Wilkinson J’s view that maintenance must be appropriate to the applicant’s standard of living, supporting consideration of lifestyle. |
| Myers v Myers & Ors [2004] EWHC 1944 (Fam) |
Clarification and summary of law relating to claims under the 1975 Act, including maintenance and reasonable provision. |
Used to support the principle that maintenance must be assessed flexibly and in context; quotations from other authorities were relied upon. |
| Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 |
Judicial value judgments on family life and maintenance; allowance for reasonable differences of opinion among judges. |
The court accepted Lord Hoffmann’s guidance that appellate interference is limited due to the discretionary nature of such judgments. |
| In Re Duranceau [1952] 3 DLR 714 |
Consideration of the applicant’s "station in life" relevant to maintenance. |
Referred to in support of assessing maintenance according to the claimant’s lifestyle and status. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court emphasized that the 1975 Act requires the judge to determine whether the deceased's estate made reasonable financial provision for the claimant's maintenance, and if not, what would be reasonable in all circumstances. The concept of maintenance is not precisely defined in the Act but has been judicially interpreted as payments enabling the claimant to meet daily living costs at a standard appropriate to their lifestyle.
The trial judge correctly identified the claimant’s status as a cohabitee eligible under the Act and applied the relevant statutory provisions. He properly considered the claimant’s lifestyle with the deceased, including the fact that it was lavish and extravagant, as relevant to what constituted reasonable maintenance.
The judge’s assessment of the claimant’s financial needs, including an assumed figure for her current needs, was justified based on the evidence, despite some evidential imperfections. The court recognized that judges must often make reasonable assumptions where perfect evidence is unavailable.
The appellate court declined to interfere with the judge’s value judgments, noting that such decisions are subject to a wide ambit of discretion and that differing reasonable views can exist. The court found no error in principle or misapplication of the law warranting permission to appeal.
Holding and Implications
Application for permission to appeal refused.
The court held that there is no real prospect of success on appeal as the trial judge correctly applied the law and made reasonable value judgments consistent with established principles concerning maintenance under the 1975 Act. The decision confirms that courts may consider the claimant’s lifestyle, including an extravagant one, when assessing reasonable financial provision. The refusal to grant permission to appeal means the original order stands, and no new precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing legal principles and judicial discretion in this area.