Factual and Procedural Background
This group of appeals and applications for leave to appeal concerned the operation and interaction between section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, particularly regarding the treatment of time spent by defendants in custody on remand and its impact on sentencing. The cases required detailed analysis of statutory provisions governing remand time, recall on licence, return to prison by court order, and imprisonment or detention for public protection. The Crown Court's jurisdiction to correct its own errors and the effect of section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (now section 155 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000) were also examined, with reference to the Court of Appeal decision in Norman.
Legal Issues Presented
- How sections 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 interact and apply to the deduction of remand time from sentences imposed for offences committed before and after 4 April 2005.
- The statutory regime governing remand time, recall on licence, return to prison by court order, and imprisonment or detention for public protection.
- The Crown Court's jurisdiction to correct errors in sentencing orders, particularly relating to remand credit and the 28-day correction period under section 155 of the 2000 Act.
- The application of the statutory provisions in "mixed" cases involving offences committed both before and after 4 April 2005.
- The appropriate exercise of discretion under section 240(4) of the 2003 Act to disapply remand credit in certain circumstances.
- The procedural mechanisms for correcting errors or omissions in sentencing orders relating to remand credit.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Norman [2006] EWCA Crim 1792 |
Clarification of the requirement that courts must expressly order remand time to count towards sentence under s 240; the 28-day limit for correction under s 155; and the consequences of failure to make such orders. |
Used as a key authority to explain the statutory regime on remand credit and the Crown Court's limited jurisdiction to correct errors after 28 days. |
| Stocker [2003] EWCA Crim 121 |
Time spent in custody under recall pursuant to s 39 is not counted as part of the relevant period for remand credit under s 67. |
Applied to confirm that remand time during recall does not reduce sentence for a fresh offence. |
| Howell [2006] EWCA Crim 860 |
Preservation of court powers under section 116 of the 2000 Act for return to prison orders in offences committed before 4 April 2005. |
Confirmed the continuing application of transitional provisions allowing return to prison orders for pre-2005 offences. |
| Menocal [1980] AC 598 |
Affirmed the Crown Court's power under s 155 to vary sentences within 28 days and the importance of finality in sentencing. |
Supported the principle that the 28-day limit for variation is strict and exceptions are limited. |
| Saville [1980] 2 CAR (S) 26 |
Permitted correction of inchoate orders without affecting the substantive sentence beyond the 28-day period. |
Recognized the court's inherent jurisdiction to correct procedural errors without varying the sentence. |
| Michael [1976] QB 414 |
Upheld the inherent jurisdiction of the court to correct orders properly reflecting the sentence pronounced. |
Supported procedural corrections of sentencing records. |
| Stillwell and Jewell [1992] 94 CAR 65 |
Confirmed the 28-day period for sentence variation is not elastic. |
Emphasized the strict time limit for sentence variation under s 155. |
| Soneji and Bullen [2006] 1 CAR (S) 430 |
Addressed the effect of non-compliance with statutory time limits on the validity of confiscation orders. |
Distinguished from s 155; confirmed that the 28-day limit for sentence variation under s 155 cannot be extended by analogy. |
| Annesley [1975] 62 CAR 113 |
Confirmed the Crown Court's common law jurisdiction to adjourn parts of sentencing when necessary. |
Supported the principle that courts may postpone parts of sentencing to await necessary information. |
| Sandwell [1985] 80 CAR 78 |
Established that an increase in sentence prohibited by s 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 is one that increases the total sentence. |
Applied to ensure total sentence was not unlawfully increased in the case under review. |
| Drewett [2006] EWCA Crim 1140 |
Related to remand credit under the 2003 Act. |
Referenced as a current authority confirming principles on remand credit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed statutory analysis of the interaction between the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 regarding remand credit. For offences committed before 4 April 2005, section 67 of the 1967 Act applies, providing an automatic deduction of remand time from the sentence. For offences committed on or after that date, section 240 of the 2003 Act applies, requiring an express court order to credit remand time; absent such an order, no deduction is made.
The court noted the exclusion of police detention from remand credit under the 2003 Act and the importance of the link between remand time and the offence for which the sentence is imposed. The court also examined the statutory discretion under section 240(4) to disapply remand credit where it is just or where rules made by the Secretary of State so provide, emphasizing the need for reasons to be given in open court.
In "mixed" cases involving offences straddling the 4 April 2005 date, the court explained the application of two different regimes and the avoidance of double counting through the 2005 Remand in Custody Rules. The court also analyzed the treatment of remand time for offenders recalled to prison, confirming that time spent in custody under recall does not reduce the sentence for a fresh offence.
The court reviewed transitional provisions preserving powers under the 2000 Act for offences committed before 4 April 2005, including the power to order return to prison and restrictions on consecutive sentences for released prisoners. It highlighted the importance of avoiding double credit in these contexts.
The court emphasized the imperative that no prisoner should be detained longer than justified by the sentence and that remand credit should generally be given unless statutory exceptions apply. It identified common problem areas, such as inaccurate remand credit orders, incomplete orders pending further information, or omission of any direction regarding remand credit.
Regarding corrections of errors or omissions, the court explained the limited jurisdiction of the Crown Court under section 155 of the 2000 Act to vary or rescind sentences within 28 days, with later corrections requiring appeal. The court reaffirmed the importance of finality in sentencing and rejected extending the 28-day limit by analogy to other statutory regimes.
The court also considered the common law jurisdiction to adjourn parts of sentencing to await necessary information, allowing for temporary or provisional remand credit orders subject to later correction without breaching the 28-day limit. This approach aims to balance the need for accurate sentencing with procedural fairness and finality.
Finally, the court reviewed individual appeals, applying the principles developed to specific factual scenarios involving remand credit, recall, return to prison orders, and sentencing for offences committed before and after 4 April 2005.
Holding and Implications
The court held that:
- For offences committed before 4 April 2005, remand time is automatically deducted under section 67 of the 1967 Act without need for express court order.
- For offences committed on or after 4 April 2005, remand time counts only if the court expressly orders it under section 240 of the 2003 Act, subject to limited exceptions where the court may justly disapply such credit.
- The Crown Court’s power to correct errors in remand credit orders under section 155 of the 2000 Act is limited to 28 days from the date of sentencing; beyond that, correction requires appeal.
- In "mixed" cases involving offences straddling the 4 April 2005 date, the court must apply the appropriate statutory regime to each offence and avoid double counting remand time.
- Time spent in custody under recall does not count as remand credit for fresh offences.
- The court may adjourn parts of sentencing to obtain accurate remand credit information and make provisional orders subject to later correction within the procedural limits.
- Failure to address remand credit at sentencing or to provide reasons for disapplying credit will be treated as omission requiring correction by appeal.
- Orders for return to prison under section 116 of the 2000 Act remain applicable for pre-4 April 2005 offences subject to transitional provisions.
Implications: The decision clarifies the statutory framework governing remand credit, ensuring that sentencing courts explicitly address remand time in sentencing decisions to avoid unlawful detention or inappropriate sentencing. It confirms the strict 28-day limit for Crown Court correction of sentencing errors and underscores the procedural mechanisms available to correct omissions or inaccuracies. The ruling does not establish new precedent beyond the statutory interpretation but provides authoritative guidance on the application of existing law, promoting consistency and fairness in sentencing practice.