REGINA v Hopkinson

Factual and Procedural Background

On 11 February 2013, following a trial at the Crown Court in The City, the Appellant, aged 19, was convicted of causing or allowing the death of a child, contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 ("the 2004 Act"). The jury also returned a special verdict that the Appellant had unlawfully caused the injuries from which the child died. The co-accused was Defendant.

The prosecution concerned the death of a baby born on 25 February 2012, who was pronounced dead on 13 April 2012 due to brain injury likely caused by traumatic shaking. The post-mortem revealed multiple older injuries. Only the Appellant and the Defendant could have been responsible, either acting alone or together. Each blamed the other, and evidence suggested that whichever defendant caused the injuries, the other was or ought to have been aware of the serious risk of harm to the child.

The Crown’s position was that it was impossible to determine which defendant caused the fatal injuries, hence both were charged under section 5 of the 2004 Act rather than murder or manslaughter. After the jury convicted the Appellant, jury irregularities emerged, leading the trial judge to discharge the jury from returning a verdict regarding the Defendant, who was scheduled for retrial.

During the trial, a special verdict was proposed and ultimately accepted for the Appellant, despite opposition from the Defendant and the prosecution. The jury returned a guilty verdict against the Appellant but failed to reach a verdict on the Defendant. Subsequently, concerns arose about jury intimidation and improper interference, including reports of jurors feeling threatened and scared. The judge investigated and discharged the jury, concluding the jury process had failed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to safely convict the Appellant of unlawfully causing the fatal injuries to the child under section 5 of the 2004 Act.
2. Whether the special verdict returned by the jury against the Appellant was safe and appropriate given the evidence and circumstances.
3. Whether jury intimidation and improper interference rendered the jury’s verdict unsafe and justified discharging the jury and ordering a retrial.
4. The appropriateness and use of special verdicts in trials under section 5 of the 2004 Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant argued that there was no evidence on which the jury could have concluded that she was responsible for the fatal injuries, rendering the special verdict unsafe.
• The Appellant supported the proposal for the special verdict during the trial.
• The Appellant’s counsel expressed deep concern about the jury intimidation and the failure of jurors to report their anxieties earlier.

Crown's Arguments

• The Crown agreed that there was no evidence to prove which defendant caused the fatal injuries.
• The Crown accepted that the jury’s verdict against the Appellant was unsafe due to the jury intimidation and improper interference that preceded the verdict.
• The Crown did not oppose the appeal against conviction.
• The Crown maintained that it would be neither logical nor safe to uphold the conviction given the judge’s findings about jury intimidation.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant opposed the special verdict during the trial.
• Counsel for the Defendant suggested that jurors be invited to reconsider continuing deliberations despite intimidation, but the judge rejected this.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the evidence and found that while there was sufficient evidence to justify leaving the charge of causing or allowing the child's death to the jury, there was insufficient evidence to safely conclude which defendant caused the fatal injuries. The special verdict was sought due to difficulties in sentencing if both defendants were convicted.

Following reports of jury intimidation and improper interference, including jurors feeling threatened and scared, the trial judge conducted an inquiry and concluded that the jury’s deliberations were compromised. The judge found that the intimidation predated the verdict against the Appellant and therefore the verdict was unsafe. The court agreed that the jury process had failed and that the verdict could not be upheld.

The court emphasised the constitutional principle that the jury's verdict must be respected but noted that the judge’s disagreement with the verdict alone is insufficient to quash a conviction. The decision to quash was based on the unsafe nature of the verdict due to external pressures on the jury.

The court also critically addressed the rarity and appropriateness of special verdicts, particularly under section 5 of the 2004 Act, concluding that special verdicts should be a rarity and are generally inappropriate in cases where the legislation was designed to address difficulties in proving which defendant caused fatal injuries.

The court ordered that the new trial proceed without reference to any special verdicts and that the jury should decide the case on the basis of the indictment and evidence presented.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against conviction is allowed and the conviction is quashed.

The court ordered a new trial on the original count in the indictment, to be held at the Crown Court in The City on 5 June 2013. The Appellant will be re-arraigned on a fresh indictment within one month and will remain on bail under the same terms. A reporting restriction order under section 4(2) of the 1981 Act was made to prevent prejudice to the retrial until the jury returns its verdict.

The decision directly affects the parties by nullifying the existing conviction and providing for a retrial. No new legal precedent was established beyond guidance on the use and rarity of special verdicts, and the court’s approach to jury intimidation and verdict safety in this context.